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PAPER FOR FULL REFEREEING

Developing a Marxian critique for educational change in an economy of uncertainty

Abstract

The intention of this paper is to clarify the nature and development of a contemporary Marxian critique as a practical tool for comprehending the dynamics underlying educational change in a rapidly changing and highly volatile global economy dominated by uncertainty.

In the past the study and development of the Marxian critique, which proved itself to be a powerful analytical method in the hands of Marx, has been the most neglected aspect of his work. It is therefore apposite in circumstances where marketisation is problematic for education's future to present an account of the aims and inner logic of the critique, its formulation by Marx specifically for his analysis of capital and its power and possibilities for understanding, for evaluating from the standpoint of human needs and development and for acting upon the current trends in education towards marketisation.

Such a critique challenges the mainstream, ahistorical ideology that claims there is no alternative to capitalism and the marketisation of education because it is a normative part of social progress to which we have to adapt. In historically critical terms this makes capitalism a closed market regulated economic system constituting a contradiction in relation to the educative human development project.

Introduction

In the increasingly complex and rapidly changing world of global capitalism marked by uncertainty, economic instability and interdependence comprehending such a world is extremely problematic. The problem draws attention to the question of the adequacy of mainstream research methodologies in providing a holistic account of the dynamics driving the quite radical changes now being experienced in almost all sectors of society and on a global scale.

In these circumstances it is vital to reassess approaches to research but particularly with regard to educational change where its marketisation is likely to have far reaching consequences for equity and social justice on which social development depends.

It is therefore important to revisit the Marxian mode of critique which is dedicated not only to understanding the dynamics of social change and development but also to evaluate the direction of that development from the standpoint of the freedom of people to shape their future.

This standpoint challenges ideologies which promote the ahistorical view of globalisation and economic uncertainty as inevitable features of a normative self-correcting, self-perpetuating economic system to which we have no alternative but to adapt.

The aim of the paper therefore is to outline the main features of the Marxian mode of critique as a dynamic tool and method of research for understanding the nature of contemporary capitalism and why and how it is impacting on education, and what effect this will have for the provision of education in the future.

It should be noted that for reasons of clarity and brevity the following exposition is carried out at a high level of generality.

Developing a critique: a tool for social change

Critique within the Hegelian-Marxian frame of reference is more than a method of gathering and compiling information about an existing phenomenon or situation. It is by nature dynamic, a tool or instrument for effecting social change in shaping a society that fulfils social needs. Critique therefore functions as a medium through which the practical realisation of human aspirations for autonomy and freedom can be effected.

This conception of critique has its genesis in the philosophical debates raging in the last quarter of the eighteenth century particularly in Germany and is associated with the work of Kant and Hegel. The debates reflected the growing consciousness that human inventiveness and ingenuity, as evidenced in the emerging capitalist market economy, could shape the world and create a new society that reflected the freedom the new economy seemed to promise, a new society based on humanist values. The debates brought into focus the problem of determining an objective basis on which new theories of knowledge and society could be formulated.

As things stood, philosophers were deeply divided between those who supported rationalist theories of knowledge and those who subscribed to empiricist theories but they held in common an assumption that the intelligibility of the world whether in the objective laws of the universe or in a realm of ideas existed apriori to and apart from the cognitive processes of the human mind.

If human creativity was to be exercised in shaping a new society it had to be free of preconceived modes of thought, a notion which brought into focus the way human beings understand the world they live in. Kant sought to resolve the dichotomy, which reflected the traditional anthropological view of the division between mind and body, by developing a theory of knowledge based on how human beings exercise judgements in the way they grasp the world and act upon it.

The task involved a 'synthesis of elements of rationalism and empiricism through which the objectivity of scientific and commonsense judgements could be defended, and metaphysical speculation rejected' (Benton 1983, p. 247), which meant that judgements required objective validation rather than recourse to principles based on faith or philosophical precepts. Kant, however, failed to overcome the dichotomy because in the final analysis he concluded that we could not know the world as it is in itself because our knowledge is forever a construct of the mind.

Hegel rejected Kant's subjective relativism and took up the challenge of dissolving the dichotomy between subjectivity and objectivity. In this project, however, Hegel retained Kant's positive contribution, the notion of critique as the exercise of critical judgement. In his schema Hegel sought to effect a synthesis by proposing that rationality, or as *Geist* as he

termed it, constituted the generative process and since the world is the outcome of such a historical developmental process it must be intelligible.

