Top of their class?

On the subject of 'Education' doctorates.

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This paper was written in response to an invitation by Stephen Ball and Maria Tambouku to write a chapter for their book, Dangerous encounters: genealogy & ethnography. Potential contributors to this collection of readings were thereby addressed as researchers who straddle the binary 'genealogy/ethnography'. This implies an opposition or contradiction and those who do both as engaged in a 'dangerous liaison.' But the subject 'Education' has always been theoretically promiscuous and my own research tool-kit includes concepts, strategies and techniques pulled from phenomenology, neo-Marxism, and feminism as well as Foucaultian post-structuralism. I am aware of their diverse disciplinary histories, their classifications on different library shelves, and the sometimes acrimonious debates between their protagonists in the pages of texts or on the conference floor. But for me it 'works' to draw simultaneously on a theorist (Foucault), who posited the 'death of the subject' and to employ an ethnographic life-history interviewing technique that documents how individual human subjects 'make meaning' of their experiences and perspectives.

Although my major research projects over the past twenty years were designed as self-contained, when I look back over them, they all coalesce around Foucault's core question: "how are the human sciences possible, and what are the historical consequences of their existence? " (Gordon, 1980, p.236). More specifically, each has explored aspects of what makes 'Education' as a 'human science' possible, and what have been the historical consequences of its existence. In pursuing such themes, all have combined a discourse analysis of policy and other documents with a qualitative component of life-history interviews. Although I might not have used this term at the time to describe a particular project, in retrospect, I see that I have been 'doing genealogy' for over twenty years. Foucault defined it thus: "Let us give the term genealogy to the union of erudite knowledge and local memories which allows us to establish a historical knowledge of struggles and to make use of this knowledge tactically today" (Foucault, 1980, p. 83).

As the invitation to contribute to this volume arrived, I was in the process of completing a project on the first fifty years of PhD degrees in Education in my country, New Zealand. This included a genealogical history of Education as 'erudite knowledge', which required what Foucault described as the "grey, meticulous and patiently documentary" scrutiny of archival records (Patton, 1979, p. 143). I had compiled quantitative data on the numbers of Education doctorates, their growth over the years and the distribution of graduates across the six universities that had supervised doctoral theses in Education. I had engaged with the problem of typologies by deconstructing previous 'maps' of educational research - other writers' conceptual literature reviews, the bibliographic classifications of librarians, the paradigmatic shifts identified by historians, and the categories used in the reports of professional research bodies. I crafted, and at the same time made problematic, alternative groupings of topics, methods and themes with which to read what the interviewees told me about their thesis topics and questions.

To explore 'local memories', I had interviewed 57 of the 183 who had graduated with Education doctorates between 1948 and 1998. These interviews had explored questions of how and why the interviewees had come into doctoral study, what their experiences of supervision had been like, how they had made time and organised space for doctoral studies in their domestic and working lives, their experiences of the examination, and the personal and professional consequences of their doctoral degrees. To disseminate my resulting 'historical knowledge of struggles' amongst the interviewees themselves, and to current doctoral supervisors and candidates, I wrote a monograph that was published by, and distributed free of charge to members of, the New Zealand Association for Research in Education (Middleton, 2001a). And to 'make use of this knowledge tactically today' I created a CDROM with visual, 'comic strip' presentations of the graduates' 'local knowledges of struggle' as a toolkit for workshops on thesis supervision (Middleton, 2001b).
This chapter is organised in four parts. It begins by deconstructing the assignment the editors have asked me to address in order to introduce my orientation to the 'subject' of Education. Second, dissonances and affinities between life-history and genealogy are explored. In the third section, I review my own use of life-history interviews to help me 'do' genealogy. Finally, I take one small theme from my project - interviewees' encounters with neo-Marxism - to show how, when woven together, my methodological tool-kit is consistent with the approach Foucault called genealogy.

On the subject of 'Education.'

