Young peoples’ conceptions of citizenship in multicultural Australia: some reflections and a brief report

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Abstract

This paper explores a number of theoretical issues arising out of a project funded by the Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs involving explorations of the notion of Citizenship amongst young people in Sydney and the ACT. Among the methods employed in the study were those of discussion in groups and dramatic enactments. A video has been produced which canvasses many of the major points of the exploration. It is also intended to be used as a resource for discussion about the relationship of notions of identity and multiculturalism to that of citizenship. The larger part of this paper deals with some of the key philosophical themes which have been generated by the broader educational debates about citizenship and which have arisen from the research project. Towards the end of the paper I very briefly focus upon a selection of the findings from the Study.

Introduction

The issue of citizenship and civics education have been the major focus of debate amongst educators, politicians and the Australian community at large in the 1990’s. There have been attempts by various groups to detail what is involved in the development of an effective citizenry. Foremost amongst those who addressed the issue of education for citizenship issues was the Civics Expert Group which attempted to articulate the kinds of things citizens should know in its 1994 report ‘Whereas the people ...... ’ Civics and Citizenship Education.’

The report had been produced against a backdrop of some alarm over the news most dramatically presented in the national ANOP civics survey that for example that only 30% of the sample of Australians knew much about the history of Australian Federation, 13% knew what was covered in the Constitution, about 40% could recall unprompted the names of both Federal Houses of Parliament, 78% lacked knowledge of the function of the High Court and 70% didn’t understand the basis of the federal system.

Over the past three years the debate over citizenship education has intensified. Not surprisingly the question of knowledge is at the centre of much of the debate. From the point of view of the curriculum the issue of knowledge and citizenship intersect in the following way: Knowledge of ‘facts’ is viewed both a means to and a symptom of intellectual power and effectiveness.1
Factual knowledge is called to mind as we attempt to participate in civic life; those who do not have this knowledge are disadvantaged in this regard. However it is acknowledged that factual knowledge is by no means all there is to effective citizenship. Skills play a vital role in enabling individuals to become actively involved for without these they cannot become effective citizens.

There is little doubt that the sort of view most often encountered throughout the educational literature over the past several years is one which places emphasis on the idea of knowledge as fundamental to effective citizenship. The matter of skills development is also prominent in discussions about what should be taught and how it can be most usefully presented within/across the school curriculum. More problematically the concept of civic values enters into current discourse with sometimes unfortunate consequences. For example, one of the more interesting outcomes of this heightened awareness of citizenship as an educational issue is the claim by those who believe that knowledge is the key to effective participation in civic life, that they are opposed by others who resist the idea of knowledge as the core of citizenship. The latter it is implied may be well-meaning but are perhaps rather woolly-minded individuals who the risk of ‘emptying out’ the curriculum in civics and citizenship education, rendering it a mere skeleton of ‘attitudes, values and skills’.

This bifurcation between knowledge and attitudes/values/skills in relation education for citizenship is the central concern of my paper. My present interrogation of citizenship issues and civics education pre-dates, but is also informed by a research project which was completed in 1997 dealing with conceptions of citizenship held young people from a wide variety of ethnic backgrounds in multicultural Australia. This project involved discussion and interviews with young people in Sydney and the ACT. It culminated in the making of a video in which young people between the ages of 16 -30 from a wide variety of ethnic backgrounds explored the meaning of citizenship in contemporary Australia by means of discussion in groups, through dramatic enactments and satirical sketches and in other ways.

It is well beyond the scope of this paper to provide a systematic account of the ‘findings’ from the research project. Rather my intention is simply to raise some key questions which were foregrounded in the exploration of what citizenship means. This exploration raised directly and indirectly the need to problematise a taken-for-granted views of what citizenship is. Here I will raise a number of critical points which arise when we examine some of the assumptions which underpin past and present understandings of citizenship.

