

Textualising Your Self in Research: Some Current Challenges

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In their attempts to theorise and outline more valid subject positions than the 'invisible' objective, authoritative narrator, postmodernist researchers have been divided in their sense of the value of the autobiographical note, the textualised self, in their writing. Haraway's (1992) 'cyborgs', Pecheux's (1975) 'dis-identification', Gough's (1994) 'nonessential, fragmented, decentred selves' and Spivak's (1990) attempts to problematise 'positionality' and identity all aim to move beyond the perceived impasse of recourse to an ultimate authority of recorded personal experience or lived subjectivity. They have sought to establish the authority and identity (or non-identity) by which or through which they represent their object of study through an analysis of the inadequacy of an identitarian model of authorship. Certainly they have rejected the older liberal model of the self-authoring, self-determining subject whose subjectivity and 'personal' integrity 'control' and legitimise the boundaries of the research topic. Hennessy (1993) Miller (1993), Taylor (1993) and others from feminist perspectives have also argued that authors need to speak from new subject positions, ones that acknowledge fragmentation,

indeterminacy, ambiguity, and complexity, as well as the larger social, discursive and theoretical coordinates that shape any representation of 'self' or 'selves'.

By contrast other postmodernist writers such as Ellsworth (1989), Lather (1991, 1992), Morris (1992) and Probyn (1992) have foregrounded or included a strong autobiographical element in their writing as one strategy (among several) to confirm or supplement the authority of their texts. This subjective element might take the form of first-person narratives of 'significant' events in the researcher's life, illustrative anecdotes to support arguments, confessional reports of past experiences or viewpoints, provisional verbal maps of past or current intellectual influences in terms of key reference points,

self-critiques or celebratory accounts of individual values or actions, statements of personal current convictions and their relation to a larger theoretical framework, admissions of the limitations (or elaborations of the strengths) of the researcher's standpoint or projected 'identity', or explicit recognition of how the discursive dictates of modernist 'authoritative' research constrain what subject positions are possible or able to be authorised. Sometimes these remarks operate as a brief aside to a more 'objective' style of analysis, or constitute a sustained stance and subject position against assumptions of 'invisible' authorship. Postmodernist theorists such as Foucault (1979) and Docherty (1993) have sought to attack the whole institution of modernist authorial authority; however, as Biriotti (1993) has shrewdly and ironically noted, it is difficult for writers to attack authority, even their own, without becoming new authority figures in turn.

In this paper I would like to analyse two recent examples of postmodernist uses of the 'personal' (Luke 1994; Noddings 1994) as indicative of some of the problems and opportunities of this discursive move, or, as in Noddings' case, the refusal of this move, in relation to attempts to legitimise new forms of textual authority. I preface this discussion with a brief overview of Docherty's general case against modernist authorial authority as a way to frame several key issues in this analysis. His critique also relates to the question of the adequacy or inadequacy of the researcher's representation of her or his subject, given recent understandings of the persistent ways that the forms and assumptions of academic discourse constraint what is admissible or thinkable in this writing (see Bourdieu, 1984, 1990, Foucault, 1971, Threadgold, 1994). This clearly relates to the broader issue of the legitimacy of the researcher's subject position or standpoint, including such concerns as who speaks, who has the right to speak, and who is spoken for in the researcher's representations. Linked to this question is the repeatedly acknowledged problem of how any sense of self or selves might be textualised adequately in any discursive practice (see de Man 1979; Gee 1994; Piem 1993; and Prain

1994). This relates to the further issue of whether narrating and narrated selves in any kind of discourse can be rendered indivisible, as is often implied in these textualised accounts of an extra-textual self. I raise these questions as indicative of significant challenges confronting any effective use of textualised personal experience in research, not just research based on postmodernist assumptions. The paper concludes with some speculative comments about possible ways forward for this strand of postmodernist thinking, particularly in relation to educational research.