Writing this chapter makes visible my own location within the phenomena that are my objects of study, namely the webs of power in which, as Educationists (and/or sociologists), we are enmeshed. I live, research and write in New Zealand and my invitation to participate in this forum both reflects, and reproduces the global nature of academic disciplines (Scott, 1998). To use Foucault's metaphor (1980b, p. 98), erudite knowledges are 'net-like' - a discipline's conceptual resources, its substantive 'content,' and the reputations and standing of its participants circulate between the threads of academic books, the internet, scholarly journals, disciplinary conferences, professional organisations, and pedagogical practices. While idiosyncratic ideas and specific topics arise within local conditions, a 'human science's' main themes, theories and specialised languages are "not bound to geographical landscapes and physical points of reference" (Popkewitz & Brennan, 1998, p. 12). The invitation to contribute to this volume interpellates, or 'hails' its contributors as academic writers/researchers; it locates, or identifies us as belonging to the same community of scholars - addresses us as having common theoretical, methodological, and professional interests. In doing so, it evokes from us a shared coded language; elicits our chapters' compliance to the publisher's house referencing style; and limits their length to 7,000 words.

Scholarly works are often assumed to be creations of disembodied thinking minds - grounded in Enlightenment "conceptions of originality and of the bounded individual with property in the self" (Haraway, 1977, p. 72). Yet academic writing also requires that one "cites the conventions of authority" (Butler, 1993, p. 13). As Foucault expressed it (1977, p. 222), "The Enlightenment, which discovered the liberties, also invented the disciplines." Like the judge, the researcher-writer "does not originate the law or its authority; rather, he 'cites' the law, consults and reinvokes the law and, in that reinvocation, reconstitutes the law" (Butler, 1993, p. 107). Even ground-breaking original works of scholarship acknowledge and engage with the conventions, while at the same time challenging or subverting them. In 'citing the law' of the discipline or field - by speaking its language and engaging with its stylistic conventions, a researcher/writer not only produces, but is also produced - as an educational psychologist, sociologist, genealogist, ethnographer, etc.

Becoming an academic involves both an intellectual mastery of knowledge and a psychological process of identification (Green and Lee, 1999). As Butler argues (1992, p. 105), academic "identifications are never fully made; they are incessantly reconstituted and, as such, are subject to the volatile logic of iterability." Scholars need continual, and repeated, recognition of their work to maintain academic identity. For example, our draft chapters for this book are subjected to the editors' gaze, required changes made or disputed, then the edited volume evaluated against publishers' academic, commercial and stylistic criteria. Once published, academic books assume 'careers' of their own. They may fail to catch moods of the moment and lie dormant on warehouse shelves, or they may become subject to critical attention, for example by being positively or negatively reviewed, or debated, in journals. They may be recognised as authoritative texts - much cited in the works of others. They may be recommended to students, or prescribed as set readings. As our employers, academic institutions allocate status and resources according to 'performance indicators' such as the numbers, types, and rankings of our publications. In our
wider professional networks, status and advancement are affected by "reputational capital" which is sustained not only through the mediation of the printed word, but also through the "reputational trading pits" of international conferences, where "gossips gauge the merits of the 'emerging star', the 'has been', or the 'never was..." (Luke, 1997, p. 56).

This frames my study of the process of becoming a doctoral student and gaining a doctoral degree. As Green and Lee have asked (1999, p. 207), "What does it mean to be a postgraduate student in education - that is, to be pursuing advanced research training in education as a field of study? ... What is involved in becoming, as it were, 'subject-ed' to education?" The notion of 'subjectivity' is useful because it draws together the 'discipline', those who engage with it (students and supervisors), and the regulations and conventions that govern it.

Becoming identified with the discipline or subject in an epistemological sense involves mastering its content and methods. Within university bureaucracies the term 'subject' is sometimes also used in an administrative sense - students enrol in a 'subject', major in a subject. The administrative or organisational strategies of working and studying in a subject involve negotiation of collegial relationships, departmental resources, and professional networks since, "to understand knowledge, it is necessary to understand the institutions in which it is produced" (Gibbons et al, 1994, p. 82). A student's intellectual disciplinary affiliation and psychological sense of 'subject loyalty' may intersect in complex, and sometimes contradictory ways with the spatial, demographic, administrative, and financial categorisations of organisations.