Problems in the present views of citizenship and civics education

Recent discussions of citizenship within academia and in some sectors of the wider community have offered cross-disciplinary perspectives on the following key issues:

1) the problem of defining citizenship at the end of the twentieth century in a context of tension between the purportedly democratic processes of the nation state and the effects of supranationalism which accompany economic integration and globalisation; and
2) the impact of mass immigrations which highlight the conflict between universalistic claims of the democratic tradition and the particularistic claims of various groups to maintain the integrity of their identity and accustomed ways of life (Beiner, 1995, Habermas, 1992)

I merely outline these here, not because I intend to analyse each in detail but because they seem to me to encapsulate the truly ‘big picture’ issues which are at the heart of citizenship debates at this point in our history. They were also issues which in one form or another, either implicitly or explicitly, attended much of the thinking and talking of the young people involved in the citizenship research project. And it is, I believe these ‘macro’ themes which need to be pursued systematically within ongoing discussions regarding citizenship.
education. For the moment however I will raise a few points of criticism of recent and current work on citizenship. These will be briefly outlined in this section of the paper. I will then return to a more detailed critique of each in the section which follows.

It seem to me that the following conclusions can be drawn from some of the most influential documents on civics and citizenship education:

1. The concept of citizenship implicit in much of the literature relies on an excessively rationalistic view of a knowing citizen and is one bound to a particular conception of what knowledge is and how it is acquired. Citizenship is about having knowledge which is essentially of two kinds: a ‘knowing that’ and a ‘knowing how’. The document Whereas the people... Civics and Citizenship Education assumes a concept of citizens who ‘knows the facts’ about the constitution, the parliament, etc ) and ‘knows how’ (how to vote and more generally ‘how to participate’ as citizens of a democracy), in other words, has the skills to carry out these activities.

2. This notion of citizenship is based on the one hand on an ideal of citizenship which is about transcendence, that is, it relies on the notion that only through participation in the public realm can the citizen transcend the particularity and limit of her/his own concerns and interests, and in so doing be transformed into a full participant in public life, through which the good is achieved. In discussing the history of citizenship the view presented is one in which citizenship rights have been gradually extended over time to take in a widening circle of kinds of social groups (women, Aboriginal people). This of course is one way of viewing the historical development of citizenship rights. But philosophical perspectives also need to be applied if students are to gain a fuller picture of what is at issue in present day citizenship debates, especially as they are tied up with questions of identity. For this teachers themselves as Donald Horne has recently pointed out, need to have a solid grounding in educational and political philosophy.

For example in those philosophical discourses the citizenship issue has been presented as a choice between various kinds of universalist conceptions (liberal universalism) and particularist or pluralistic notions which emphasise group identity and allegiance. Questions of equality have intersected with issues of ‘difference’. Discussions of distributive justice and communitarian ethics have explored extensively the notion of civic equality and how this is best organised or achieved (Rawls, 1971, 1993; Walzer, 1982, 1987; Gutmann, 1987; Taylor, 1985; Iris Marion Young, 1990). Post modern analysis with its insistence on plurality of identities and difference has proved a formidable critic of older views of the citizen originating in the Enlightenment, in particular that arising from the work of Rousseau. So there have been a number of overlapping debates and discussions over a relatively long period which in a variety of ways are crucial to the discussion of what is entailed in being a citizen and how citizenship education can play a particular role. These must find there way into the curriculum in a form which does not dilute them to the point of caricature or render them ‘toothless’ by removing the genuinely argumentative aspect from them.

3. The concept of citizenship which is suggested in much of the literature deals exclusively with those aspects of human action and interaction which following Giddens, I will call ‘discursive consciousness’ at the expense of the dimension of practical consciousness and the realm of subjects’ ontological integrity’ I will explain this more fully in the following section of the paper.

4. The particular conception underpinning much of the debate tends to lack any recognition of how feeling or the emotions are deeply embedded in the way we are and in everything we do, but also in the sense of the cultivation and development of feeling in the potential citizen. This point is tied crucially to the previous one in that it relates quite directly to the
most complex minute detail of habituated bodily movements and expression. Psychoanalysis deals with this unconscious experience and motivations at the basic ontological level. This is at the level of the individual’s experience of emotion - critically at the level of what I shall call social emotions (Maffesoli, 1996) I will now elaborate briefly on each of these points.

Critique of the ‘knowledgeable’ citizen

1. Stuart Macintyre of the Civics expert Group has raised the issue of what has come to be called a ‘civics deficit’, that is, an insufficiency in knowledge about civics. However it is not clear that he had this kind of knowledge deficit in mind when in an address to the 1995 conference of the Australian Curriculum Studies Association he identified specifically three issues needing attention in civics education. These are ‘multiculturalism, the recognition of ethnic and cultural diversity; reconciliation, the recognition of the special status of the indigenous peoples of this country; and, republicanism, the recognition of constitutional self-sufficiency’.