The synthesis represented a dynamic union of polar opposites of mind and the world not between two qualitatively different entities but as different aspects of a single generative process. The task for Hegel was to discover through philosophical critique the laws governing the inner dynamics of that process as rationality with reference to the logic of the cognitive process exemplified in human reasoning and the judgements which are the outcome.

While Hegel's schema represented a profound step forward towards conceiving human beings as subjects of their own destiny (Taylor 1975, p. 571), his philosophy remained idealist and in a sense speculative, for human beings had no role as agents, only as vehicles, mediators, in what he considered to be a universal generative process.

The inner dynamics of critique: the Hegelian dialectic

The task of discovering and conceptualising the processes of cognition required breaking through the barrier of the traditional form of logic which was unable to accommodate contradiction. As the very essence of the generative process contradiction expresses itself in the opposition between existing forms of things and the substantive dynamic underlying their change, movement and development.

A logic expressing the process of change had to be formulated which accommodated the essential opposition or contradiction which change necessarily entailed. Hegel arrived at the concept of the dialectic as the logical description of change. In order, however, to render it intelligible he proposed the notion of the Absolute as an organising framework representing the totality of the structural relation expressing the polar opposition between the substantive dynamic and the formations it engenders. These notions are encapsulated in the axiom, the unity of unity and difference, where the first term expresses the totality or Absolute; the second, the substantive dynamic; and the third the form in which the dynamic is represented.

The notion of the Absolute

The idea of the Absolute implies that an account of an object must entail both its substantive dynamics as well as its form. Accepting an object as it is merely describes a moment in its historical development. It explains nothing about how it came to exist, what drives it and where it is tending. The notion of the Absolute as an organising framework therefore assists in grasping the whole truth of a phenomenon (Hegel 1977, pp. 11, 495 §3) which entails both empirical observation as well as analysis to bring to light the substantive dynamic which is beyond observation.

In this way the Absolute functions to conceptualise and explain reality in logical terms reality as it actually is, a rational, organic process in constant motion, transformation and development emanating from the interplay of internal structural interconnections, an interplay governed by objective laws immanent within these interconnections (Engels 1968, p. 408).

Hegel articulates the generative process in typically idealist fashion. Its defining character is that it is powered not by any external, supernatural or mechanical force, but by an inner impulse to develop and realise a potentiality, a creative power, capacity or life force, which are different ways of conceptualising the substantive dynamic. The substantive dynamic or creativity by its very nature is therefore essentially free, autonomous, unfettered and infinite,

a unity. In order to realise its potentiality it must, however, take finite form and recognise that form as its own expression in much the same way that a work of art is recognised as an objective expression of the artist's creativity which involves an intention and its practical expression. Taking definite form causes contradiction because the nature of creativity as infinite creative capacity is at odds with the finite form which is the necessary basis of its existence. For Hegel contradiction, which can be articulated as the contradiction between two imperatives, 'to be' and 'to be free', generates tensions that become the immanent motive force of organic change and development.

The relation between creativity and the forms in which it becomes manifest constitutes the dialectical principle governing the actualisation of creativity through concepts in the world as exemplified in its historical trajectory. In this sense actualisation implies not merely the existence of an object but also the object as an operational part of a whole. For example, a hand can exist as a body part but it becomes actual only in so far as it functions as part of the body. On this account the formations of things while their existence is patently observable their actualisation as a functioning part of a holistic developmental tendency has to be grasped logically.

The dynamism of the relation of opposites is expressed in pairs of opposites such as subject-object, universal-particular, positive-negative, whole-parts, and so on (Wood 1981, pp. 200-201). In other words, the dialectic functions whereby polar opposites shape and are shaped by the back and forth movement each exerts on the other, a process which entails continual dissolution and regeneration. The pairs of opposites form an organic unity because each pole reciprocally sustains and shapes the other in which the creative dynamic is related to the other not as something qualitatively different but as its own creation.

In Hegel's schema human beings are merely spectators in the working out of rationality in the generative process. Nevertheless, because the processes of human cognition are paradigmatic of rationality in which philosophy is the mode through which thinking is transformed into knowledge by means of concepts (Hegel 1975a, p. 4), human beings play a mediating role. In this event the Absolute Idea as the outcome of cognition is objectified in concepts and materialised in the world through the thinking processes and activities of human beings. The world is knowable or intelligible because it can be recognised as the concrete consequence of a rational productive process.