Of course, a major thrust of postmodernist thinking (Docherty 1993; Foucault 1971, 1972, 1979; and Lyotard 1984) has been to question the whole basis on which modernist authors seek to legitimise their authority, both in terms of the resemblance between their theories and their objects of study and in their representations of these objects. A commonplace of this critique has been to note various ways modernists are obviously disciplined and constrained by the discursive rules they reproduce. Docherty argues that the modernist conception of the author (as the reputed originary site for 'new' and supplementary textual meaning outside or relatively independent of a given socio-historical situation) fails to recognise the ahistorical idealist and essentialist underpinnings of such a view. Modernist authors imagine themselves to be the legislators 'of taste, value, legitimate cultural and political authority' (p. 61), but fail to see the closed nature of this kind of discourse, answerable only to its own values, and also fail to see the real limitations to their authority in practice, even as they seek compulsively to re-authorise themselves in

each new textual event.

For Docherty the limitations to this form of authorial authority are no more clearly evident than in these authors' absolute reliance on what he terms 'parasitic citation' (p. 59), an appeal to a prior authority or authorities so that the writer becomes the institutionally agreed upon representative of a larger correctness, a broader class of ratified opinion by which 'new' knowledge is objectified. Docherty further asserts that this institutional form of authority inevitably locks the author or researcher into a very meagre set of procedural moves, theoretically and practically. However, at the same time as they seek to legitimise their research by its resemblance to, and immersion in, a larger citational authority, researchers are also expected to distinguish themselves from the research of others, to demonstrate the individuality and novelty of their findings by their refusal to obey a current authority or framework. In this sense they are often expected to play the role of the 'nonconformist' (p. 59), the renegade, the critic, the outlaw, to be a transgressive form of authority. Simultaneously they must also affiliate themselves with new others, and identify with a larger institutional force if they are to be recognised as a new authority. To achieve such recognition, then, a writer must

transgress a prevailing law or part of that law, but the precise nature or content of this law determines what will count as transgressive, and hence the law limits in advance the forms of any transgression.

This has had significant consequences for the forms of 'rebellion' that much postmodernist research has taken, whether in pursuit of more personal claims to authority, or in hybrid attempts to legitimise new subject positions, or in deferred indeterminate subject positions for research, or in the recuperation of earlier (liberal or existential) subject positions, or even in the attempt to elude binary reversals of modernist thinking. Docherty argues that there has been an extensive search for new originary sources for textual authority, whether in 'personal' intellectual or lived experience, instinct, ethics, putative social demands or needs, communitarian values, ideology, biology, and individual or group identities or 'standpoints', with all the attendant problems of the essentialist fixities and empirical bases of the resultant identity politics.

However, for Docherty these moves merely displace the problem into a new model of authority that must be hypothesised in exactly the same way as past versions. Authority is once more viewed as an origin rather than as a set of social arrangements or as an outcome or product of larger histories and influences. In other words all the past norms, imperatives, canons, procedures and citational networks in relation to this new (or supplementary) authority will be invoked again to legitimate the writer's viewpoint. Docherty argues that genuinely postmodernist research must abandon the modernist researcher's concern to produce 'punctual' (p. 68) knowledge. By this he means the predictable elaboration of 'new' understanding at 'a proper moment' (p.68), where the impersonal, explanatory clarity of address supposedly legitimates the author's 'invisible' subject position and authority. Genuine postmodernist study, he argues, 'implies a refusal of any such clear, stable identification' (p.67) of the writer with any other group. He supports McHale's (1992) assertion that the postmodernist should be more concerned with ontological questions such as the multiple nature of being and senses of being, the constitution of subjectivities in the multiple forces that produce specific social subjects (and their consciousnesses), as well as the conflictual plurality of conceptual frameworks that claim to interpret these subjects, rather than epistemological questions concerning singular or unitary approaches to issues of knowledge and truth claims. He

resolutely resists the use of ontological forms of knowledge to focus and resolve epistemological and theoretical questions relating to the legitimacy of individual or group understandings.