Now each of these is a substantive issue and their interrelationships need to be carefully drawn out. But although the first two are mentioned (I will leave the third for the moment) in the Civics Expert Group’s report they not linked in any practical way with the idea of knowledge ‘acquisition’ of skills development. So it is not clear that mastery of an identifiable knowledge base (for example a knowledge and understanding of the history of Australians and their institutions) includes either learning about multiculturalism or reconciliation, or learning how to be multicultural, tolerant of diversity and so on, as an essential foundation for effective Australian citizenship. The ‘big picture’ issues to which I have referred above are identified but they are not problematised as knowledge/skills questions (as ‘knowing that’ or ‘knowing how’ issues. In fact it seems to me that the model of the ‘knowing citizen’ in the Report of the Civics Expert Group is at the very least confused on the knowledge issue. There are references to ‘knowledge’ and ‘understanding’, and to ‘skills’, but their relatedness remains largely unexplored. ‘Cultural understandings’ are certainly referred to, but it is unclear as to how precisely values are implicated in these, and whether ‘civic values’ inculcation is to be conceived as a kind of ‘knowing how’ or a ‘knowing that’, as both, or something altogether different. It is acknowledged that schools are socialising agencies which teach children the skills of living ‘in a community’ and that such skills are a foundation for active citizenship, but again it is not clear whether the authors have in mind that knowledge acquisition (notably what many have characterised as grasping the facts about our civic past) is synonymous in their minds with that socialisation. Skills development is mentioned frequently and there is talk of structuring skills sequentially and progressively through the eight levels of society and environment ‘in the service’ of civics education. But by and large the relationship between skills and knowledge and values remains untheorised.

It seems to me that underlying the view of citizenship expressed here there is on the one hand a rather old fashioned rationalist/empiricist notion in which civic knowledge is quite unproblematically made available for absorption by the next generation. This despite the fact that some commentators profess to be aware of a dichotomy which pits ‘value-neutral’ citizenship education against something which presumably is ‘value-laden’! The epistemological assumptions underpinning the major discourses about citizenship education rely on a view of knowledge as the process by which disembodied, decontextualised and detached subjects receive content which remains essentially
abstracted from lived experience. Skills are acknowledged as playing a role - they enable an individual to learn to present his/her ideas successfully to an audience, to simulate parliamentary debate and so on. But essentially citizenship and civics knowledge remains a cognitive process in which key meanings remaining largely uncontested. As I have suggested earlier a major part of the knowledge dimension of the problem arises from the fact that there has been an unsatisfactory articulation of theories about citizenship in the philosophical, political and social science literature at large and the recent, highly publicised, ‘official’ educational literature on the topic. So there is a very wide discursive ‘gap’ between those attempting to think and write ‘officially’ about citizenship and civics education on the one hand and the political and social philosophical discourses which have developed over many years (up to an including post-modern articulations of identity, communitarian theories of social distribution, critiques of identity politics, neo-pragmatist notions of democratic participation and so on). But there is another ‘gap’ - that between the political philosophers and the like and many of the teachers engaged in innovative, practices aimed at exposing youngster to first-hand experience of co-operative and socially responsible living and working. These gaps have widened over time and I think explain at least in part the privileging of what I will call an over intellectualised, static account of citizenship, which rests on a foundation of complex philosophical assumptions which remain largely unexamined even by the most well-intentioned and lively educators. A good example of this is the notion of ‘transcendence’.

2. I use the term ‘transcendence’ because within the Western intellectual tradition there is an influential model of the citizen generated by notions of the human being as having both a private and public existence in which respectively, personal needs are met and social obligations and rights exercised. Now philosophical ideas about the particular (the individual) and the general (society, the ‘general will’) are essential to an understanding of this. An individual transcends her/his private interests and particularity in participation with others in deliberative decision making. This model takes it shape from the ideal of citizenship as outlined in Aristotle’s Poetics, though it has of course undergone modification over time. It is the dominant view of what is entailed in taking on the perspective of the citizen and as such is often presented as intellectually unassailable. But with the proper conceptual tools and by moving away from a strictly theoretical way of dealing with this theme a lively critique can be developed. of the doctrine of transcendence.