A useful analogy in grasping what Hegel attempts to convey in regard to the Absolute and the logic of the dialectic is presented in Kant's notion (1952, pp. 18-24) of an organism as a self-organised or self-generative being in which every part reciprocally shapes and is shaped by other parts. Each part therefore has a dual function in relation to other parts as well as to the whole as cause and effect, as a formative process and as a condition of existence. A self-directed, self-realising organism is therefore not an aggregate of parts or a complicated machine but an organically functioning unity, something in the nature of an agent in its own development (Taylor 1975, p. 83).

Philosophical critique as method

While philosophy remains in a sense a speculative undertaking, in the hands of human beings as vehicles of the generative process it takes on the character of critique. Concepts achieve practical expressing in the world as the result of human activity. On this account the social world at least is explained as the result of ideas which are the expressions of a universal rationality informing the productive activities of human beings in the shaping of their world. Hegel's account, however, extends to the physical world as the outcome of the Absolute Idea. The idealism in which this schema is framed is the point of departure in the formulation of the Marxian critique.

The method of analysing the internal relations of the Absolute is known as an immanent critique which in the Marxian tradition is regarded as self-validating. There are no external standards against which the object, the result of the substantive dynamic, can be measured. The only admissible measure is its adequacy as an expression of the goal towards which the dynamic is tending.

As the foregoing exposition implies in order to analyse an object in the absolute sense two aspects must be considered: its internal structural relation, and its developmental trajectory.

The internal structural relation must be analysed dialectically, and in this regard Hegel's system of syllogisms is extremely useful though not easy to grasp. There are three factors of the relation which must be examined: the substantive dynamic, the form of the object in which it is manifested, and the basis or context which mediates the relation. In Hegel's system of syllogisms these factors are expressed respectively as Universal, Individual and Particular. Each must be analysed as a relation and then the totality of their relationships as a functioning whole. It is the kind of structuring which is exemplified in the way Marx organised his analysis in the three volumes of Capital.

The analysis then needs to consider the object's development process emanating from its internal relation. Here the account must also be taken of three factors: first, the goal to realise a potentialities which drives its development; second, the process of transition. Two moments in the dialectical process are involved, the negative and positive. In the first movement the dialectic negates or dissolves existing formation which has become a barrier to further development. In the second movement the positive element, the substantive dynamic is preserved and carried forward to be materialised and affirmed in the new formation; and finally, the course of development which describes a hierarchical succession of stages each dialectical linked to the preceding and succeeding stages in a spiral rather than a linear pattern. Each stage constitutes a circular pattern composed of an ascending dialectic, which describes the formation of the object under investigation, and a descending dialectic which reviews what has been formed with regard to its adequacy as an expression of the goal towards which its development is tending.

These two analyses constitute the basis of Hegel's philosophical critique in an extremely simplified form.

The formation of a critique for capital

In formulating his mode of critique Marx remained within the historical frame of reference implied by a dialectical vision of change and development and also in true dialectical fashion retained the positive element, what he considered to be the rational kernel of Hegel's philosophy, its dialectic. However, he vehemently rejected its idealist orientation in which it was developed by Hegel (Marx 1954, p. 29). His task was now to develop a materialist conception of history against which he could critically analyse and evaluate modern bourgeois society with regard to its adequacy as an expression of human aspirations for freedom personal, social and from want, and social development

Steeped in Hegelian philosophy Marx's experience as a journalist proved to be the catalyst which impelled him to develop and adopt a materialist orientation. The actual conduct of the Prussian state so idealised by Hegel as the historical culmination and actualisation of rationality (Marx 1968b, p. 180) had demonstrated it to be permeated with injustice serving the interests not of society as a whole but the ruling class. It set him on a path of developing a critique which would 'not dogmatically anticipate the world' but 'find the new world through criticism of the old' (Marx 1975a, p. 142).

The task had to begin with a critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right from which he concluded that the state has its roots not in the form itself nor in the human mind but in the material conditions of life. On this basis he developed a materialist conception of history which served as a 'guiding thread' in his subsequent studies focussed on bourgeois society. Marx encapsulated his historical standpoint in the famous 'Preface' (Marx 1968b, pp. 181-182).