The term 'subject' is also used in relation to (but not entirely analogously with) 'the individual.' This individualistic notion of the subject is double-sided. In the first sense, it is similar to the grammatical subject of a sentence - the (autonomous) actor or agent. As the subjects (or authors) of our thoughts or behaviour (Foucault, 1985), we act upon the world - choose our topics and methodologies and freely engage in research projects. Conversely, subjectivity is also used in a passive sense - doctoral students are 'subject to' supervision, to degree regulations, to the conventions of thesis writing within a field, and to examinations (Foucault, 1977).

Judith Butler urges us to distinguish between the embodied individual (or human person) and the 'subject', arguing that the latter is "a linguistic category, a place-holder, a structure in formation. Individuals come to occupy the site of the subject..." (1997, p. 10). The 'relentless erudition' of genealogical research (Patton, 1979, p. 144) can reveal the historically and spatially specific 'sites' an embodied researcher might 'occupy' - for example 'a student as doctoral material'; the academic as 'rationally autonomous individual,' or the subject-position of 'neo-Marxist sociologist.' In his later works, Foucault wrote that " to analyse what is termed 'the subject', it seemed appropriate to look for the forms and modalities of the relation to self by which the individual constitutes and recognises himself qua subject" (Foucault, 1985, p. 6). The 'forms and modalities' relevant to my study include the conditions of possibility for what counts, and does not count, at a particular time and place as research. They include formulas, texts, policies, and systems; and they bring into focus the enabling and constraint of researchers' desires, practices and pleasures.

Foucault's genealogies were archival and did not extend to living persons. His forms and modalities of subjectivity are not analogous with the embodied 'person'. To explore the experiences and perspectives of living persons, one needs access to the tool-kit of the ethnographer.
Researching lives

Foucault did not do ethnography; his data were historical documents. The archives of prisons, asylums, clinics etc provided resources for his explorations of the 'networks of writing' that diagnosed, classified, and recorded (Foucault, 1977, p. 189). His 'data' included textbooks for professionals, manuals for administrators and the 'case records' of those who were objects of their surveillance, confinement, or regulation - as patients, prisoners, pupils, citizens, etc. His focus was not on 'living breathing persons', but rather on the 'subject-positions' that apparatuses of administrative and professional surveillance, regulation and monitoring made available:

This is what I would call genealogy, that is, a form of history which can account for the constitution of knowledges, discourses, domains of objects etc, without having to make reference to a subject which is either transcendental in relation to the field of events or runs in its empty sameness throughout the course of history (Foucault, 1980b, p. 117).

Such concerns may seem the antithesis of life-history, a term that may seem to imply biographical accounts of autonomous individuals engaged in processes of 'development.' In her foreword to a recent collection of autobiographical accounts by educational researchers, Catherine Bateson refers to:

... stories of the evolution of curiosity and attention, for research is one of the activities through which we continue the processes of learning and exploration so crucial in childhood, transformed to offer new knowledge to the society rather than knowledge new only to the individual. It is crucial to the field of education to understand how curiosity can continue to develop in adulthood (1997, p.i).

Bateson's reference to 'stories of the evolution of curiosity and attention' could be read as implying a foundational theory of 'stages' of emotional or intellectual development.

Clinical case studies of individuals form the very foundations of 'erudite' developmental psychologies, including psychoanalysis. The very term 'life-history' can be said to suggest chronology, or linearity. Similarly, some of the 'systems of thought' of social theory (such as Marxism) defined evolutionary 'stages' in social and economic history. Foucault was critical of the teleological assumptions that transected these human sciences:

I don't believe the problem can be solved by historicizing the subject as posited by phenomenologists, fabricating a subject that evolves through the course of history. One has to dispense with the constituent subject, to get rid of the subject itself, that's to say, to arrive at an analysis which can account for the constitution of the subject within a historical framework (1980b, p. 117).

If genealogy requires that we 'get rid of the subject itself' and life-history involves individuals' 'stories of the evolution of curiosity and attention', does a methodology that braids these together necessarily unravel - collapse into oxymoronic incoherence?