One way of looking at the issue is to cast the process of transcendence as one in which individuals achieve citizenship precisely through abstraction from all that relates her/him directly to production and reproduction, from processes of everyday life, quite specifically from everyday bodily activity from accustomed action, and habit, in other words from materiality. (Recall that in the Classical model, slaves and women were precluded from citizenship precisely because they were bound up with the material, practical aspects of everyday life in ways which purportedly made them dependent and prey to those non-rational dimensions of human existence thus detracted from man’s sense of himself as essentially rational.) A deconstructive approach to the idea of ‘transcendence’ can yield some interesting results. It can for example lead to a questioning of the habit of dividing human activity into public/private, and perhaps further on an interrogation of our habitual ways of thinking for example our (culturally-generated) compulsions towards the distant, the normative and anything that can be distilled into a general rule. It may examine in practical ways (eg through an examination of all types of cultural ideal) our orientation towards the simplification that is perfection and our attraction to the fantasy that reduces existence to some view of what it ought to be- to the transcendence of our individual ‘ordinariness’ through participation membership in the whole.
A critical understanding of the notion of transcendence and associated ideas would, I think, help students to understand that in the creation of a unified public realm differences can only ever be suppressed, not eliminated, and moreover that it is through habituated, customary social action that such difference is expressed, not through intellectualisation divorced from activity, theorising about the organisation of social life divorced from practice in all its diversity. In a society whose ‘public’ is heterogeneous, the differences which matter are irreducible and therefore must be at the very least publicly recognised. Social groups whose ‘different’ ways of seeing involve quite different foregrounding of concepts and understandings (eg aboriginal notions of being and knowing, and focus on place rather than time) can only ‘transcend’ their particularity of perspective if at a more basic level of existence they are accepted as being fully human. This can only occur at the level of practical consciousness not at the level of abstract, transcendent intellectualisation that is, the level of what I describe (following Giddens) as discursive consciousness.

3. The third point of criticism I want to make, concerns the relative neglect of the notions of practical consciousness and ontological integrity of human beings in the various discourses about citizenship and civics education. (I should hasten to add at this point that I am not claiming that teachers and others who actually work with young people share this neglect, for obviously many do not.) Discursive consciousness is about those aspects of action and situation which are at least verbalisable or founded upon explicit formula. Practical consciousness refers to the very complex but often overlooked facets of situation involving awareness of and attention to the relation of an embodied subject to others and to its own habituated space. The work of philosophers Dewey, Merleau-Ponty, and the sociologist Bourdieu all draw attention to the habitual routinised background awareness that enables individuals to carry out everyday purposive activities and which is the very stuff of which intersubjective encounters consist. But practical consciousness is perhaps more aptly demonstrated for present purposes by way of the following example drawn from the work of Iris Marion Young 5:

While at the level of discursive consciousness (the level of public protocol and contemporary social etiquette) I may tend to behave in such a way that I do not exhibit discursively conscious racism or some other form of bigotry against a particular group of people, I may nonetheless, at the level of unconscious meaning in interactive contexts, make judgements which are conveyed through negative or positive behaviours that may variously deride, privilege, devalue or stereotype some groups of people, thus indicating that I do not really regard them as my ‘fellow citizens’. So while at the level of discursive conscious there is now a widespread understanding that it maybe problematic if not downright unacceptable to draw attention to peoples’ race, gender, physical disability and so on particularly in formal and public contexts, there remain those aspects practical consciousness which may routinely convey patronising attitudes, dislike, avoidance, discomfort and even fear. The problem lies in the fact that those exhibiting such attitudes are frequently quite unaware of their behaviour. Indeed at the level of discursive consciousness they espouse quite opposite views albeit invariably in abstract and theoretically complex terms.

But the reality is that quite literally, in a bodily sense, people may continue to have strong aversion to other groups of people. So however much they have expunged such reactions from their discursive consciousness the unease, fear or dislike remains. For those who are the objects of this negative experience there may be anger, bafflement, and confusion which for them over time is expressed through their own discursive consciousness. This may lead to a reduction in their sense of self and they may be forced to take greater refuge in a reactive group identity. Those exhibiting the behaviours initially may have done so out of some not consciously recognised sense of threat to their basic
security system, but in behaving as they do, they succeed only in threatening the basic security systems of others who have then only a group identity to fall back on, the result being stigmatisation, denigration or invisibility.