The materialist conception of history

In summary the materialist conception of history is premised on the material fact that in order to live human beings must produce their means of subsistence, an activity which is conditional upon cooperation with others in a division of labour (Marx and Engels 1976, pp. 31-32). This makes production a social rather than a private individual activity characteristic of the capitalist social relations of production. The driving force underlying this activity and at the same time engendering historical development is the satisfaction of human needs.

Their satisfaction is dependent upon a certain combination of people, resources, tools and expertise, a combination which Marx termed the forces of production, together with a corresponding form of a division of labour which he termed the social relations of production. The relationship between the forces and social relations of production provides the dialectical framework for Marx's analysis of capital.

The process of development occurs when the initial satisfaction of needs engenders new needs and these in turn impel the development of the forces of production and new formations of the social relations of production. The sum total of the relations of production form the material conditions from which arise human consciousness and the social, cultural, political, intellectual aspects and processes which constitute society as a whole. The implication is that in producing for their subsistence needs human beings create their own history (Marx 1968c, p. 96).

From the materialist historical standpoint Marx is able to challenge the ahistorical and idealistic stances of Hegel, his followers, socialist reformers and the political economists who accepted the existing state of affairs as normative. Consequently, for Marx their theories were ideological because each within their discrete, theoretical frames of reference, the philosophical, the social and the economic, had not questioned their assumptions. They did not therefore recognise that their theories were only partial, one-sided accounts of a reality characterised by separations and alienation, a state of affairs which had its objective basis in the economic requirements of a market based and regulated economy.

The task of critique

Critique takes as its subject, not as its object, a phenomenon such as capital, which then determines its operation. In his analysis capital as the driving force and dynamic of bourgeois society becomes the subject and is analysed in terms of the value relation and as the reified materialisation of the real subject, wage labour. In this sense capital is a pseudo subject, yet the power accorded to it by people bestows on it the aura of a subject, hence Marx's characterisation of capitalism as commodity fetishism. Critique has to accommodate this historically specific phenomenon. A universal critique applied to the analysis would not be adequate to the task.

The task of critique for capital is to reveal the nature of the social relations concealed by the surface exchange of commodities. These relations are determined by the form of class division in which a class of workers, the producers of the wealth of society, is forced to sell its labour power to a class of owners of capital, and to forfeit the surplus capital value it produces to the capitalist class which appropriates it as its private property. A characteristic

of capitalism is the separation or alienation and reification that accompanies marketisation which is the only form in which capital can be accumulated and expanded.

In Marx's schema this objective economic alienation is reflected in all sectors of social life under capitalism. It is also reflected in the divisions of the sciences into discrete disciplines which are thereby abstracted from each other and from everyday life. If philosophy is to become an effective weapon in the hands of the workers, the proletariat, to overcome their economic and social alienation it must shed its discreteness and remoteness and as a critique become an instrument of revolutionary change as well as an interpretation of the world (Marx 1968a, p. 30). In this role it must be reintegrated into the productive activity of the workers informing their struggle to overcome the barriers of their exploitation to order to fulfil their social aspirations.

The integration of philosophy as a 'weapon of criticism' (Marx and Engels 1975b, p. 182) on Marx's account is but a stage in its development towards a holistic science, a positive, real and effective Science which incorporates the various fields of knowledge hitherto serving the sectional interests of the capitalist society (See Mészáros 1970, pp. 78-80, 99ff). Within this framework critique is inextricably bound up with the abolition of capitalism's class divisions.:

Where speculation ends, where real life starts, there consequently begins real, positive science, the expounding of the practical activity, of the practical process of development of men. Empty phrases about consciousness end, and real knowledge has to take their place (Marx and Engels 1976, p. 37).

Here Marx makes plain that in a positive science theory and practice are united as 'an ever-renewing praxis', a science of the practical process of the development of human beings (Zeleny 1980, p. 146). In the meantime Marx honed his methodological technique through his critiques of the various theorists.

The formation of the Marxian critique

The rigorous formulation of Marx's method of immanent critique began with his critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right. Adopting a working class standpoint and with a view to exposing the contradictions within the text's own presuppositions Marx attached a critical commentary in a section of text. On his own presupposition that theory emerges from the concrete world Marx assumed that theoretical contradictions reflect those in the real world. He followed this by analysing the presuppositions on which the contradictions were based in order to expose their inner dynamics and therefore their historical development (Oakley 1983, pp. 10, 16-17).