A meeting point can be found in Foucault's (1980b, p.81) requirement that genealogy "ask not the big theoretical questions of what is power? And where does power come from?" Rather than construct a systematising theory, or 'shoe-horn' data into theoretical categories, social researchers are urged to describe rather than explain: "It is not theory, but life that matters, not knowledge but reality, not books but money etc" (1980b, p. 81). Genealogy
should limit itself to "the little question, What happens?" (p. 81). It is concerned with how, rather than why, things happen. Describing genealogy's techniques of investigation as "flat and empirical," Foucault saw it as enabling the study of a "complex configuration of realities" (p. 81). Consistent with this focus, life-history interviews can help us access 'subjugated knowledges' - "those blocs of historical knowledge which were present but disguised within the body of functionalist and systematising theory ..." (Foucault, 1980b, p. 81).

Genealogists are fascinated by the details, the minutiae of the management of everyday life. As already noted, what interested Foucault were the 'forms and modalities' for such self-monitoring and regulation - the 'external' historical conditions, and discursive framings, of its possibility. What life-history interviews can add are stories about 'self-regulation' told "from within." In his later work, Foucault referred to the 'arts of existence':

Those intentional and voluntary actions by which men not only set themselves rules of conduct; but also seek to transform themselves, to change themselves in their singular being, and to make their life into an œuvre that carries certain aesthetic values and meets certain stylistic criteria (Foucault, 1985, p. 10).

My interviews included how these New Zealand doctoral students had come to 'set themselves rules of conduct' in their research, writing, domestic and professional lives, the changes each student had to make in his or her 'singular being' in order to produce a scholarly work (an œuvre, the thesis) and to 'style' their scholarly life.

A genealogical inquiry that includes life-history interviews can reveal the ways we craft ourselves, and simultaneously 'are crafted', as academic researchers/writers - the "modalities of the relation to self by which the individual constitutes and recognises himself qua subject" (Foucault, 1985, p. 6). As Britzman asks, "How does education live in people and how do people live in education?" (1998, p. 5). How do Education academics account for our desire to do research? How do we describe the ways "we come to attach ourselves to as well as to ignore particular ideas, theories and people" in educational theory and research? (Britzman, 1998, p. 16). How do we describe what drives us to see projects through to completion? Life-history interviews can help the genealogist write what Foucault called a "history of desiring man" (1985, p. 6).

Writing a history of 'desiring researchers' need not involve case studies of individual 'development.' I have argued that Education 'crafts' us by inviting us 'inside' its systems of thought, and subjecting us to professional surveillance and administrative regulation. The idea of 'subjection' collapses the binary between what is commonly thought of as the 'psychological' and the 'sociological.' As Butler puts it (1997, p. 1), " Subjection is paradoxical. To be dominated by a power external to oneself is a familiar and agonising form power takes. To find, however, that what 'one' is, one's very formation as a subject, is in some sense dependent upon that very power is quite another." How then, can life-history interviews be used in such an inquiry?

True confessions

I began this paper with a discussion of how, as human scientists, our thoughts, desires, emotions, and professional status are interlaced through our discipline's nets, knots and nodes. The 'gathering' (or, rather, 'generation') of our data, the mode of analysis, and the forms our research takes are also "an engagement with the realm of discourse and inevitably bound by its rules and limitations" (Harvey, 1996, p. 113). Foucault used the metaphor of the 'confessional' to describe the generation of information about individuals in professional or administrative settings. In a research interview, as in a clinic, "the speaking
subject is also the subject of the statement" (Foucault, 1980a, p. 61). The words of the "one who speaks" are "assimilated and recorded" by the clinician or researcher who then 'deciphers' what is said (p. 61) according to what Alfred Schutz described as "the procedural rules of his science" (1970, p.12).

An interview narrative, then, is 'evoked' by the interviewer's 'mode of address' to the interviewee. Because most of the doctoral graduates worked in higher education, I was able to invite most of them to participate in this project via e-mail, although in the case of one or two of the retired informants without e-mail, I had made the initial contact by telephone. The overall purpose and scope of the project was explained in the e-mail (or, in the case of those without e-mail) in a printed version. Each interviewee filled in a brief biographical form prior to interview. Because I was interested in notions of 'cultural capital', I requested information on each interviewee's father's and mother's (or care-givers') levels of education and occupation. In addition, interviewees provided details of the schools they had attended as pupils; the age at which they had left school; their occupations upon leaving school; and details of their higher education. They identified their thesis title; their years of PhD enrolment and graduation; and filled in an outline of their subsequent career - many provided me with a full printed curriculum vitae. I began each interview with a statement like the following example from one of the transcripts:

In a disciplinary sense this project sits between the sociology of knowledge and oral history. It's part of a general interest in education as a field of academic study and how it sits in the universities ... I'm interested firstly in epistemological questions - what kinds of research questions, what kinds of theories, and traditions informed your research? Secondly there are the more experiential dimensions of why you did a PhD, what it was like doing the research and doing the thesis and the conditions under which you did it. There is the pedagogical question of the supervisory relationship. I am also interested in how you organised your life - at home and at work - when doing your thesis. And what has having a doctorate meant?

Interviews were loosely structured (chronologically) in the sense that I asked people to start with their childhood and schooling. However, stories do not follow linear paths - people follow threads or leap across themes. I guided the conversation by means of prompts rather than lists of questions, using the 'scaffold' identified in the invitation to participate and limited the length of each interview to a maximum of one 90-minute audiotape. In these ways I 'evoked' the interview narratives. But interviewees also 'shape' data. What interviewees tell interviewers depends, among other things, on their interpretations of the questions asked; their readings of the scholarly fields and institutional or professional 'normativities' that shape the project; their sense of trust (or otherwise) in the interviewer; their willingness or ability to delve into what can at times be emotionally fraught (or blocked) memories; how they are feeling at the time of the interview - stressed, pressed for time, preoccupied, relaxed, etc.

Professional typists transcribed the interview tapes. Transcribing transforms speech into text - organises and punctuates. I then added a further 'layer' to the production of my 'raw' data by reading each typed transcript while listening to the tape, correcting any errors of spelling, and changing punctuation that felt wrong to me. I returned my edited version of the transcript to the interviewee with an invitation to comment, and to edit the story he or she wanted to tell. Further changes were made if requested and a final corrected copy sent to each interviewee as a personal record. After viewing the transcripts, many agreed to allow use of their real names in the sections on thesis topics and methods. However, false names were used in the chapters on 'private' matters such as family life, collegial and supervisory relationships.
My framing of the interviews, and analysis of the data rested on the assumption that a thesis project is neither the production of an originary thinking mind; nor is it a conditioned subservience to the kinds of questions and recipes in academic books or in disembodied ideas. In qualitative research, the personal is not the same as the private - "the personal is often merely the highly particular" (Williams, 1991, p. 93).

The sense we researchers make of interviewees’ life-history accounts - and the narratives we then produce for publication - are threaded with ideas and orientations from the texts available to us at our time and place, the texts that 'attract' us, the texts we reject. They are coloured by the constraints and possibilities of the fields of study that inform our theoretical and methodological orientations. They are also produced within the ethical and other ‘normativities’ to which our professional and institutional locations commit us - in the case of this project I was researching and writing about the very networks of collegial relationships in which my own professional activities are enmeshed. And they surface from the emotional underworld of researchers' own psyches.

My approach was not that of case studies of individuals. Instead, I 'read across' multiple texts - hundreds of pages of interview transcripts alongside, and in interaction with, my discourse analysis of previous historical and bibliographic classifications of Education as erudite knowledge. I entered the edited transcripts into a NUD*IST computer data-base which I created in a form that enabled multiple readings 'across' transcripts. I read them, for example, historically (according to the years in which the thesis was produced). I read them epistemologically (by thesis topic, theoretical or methodological orientation, and sub-discipline). And I read 'across' them according to the questions I had asked (about childhood and schooling, becoming students of Education, enrolling in a doctorate, supervision, domestic life etc). My objects of analysis included discursive, or paradigmatic, movements within, between and across the knowledge boundaries drawn by historians, bibliographers, literature reviewers, and administrators. I was concerned with the demarcation and management of time as well as the geographical dimensions of thesis work - its occupation of domestic, familial, romantic and collegial spaces.