A major part of the problem lies in the determination to separate reason / discursive consciousness from body and emotions, and the habit of simply ignoring the reality that bodily reactions and feelings have any currency at the level of reasoning, intellectual judgement and theory construction. This sort of denial of embodiment and affect is epitomised in bureaucratic rationality which while relying upon the fact of human embodiment including emotional and affective foundation, simultaneously denies their existence. But there is also as Iris Marion Young points out, the problem which the liberal injunction that differences should not make a difference highlights: this operates as a ‘sanction of silence’ ensuring what (at the level of practical consciousness) we can actually know about the significance of differences between groups of people.

It seems to me therefore that a concept of citizenship must somehow find a means taking seriously the dimension of practical consciousness and that citizenship education in particular must be designed to allow access to and understanding of this realm of human existence. It must also enhance our awareness of the fundamental nature of the basic security system of each and every individual. such a broadening and deepening of the concept of citizenship would need to draw upon a wide range of theoretical resources. However as things stand at present the kind of interdisciplinary analysis required is lacking both in the literature on citizenship education and in curriculum within the Australian context.

The basic security system referred to in Giddens structuration theory refers to the most basic level of bodily integrity and sense of autonomy essential for any kind of coherent and meaningful action involving others and physical environment. Giddens theory conceives of social structures existing only through their ‘enactment in reflexively monitored action, the aggregate affects of that action, and its unintended consequences’. Action however always involves the socially situated body in a dynamic of trust and anxiety in relation to its environment, and in particular in relation to others.

The prevalence of tact, trust or ontological security is achieved and sustained by a bewildering range of skills which agents deploy in the production and reproduction of interaction. such skills are founded first and foremost in the normatively regulated control of what might seem .... to be the tiniest, most insignificant details of bodily movement and expression (Giddens 1984,p.79)

What all of this points to once again is the negating of the body in human existence and the dominant discourses. It seems to me that the body understood in this way simply does not appear in discourses about citizenship which have been most influential. Its absence is connected intimately with another major omission in conceptions of citizenship at the present time. I refer to the role of emotion in human understanding and action.

4. The conception of citizenship suggested in most of the literature relies on a view of the person or the individual whose embodied nature is at best glossed over as an embarrassing particularity and whose placement as an ecologically niched and mobile perceiver is ignored. Yet there is at least the glimmer of an understanding that the teaching of civic values will somehow involve the emotions. (Good teachers certainly know this !) For emotional depth, which is surely required for true appreciation of one’s social situatedness, can only occur when there is a growing awareness in the individual of her involvement with others. People only ‘matter’ or make a difference to each other through emotion and cognition, through experiencing the emotional expressions of others who are tied up in various ways with one’s own life project. “People are people through other people” In the process of experiencing the emotions we are reaffirmed in our spatio-temporal existence. But our emotions are neither in our minds nor in our bodies rather
they are always located in the depths of our actual embodied engagement with the world in all its specificity. (Dewey, 1916; Merleau-Ponty, 1962)

Young peoples’ conceptions of citizenship in multicultural Australia

In the project outlined at the beginning of this paper groups of young people between the ages of 16-30 were involved in a variety of dramatic activities and discussions over a period of 18 months, from mid-1995 to late 1996 as a means of exploring what citizenship means to Australian youth from the widest possible range of cultural and ethnic backgrounds. The project was funded by the Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs under the Community Relations Agenda research program.

Each group of young people was filmed as they engaged in group discussion, individual interviews, comedy sketches, debates and other activities which focused on the following themes and many others: being an Australian, belonging to a nation, having a cultural identity, feeling loyalty, having a sense of citizenship and what this entails, notions of dominant and minority culture and themes of ‘sameness’ and ‘difference’ in relation to individuals and their cultural and ethnic backgrounds, beliefs and practices. Out of the many hours of footage a 50-minute video was developed titled; Many Voices, One Australia:

Young people Explore the Meaning of Citizenship in a Multicultural Nation’ was developed. Textual material will accompany the video.