As Marx's worked through his critical assessment, Hegel and followers and the socialists he settled on a study of the political economists who provided him with a detailed analysis of the nature and functioning of the capitalist form of production. In the process Marx perceived that the essential dynamism of the capitalist mode of production derived from the relation between capital and wage labour, not as a normative relation but one historically specific to capitalism (Marx 1964, p. 106).

On this account critique must reveal the one-sided nature of bourgeois ideology which serves to conceal the fetish nature of its primary concern, the accumulation and expansion of capital, and the social relations on which it is based. Furthermore, it must penetrate the ideology of the sphere of exchange, the market place, to discover the true source of capital accumulation in the exploitation of workers in the sphere of production (Raduntz 2001, p. 109ff).

The role of the critique for capital is to make these facts visible by means of a thorough-going analysis, and to enlighten workers that as producers their labour constitutes the real dynamism underlying the apparently independent enterprises. Worker control and empowerment, however, depends on linking critical analysis to informed political action without which transformative change cannot take place. For, as Mészáros (1970, p. 129) points out, economics unmediated by political action cannot anticipate social and economic development and therefore does not have the power to effect change.

The nature of the Marxian mode of critique

In its reversal of Hegel's idealism Marx's critique is not a mirror image slavishly following the Hegelian Logic. The starting point is historical reality from which vantage point the totality in which the historical project is conceived is not a closed but an open-ended system relative to and therefore limited by other totalities. It follows that the logic underlying capitalism for instance is historically specific to that totality, not a logic universally applicable to all.

Furthermore, according to Zeleny (1980, p. 24), the essential dynamics are something historically transitory proceeding through phases of qualitative changes, not as the dialectical order of categories within the Absolute. In relativising the substantive dynamic Marx revolutionises the basis of traditional Enlightenment science.

Because historical reality has primacy over its dialectical comprehension historical development cannot be regarded as having an identical structure. It is rather the case that the dialectic and historical reality are different forms of the same productive process (Zeleny 1980, p. 35). They constitute a dialectical relation, one that is mediated by the mode of critique. It is the source of critique's dynamism. Only after the critique has appropriated the material in detail, analysed its different forms of development, and traced out the inner connections of those forms, in other words, 'if the life of the subject-matter is ideally reflected as in a mirror', can the actual historical development of that subject be adequately described (Marx 1954, p. 28).

In Marx's schema to grasp historical development in its totality, in its truth as Hegel expresses it, is to grasp it in its contradictions, a requirement which entails penetrating surface appearances to discover its essential dynamic for it is here that contradiction can be studied at its source (Marx 1973, p. 31). Through the structural-developmental analyses of capitalism's substantive relation the contradictions become visible.

Regarded as a productive process critique itself can be analysed and its contours sketched in its functioning with reference to the structural-development relation outlined with regard to Hegel's mode of critique.

Critique's structural relation mirrors that of its subject. It possesses the following components: a *subject-object relation*; the *means of producing practical theory*, the structural-developmental analysis; the *materials of the mode of critique*, concepts and categories as totalities; and lastly, the *product*, a practical social theory.

The developmental function of critique includes: the *goal and principle of critique's functioning* which is to assess the adequacy of critique's subject, for example capital in its historical development in fulfilling social needs (Hook 1962, pp. 118-119); the *principle of transition*, critique's dialectic of negativity, to judge capitalism's inadequacies while recognising its positive contribution to social development; the *function of the mode of critique* which encompasses at least two aspects to be considered: the conditions which act as catalyst, and the structuring of an inquiry at the level of historical reality and the level of dialectical logic; and finally, the *course of the mode of critique's functioning* entailing the

starting point in objective reality in which all presuppositions are examined, the process of inquiry, and the presentation of the results (See Marx 1954, p. 28).

Only through a study of critique's operation in Marx's work can its power to explain the complexity of reality be appreciated. In the *Grundrisse* and in *Capital* we have an example of the dialectical nature of the critical inquiry as a whole. Together they form two sides of the structural pattern of discovering the truth of capital through critique. In Marx's notebooks in the *Grundrisse* for example we have the process of inquiry, the ascending dialectic. In *Capital* we have the presentation of the results, the descending dialectic. Both are important in providing a holistic account of Marx's critique of capital.