Individuals do not appear in the resulting monograph as coherent biographies - fragments of their interviews are scattered across its chapters (Middleton, 2001a). There is a chapter on 'Candidates and questions' that explores the genesis of research questions. There is a chapter that 'maps' their thesis topics, disciplines and methods. Another chapter addresses pedagogy - the supervisory process. There is a chapter on managing time and space at home and at work, and another on the examination and consequences of the doctorate. Real names are used in the chapter on thesis topics, but false names in the chapters on personal matters. To protect anonymity, some interviewees appear with different false names in different places. Foucault's (1980b, p. 117) "subject that evolves through the course of history" therefore is largely 'dissolved' (or dispersed) by this method.

This enabled a focus on the experiences and perspectives of doctoral study across 'fields' and over time. By scanning 'across' individual narratives - reading 'horizontally' rather than, (as in a case study), 'vertically' or 'developmentally', I could undertake an "analysis which can account for the constitution of the subject within a historical framework" (Foucault, 1980b, p. 117). It offers a view 'from the bottom up' - an 'ascending' analysis of power. It brings to the surface the 'underside' of erudite knowledge including its 'abject zones' - such as the 'bodily' matters of changing the baby; typing in the garden shed; being inspired while going on runs (Butler, 1993). In short, its object of analysis is the "union of erudite knowledge and local memories" that is the hallmark of genealogy (Foucault, 1980b, p. 83). I shall now demonstrate ways of working with fragments from interview transcripts, taking as my example connections drawn by the interviewees themselves between their (subjugated)
personal knowledge of social class and the (erudite) knowledge of neo-Marxist sociology of education.

Classy knowledge

Neo-Marxism is one of the systematising theories that has influenced teaching and research in Education, especially the sociology of education. It was particularly strong in Britain, Australia and New Zealand throughout the 1980s (Middleton, 1989) and many of the interviewees spoke of their encounters with it at this time.

As discourses, theories like neo-Marxism are more than abstractions in texts; they are ‘productive.’ They “express human thought, fantasy and desire. They are also institutionally based, materially constrained, experimentally grounded manifestations of social and power relations” (Harvey, 1996, p. 80). Adding an ethnographic component to an archive-based genealogy of neo-Marxism's entanglement in institutional power-relations makes visible a dimension often missing in such work, namely, "pleasure, plot, moving and being moved, metaphor, cultural artefacts, audience engagement and interaction" (Ellsworth, 1998, p. 21). As Fanon wrote, "What are by common consent called the human sciences have their own drama" (1986, p. 22).

Britzman notes that "What attaches the psychical to the social and the social to the psychical are matters of love and hate in learning" (1998, p. 8). As with other strands of Education discussed in the interviews, neo-Marxist sociology had elicited some strong reactions. While some embraced it passionately; some were angry with, and others repelled by it. In their accounts of coming across neo-Marxism at university, as in the case of other theories, some interviewees drew connections between their responses to it and their childhood experiences of social 'classification'.

As noted above, prior to the interview each interviewee had provided basic demographic information. Consistent with the recorded demography of populations of student and practising teachers (from whose ranks most Education academics emerge), the majority described families of origin that - allowing for the changing status of occupations over the 50 years studied - would be (or would have been at the time) classified as working-class or lower middle-class (Middleton, 2001a, p. 33, note 1). Social-scientific terms like 'race', 'class', and 'gender' have entered the administrative apparatus and the commonsense vocabularies of populations, where they become reified and assume a life of their own: "The bureaucracy of statistics imposes not just by creating administrative rulings but by determining classifications within which people must think of themselves and of the actions open to them" (Hacking, 1991, p. 194). Many of the interviewees used the terms 'class', 'gender', 'race' etc spontaneously to categorise aspects of their childhood and later educational experiences.

During the interviews their categorisations of their 'class' or 'socio-economic' status did not always rest at the level of such statistical categories. For many, these words were not mere statistical labels, but signified deep phenomenological, or psychological meaning. For example, Simon had taken up sociology of education as an adult student. A post-war baby-boom child, he spoke of a working-class family of socialist views. He related this back to his interest in economics in high school. And, linking further back, he traced threads between his economics at school, his family's class location and socialist politics, and his sense of marginality as a working-class boy in a middle-class school:

I loved Economics. I thought here was a vehicle with which one might change the world a bit. I saw that Economics was a tool for shaping policy. My family was a working class family and a Labour Party family. I remain a member of
the Labour Party to this day - not without some misgivings along the way! So I had an initial sort of socialist economic perspective on life. I enjoyed it at school. I had an excellent teacher, though I didn't admit to that for a long time because I came to see the school I went to as a bastion of middle class values. I had a difficult time there in some respects, but it changed the way I saw things.