The themes and issues which arose during the course of the project were many and varied and a full analysis of them is well beyond the scope of this paper. However in light of what I have argued above there were nonetheless some significant conclusions to be drawn, I will briefly canvass these in what follows:

First, it was clear from the listening to young people and watching them perform, that they believed such notions as citizenship, ‘being an Australian’, ‘belonging to this country’, ‘having a national identity’ and so on was regarded as simultaneously straightforward in meaning and extraordinarily complex, indeed for some participants, in the final analysis these were themes which could never be fully conveyed in words, rather they would require some other medium for their full expression. While none denied the enormous value of rational debate and careful exploration through talk in a supportive environment, many (not all) felt that this could never do full justice to the frequently very personal and sensitive matters raised. Many seemed to feel that words at least at some level in the overall process of exploration, were not adequate to what they wanted to convey. The majority therefore believed that other means (eg dramatic enactment, the use of humour and the telling of fictional stories, etc) could best be used to get to the depth of understanding required. I do not mean to suggest here that they repudiated language rather they saw it as one dimension of their investigation. Obviously there were differences according to educational backgrounds, differing degrees of access to dominant discourses and arrange of attitudes about the importance of rational debate. Except for those with some special interest in or access to sophisticated theorising about political philosophies and their application to thinking about citizenship and related issues, few participants demonstrated a command of the theoretical tools available in the wider citizenship literature.

Second, many of the participants, especially those in their early twenties, spoke warily of discussions about citizenship and related issues becoming too easily tainted (my term) by politics. It was not always clear what was meant by this, but generally it seemed that present Australian political party allegiances were what many had in mind, though there were considerable generalisation about ‘conservatives’, ‘radicals’ ‘greens’ etc. It seemed to me that there was more a general attitude of resignation rather than cynicism about the actions of politicians. The existence of ‘power structures’, sometimes clearly defined but most often
not, were invoked to explain the feeling of helplessness or indifference manifest among their friends or peer group.

Third, the issue of difference was a recurring theme throughout the discussions and activities. The discursive dominance of claims and arguments about various forms of social difference, notably that of ethnicity, over the past two decades and more was affirmed in this study. It was clear however from the discussions and other activities that for a significant proportion of participants that general categories were used in everyday talk without too much critical thought being involved. When pushed, individuals demonstrated their frustration with the theoretical tools with which they had been furnished. Many any were troubled by what I have called above the disjunction between discursive and practical consciousness (not their terminology in relation to the issues and problems being explored, but had not the conceptual instrument with which to begin examining it.

The fourth and final point I will make concerns my own perceptions of one of the most interesting differences in perspective of participants in terms of their location. ACT participants in general situated themselves as ‘Canberrans’. The Can Canberra they know and feel loyalty to, has very little to do with the city’s status as national capital. It was described in terms of ‘community’ as the site of (for some, not all) their identity formation. Their gently humorous portrayals of aspects of citizenship on the other hand had no spatial specificity, no locality, no sense of place. The abstractness of the conception of citizenship to which I have referred above was much in evidence in the caricatured responses of the young people from the ACT. Sydney participants, with the notable exception of young Aboriginals, made no reference to actual locality or region, only to personal space and to limitations imposed thereon by the demands of bureaucracy, government and the need to avoid conflict with other individuals.

Conclusion

I think that there is a need for an overhaul of the conceptual apparatus which presently informs our views about citizenship and civics education. We need to replace the abstracted, over-intellectualised account inherited from an earlier time with that grounded in what I would call a materialist/embodied account of what is entailed in being a citizen. This emphasises the reality that above all citizenship is as much a lived reality as the ‘private life’ of the individual. The important feature is that it is this lived sociality in all its complexity, which now needs to be more fully understood.

The specific groupings which can arise in response to the increasing dehumanisation of life under economic and cultural globalisation of necessity emphasise the exchange of passion and feeling but they also give rise to new and potentially productive processes and human actions. There need to be an awakening to what Maffesoli calls the ‘density of sociality’ which has always existed but which has disappeared from the discursive landscape for long periods. This density is experience in all its dimensions, lived life in all its materiality and those feelings or passions which constitute the essential dimension to all social dynamics. The shared sentiment is the true social bond not some abstract ideal of what a citizen should be. If the result is a rather pared-down version of citizenship instead of one trying to live up to an outmoded and glorious ideal, then in my view this would be no bad thing.
Notes


2. See Boston Op.Cit. p 6

3. See the Editorial by Bruce Wilson in the above mentioned Issue of EQ

4. Address to the 1995 Conference of the Australian Curriculum Studies Association

5 For an excellent discussion of discursive and practical consciousness see Iris Marion Young Chapter 5 (See below)

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