Developing a Marxian critique for education change

The foregoing discussion has sought to clarify to some degree the nature and functioning of the Marxian mode of critique in order to demonstrate it as a formative and therefore dynamic process. In this regard it reaches beyond mainstream methodologies. Recognition of its power as an agent of transformative change, however, has had a chequered history with the consequence that its development has been somewhat retarded.

In the history of Marxism which has sought credibility in the scientific fraternity the Hegelian contribution to Marx's method of critique has been extremely problematic in its claim as a scientific theory of working class emancipation (Callinicos 1983, p. 8). For in mainstream positivist terms the Hegelian component made the claim somewhat tenuous. On the other hand without it the emancipatory project becomes effectively neutralised.

Marx (1954, p. 29) himself emphasised the debt he owed to Hegel in formulating the critique for his analysis of capital, and Lenin (1974, p. 180) among a few other Marxists has emphasised that Marx's analyses could not be interpreted correctly without an understanding of Hegel's dialectic. The issue is complicated by the fact that of all the problems associated with Marx's economic theory the most neglected has been his method in its relation to Hegel (Rosdolsky (1977, pp. xi-xii)).

There can be no doubt that Marx's historical standpoint is not an easy one to hold with any consistency because history presents a moving target, as it were. The problem has not been eased by the absence of a readily accessible account of the Marxian historical standpoint and its mode of critique which would be helpful for those not totally immersed in Marx's work. It may clarify why few educators have ventured to develop for education.

In contemporary capitalism where education is being radically restructured to support the market economy the development of such a critique is of vital importance for analysing and evaluating the adequacy of education if it is marketised and subordinated to the needs of capital in relation to its role in promoting human development.

Critique's education project can be outlined and structured according to the three aspects: how it came to exist, what drives it and where is it tending. First, it is important to trace the conditions which have given rise to and can explain the development of national systems of education. It is apparent that these systems have now reached their use-by date and are proving a barrier in capitalist terms to the development of its forces of production to which education has an important input. As fast capitalism it now needs an education system which is more flexible and responsive to its needs.

Second, this raises the question what drives education towards marketisation and it is apparent that the dynamics of its development lie within the capitalist economy. Educational analysis is then required to explain why at this juncture in capitalism's history it requires

education to be marketised, and what are those aspects of education which can support economic recovery from its current crises. From the perspective of capital education supports technological innovation on which the capitalist economy depends, even more so now. Education also has potential not only as an enterprise in its own right but also as a consumer of educational goods and services. It can also assist in crisis management through researching trouble spots in education and in assisting in warehousing the unemployable and in the rotation of people through their circuit of unemployment and employment.

Lastly, the question where is it tending is answered by discovering what the effects of education's marketisation are likely to be. With reference to what has occurred in the material production sphere and to the uncertainties which surround capitalism's current crises, it becomes apparent that the trends in education are hardly conducive to social development.

These questions are historical in nature but in terms of logic education must be analysed from at least three perspectives: in its *universal* perspective as for instance has been outlined above; in its *particular* contexts where government policies and issues of gender, racism, equity curricula can be examined; and in the *specific* perspective of a single school or sector. None of these perspectives have priority over others. All are interrelated and constitute a totality of the education enterprise and provide a wider standpoint from which to judge the trends in education.

These aspects of a Marxian critique sketch a project for educational research of huge proportions, a project which set out to challenge the notion that capitalist is here to stay. The study of contemporary capitalism demonstrates that its contradictions, which derive from its class division, are responsible for its endemic crises which are occurring in ever rapid succession. It makes the future uncertain and problematic but one which the Marxian critique is designed to help shape towards a more humane society..

Conclusion

Grasping the nature and function of the mode of critique is no easy matter. Nevertheless, we need the explanations it offers in order to understand the dynamics driving the contemporary capitalist market economy which calls for education's marketisation and subordination to market forces.

If a Marxian critique is to be developed for education its principles must be engaged as an education research tool which challenges the notion that there is no alternative to capitalism and seeks to realise the values of equity and social justice not only in education but also in society at large for both education and the wider society are integrally linked in the future towards which we are tending..

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