Instead, he advocates a radical decentring, a postmodernist displacement of the authority of these authors into a larger historical knowledge that does not require the endless reprise of a slavery of

readers subjected to a mastery of 'individual' authors. Of course, in their attempts to authorise new perspectives postmodernist researchers all too often, either intentionally or otherwise, revert to modernist discursive strategies and are forced to reactivate the role or function of the 'dead' stable author, as Docherty partly acknowledges in his own writing practice. In the light of these cautionary observations and prescriptions I wish to consider two recent attempts to engage with postmodernist assumptions about the construction of autobiographical or personal detail to move away from past seamless authoritative narratives of research.

Certainly various postmodernist researchers have theorised and outlined new reputedly more 'legitimate' subject positions and forms (or refusals) of authority as they have sought to dismantle or question past authorial stances. Luke (1994: 361-2), for example, is concerned to show how and where his own perspective, partly legitimated by a textualised sense of a kindred identity, overlaps yet also remains separate from recent feminist critiques of the gendered nature of literacy learning. His overt aim is to support recent claims that the teaching and learning of reading practices 'contribute to a sexual division of textual labour, and to suggest educational consequences of this division'. He acknowledges that the questions of 'voice and speaking rights' are legitimate 'practical, political and theoretical issues' within feminist thinking, and carefully frames his own standpoint to circumvent potential criticism that he is speaking for disempowered others and appropriating their rights:

Until now, I have been reluctant to frame an article specifically on the topic, uncertain of my own capacity and position to speak on feminism and women's issues, knowing the limitations (and, I suspect, not knowing some of the strengths) of my own epistemological and political position as a male of colour.

This insertion of a self-consciously personal and self-critically reflexive note is a very characteristic use of autobiographical detail within some forms of postmodernist research. A problematic sense of self or selves (though a strongly singular 'stable' sense of self in this case) in relation to the research topic is textualised as part of the case for establishing the provisional authority of the researcher to contribute to the topic. Again, typical of this kind of discursive move, the researcher characterises himself as participating in a necessary revaluation of a past stance on a particular issue, noting the absence of a gender focus in his and others' past formulations of the sociology of the curriculum. To demonstrate further his self-critical subject position he quotes 'constructive' (p. 363) reviewers' comments on an early draft of his paper that suggested it was 'couched in an 'arcane' terminology of poststructuralism, and at once, was univocal, sweeping and 'male' in style and intent'. He also notes that reviewers claimed that 'anomalous' research data had been ignored, and that the 'the force and style of the paper risked

appropriating feminist issues and practical work under a "Grand Theory" of literacy ' (p.363). Leaving aside for the moment whether 'anomalous' research findings are incorporated into the final draft, the openness of these remarks could be construed as an attempt to dismantle a traditional authoritative tone. In revising the paper Luke offers a

different kind of authority for contributing to this topic by arguing that 'to be silent on such issues is tacitly to support exclusion and marginality' and that his main concern is 'not to speak for women, but alongside them' (p. 363). He positions himself as having a parallel ethnic legitimacy for contributing, and claims that 'the provisional move to avoid appropriating feminist into grand (pedagogical) theories, then, is to contextualize our work by stating from the outset our interests and suppositions' (p. 363).

This procedure assumes, against some of the tenets of postmodernist thought, that such a complete textual inscription of an intending self is possible, and is presumably carried out in the name of a new 'methodological scrupulousness' (Greenblatt 1989:12), where postmodernist researchers are expected to make explicit both the limits of their authority and the irreducibly constructed nature of the ways they represent their object of study. Luke is careful to demonstrate the limits of this authority when he partly distances himself from particular feminist debates, noting that:

Quite simply, I am uncertain about how to resolve the current debates about the need to move beyond calls for 'gender equity' among 'universal human subjects' in neoliberal social and public policy towards those who focus on difference and locality...That matter, and the complex issue of whether curriculum and schooling should be 'degendered' or 'engendered' is being taken up by those scholars working in the fields of feminist pedagogies' (p. 362).