Economics - and later, 'leftist' sociology - 'hailed' Simon as 'insider.'

Judith was also working-class and was "a scholarship child at a private boarding school." She explained that "people were very nice to you, but they'd say things like, 'We're going out on the boat, but we didn't invite you 'cause we knew you couldn't afford it.'" As Harvey says (1996, p.103), "The margin is not simply a metaphor, but an imaginary that has real underpinnings. From that location a powerful condemnation of supposedly emancipatory discourses shaped at the centre can be launched". As a university student Judith would critique hegemonic liberalism and embrace Marxist thought. However, the link between what Said called 'the condition of exile' (1993, p. 39) and the taking up of Marxism or another critical theory is not a simple cause-effect connection. Thomas spoke otherwise of 'exile' - he threaded together his experienced class marginality at school and, in later life, feeling driven to "prove that he was good enough" by attaining a higher degree:

I went to a little private boarding school. If you don't get caught up in the status symbolisation system then, you don't get caught up in anything, so status has always been a factor. And I think that's the university's business, to peddle status and, if you want to be a peddler, you'd better have some!

We are not 'conditioned' (as behaviourists would have it) or 'socialised' (as functionalists would have it) by discourse. But neither are we the autonomous agents of neo-liberalism who 'rationally' choose whether or not to 'take up' subject-positions offered (Jones, 1993). To explain 'why' an individual gravitates towards a particular theory or politics, some draw on psychoanalysis (Britzman, 1998; Butler, 1993, 1997; Ellsworth, 1998). The rational 'choosing mind' appears like the tip of an iceberg; supporting it lie the submerged layers of the unconscious - fantasies, dreams, desires, denials and repressions. These are the hidden depths of the "matters of love and hate in learning" that Britzman identifies. However, while fascinated by these approaches, I would be unethical to 'psychoanalyse' my interviewees! Furthermore, as explained previously, I was not doing case studies. Genealogy 'describes' rather than 'explains' - addresses the how rather than the why questions.

As adults, we 'speak our childhoods' through the conceptual apparatuses of adulthood. My interviewees hold Education doctorates - they are my academic peers - and they 'spoke their childhoods' to me through their microphones of 'erudite knowledge.' Perry told of how his Catholic upbringing and his family's altruistic values continued to underpin his adult desires to work for " the social justice thing" through his teaching and research:

I was brought up a Catholic and that is a very powerful thing. I have thrown away a lot of it now but that side of it I think has definitely coloured so much of my work... I have always had a kind of concern. And also being schooled in Catholic schools I think you do get a sense of being taught that everyone should be on the same level. There is an egalitarianism - that's the rhetoric anyway!

Another 'middle-class' child, Gordon, traced connections between his research focus on matters of equality and his family's middle-class positioning in a working-class neighbourhood:

Both my parents were in business and were successful in a very poor area of the city - very working class. I came from a fairly privileged background. I got to see the sacrifices that they had made for other people and how they did a lot for their community and were respected for that. They were very political people, Labour Party, very political... Very passionate, very caring. They'd do anything for you, and then, at the end of the day, they might begin to think about themselves. They would always put other people first. It is really a Christian way of living, without their being devout Christian.

There is not space here to elaborate on how interviewees came into doctoral work (most via careers in school teaching). To become a doctoral student, one must see oneself as, and be seen by others, as 'doctoral material.' Being identified as 'doctoral material' exemplifies what Judith Butler referred to as the 'power of naming.' Drawing on Lacan, she writes that, "To have a name is to be positioned within the Symbolic, the idealized domain of kinship, a set of relationships structured through sanction" (Butler, 1993, p. 72). The name, she argues, "works as a politically invested and investing performative. To be named is thus to be inculcated into that law and to be formed bodily, in accordance with that law" (p. 72).

The 'entry into', or sense of alienation from, a discourse or theory can also be seen in this way - as interpellating, or addressing, the student as 'insider' or 'outsider.' Maurice described feeling 'addressed by' and 'included in' neo-Marxist theories as a university student. He described his background as working-class and related this to why, part-way through his degree, he abandoned a (high status) philosophy department and moved across to a (low status) Education department:

I guess the politics of knowledge became really important to me at that point. In particular, I came to see the philosophy department as this privileged little enclave, a kind of pale imitation of the progression of the public school system in Britain where people talked in funny voices about questions which bore no relationship to their own context. That propelled me towards Education, which was perceived in the university as being at the bottom of the hierarchy of subjects, and philosophy was at the top.

The 'erudite' theories of the sociology of knowledge 'spoke to' Maurice's 'subjugated' experience - hailed or interpellated him as insider. In Hollway's terms, people "have investments in taking up certain positions in discourse ... I mean that there will be some satisfaction or pay-off or reward. The satisfaction may well be in contradiction with other resultant feelings. It is not necessarily conscious or rational..." (1984, p. 238).

As the theory that supposedly was 'authentic' to the working-class, Marxism is assumed by many intellectuals to be liberatory. However - as Lather (1991) and others have indicated - emancipatory theories and pedagogies designed to give voice to an oppressed group can, once woven into the apparatuses of power, also become instruments of surveillance and regulation. As a young honours student, Mary had felt intimidated by Marxist masters students: "They were so intelligent and critical and Marxist - neo-Marxist and radical and wonderful and I kind of revered them. I just felt inadequate. I thought I might go over to psychology."

Judith told a very different story of alienation. From a fundamentalist Christian and working-class family, Judith had been forbidden to 'waste time' reading as a child. Her rebellion was books. As a student teacher, she had struggled between her mother's view that "philosophy was evil because it challenged faith" and her sense that "if there was a God, surely he'd want us to use our reason if we had any?" Escaping from a violent domestic situation, as a student she encountered neo-Marxist sociology. This 'excluded' her as 'successful' working-
class academic - positioned her as an oxymoron, or impossibility: "I heard why working class people fail. Then I thought, "You bastards! You're sitting there saying how people fail and you're not empowering anybody... It just made me so angry after what I've been through. I thought, 'All you intellectuals sitting there - you don't know a shit!' I got really carried away." To her, Marxism felt oppressive. She embraced a form of 'new right' neo-liberalism, which empowered her with its promise of rational autonomy.

Further accounts of life with neo-Marxism told of relations between colleagues in departments dominated by leftist factions. Tim, a member of New Zealand's National (conservative) Party explained how in the 1970s: "I always stood out because I stood for what I believed in ... the departments I worked in were red, tinged with red. They were obviously supportive of the Labour opposition... With people who just sniped, it made the environment a bit unpleasant." Anna described completing her neo-Marxist thesis in the 1980s under the supervision of her head of department:

I never graduated and I didn't go to the graduation ceremony because in those days we didn't even put 'Dr' on our doors. My chief supervisor never had Dr, he always had his first name, because he was very egalitarian and democratic and we didn't believe in all this bull-shit about hierarchies of the university and that kind of stuff. So I sort of copied him in a way. I wasn't going to walk around in these elitist gowns and pretend I was better than anybody else. I wasn't going to have Dr on my door and I never used 'Doctor' unless I absolutely had to. I never used it, like some people - the minute they got a doctorate they would go out booking train tickets for Dr so-and-so.

As a discourse, neo-Marxism offered "forms and modalities of the relation to self by which the individual constitutes and recognises himself qua subject" (Foucault, 1985, p. 6).

Rather than engage with the truths or merits of particular theories in Education, I have worked on them with the tool-kit of the genealogist/ life-historian to explore its truth-effects - what entanglement in its webs as students, teachers, or researchers 'does.' As this chapter goes to press, I wonder what its 'truth effects' will be. While I have taken pleasure in its creation, like the research I have described in it, it has also been "an engagement with the realm of discourse and inevitably bound by its rules and limitations" (Harvey, 1996, p. 83). I have tried in this piece to describe my use of ethnography ingenealogy and, at the same time, to deconstruct the process and circumstances of its production. But, as Foucault said, "People know what they do; they frequently know why they do what they do; but what they don't know is what what they do does" (in Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1982, p. 187).
References