These two sentences track a shift from an issue being represented as the researcher's own particular dilemma to a more public theoretical problem for others to address, and the shift could be read as his recognition of the constraints on his right to lead this debate.

The rest of his text reverts to more straightforward modernist discursive moves as he codifies strands in a genealogy of 'the gendered division of literate work' (p. 362); although a postmodernist textual analysis is used to place 'critical literacy' within a 'heteroglossic' postmodern plurality of potential uptakes by various stakeholders in curriculum development. He concludes an overview of major research in the field with his identification of key unresolved issues in feminist theories, issues he notes that remain unresolved as well in social theory in general. These include the effects of textual representations on the formation of female subjectivities, and the potential for concepts such as 'voice', 'authenticity', 'self', 'difference',

'plurality' and 'power' to provide a theoretical and practical basis for actual self-determination and agency for real social subjects. Of course, Luke's own textualised self, as indicated above, has to negotiate some of these concepts through his representation of his own subject position, but must negotiate them in ways he cannot critique overtly himself.

As already suggested, there are various problematic questions in relation to this specific attempt to go beyond a modernist perspective in terms of textual procedures. For the reasons that Docherty's analysis makes clear, attempts to boundary or renounce textual authority are often subverted by the institutional requirements of this kind of discourse or by the self-imposed constraints of the author. Those who believe they should achieve some inner consistency in their writing, especially researchers like Luke who characterise themselves as strongly committed to the development of social democratic values, are clearly ill at ease with the appearance of too many anomalies and inconsistencies in their textual representations of their research or of themselves. However, writers who seek to establish a convincing

match between their political views, and their historical and textual selves, as Gallagher (1989: 46) has noted, merely reproduce the 'myth of a self-consistent subject impervious to divisions of disciplinary boundaries and outside the constraints of disciplinary standards'. For Gallagher, this demand for authors to make explicit the political foundations of their agenda, often in the name of an 'historical self-consciousness' (p. 46) exposes a profound misreading of the nature of the establishment and maintenance of contemporary subjectivities and their textual inscription. She argues persuasively that attempts to create a stable critical subject (as well as this subject's textual representation based on an identitarian model) are likely to repeat rather than resolve the problem of the writer's relation to her or his subject.

Clearly these concerns are relevant to Luke's self-representation in his text. While his self-textualisation is intended to dismantle a modernist seamless narrator, the 'stable' textual identity construed in this narrative would not meet the exacting postmodernist requirements proposed by Hennessy (1993), Taylor (1993) and Spivak (1990). They insist that researchers should problematise positionality, identity, and textual power, and refuse to appropriate others' perspectives in the customary manner of dominant scholarship. While clearly Luke's narrator attempts to acknowledge limits to his modernist textual authority, to move beyond what Showalter (1987) has termed 'critical cross-dressing', there are problems with a textualised identity established in terms of a provisional map of the embodied social subject, even a map that nominates one or more coordinates of gender, ethnicity, class or some other sociocultural category to legitimate its authority. Hennessy (1993:30) argues that 'standpoint theory', which

invites a feminist researcher to identify herself and her textual authority with the authority of a particular group of women or set of experiences, has inherent problems in that it tends to force the writer to rehearse essentialist 'preconstructed hierarchies' that block new potential subject positions and roles. Standpoint theory's key epistemological assumption, that all groups have distinctive essential ways of knowing and experiencing the world that distinguish them from one another, are too easily accommodated within empirical notions of identity that render new forms of self-determination theoretically and practically unthinkable. For Spivak (1990: 47) additional challenges are involved in the question of subject positionality in that holders of discursive power 'should learn how to occupy the subject position of the other' rather than appropriate or colonise this other to serve their own interests. Whether this is likely, given Docherty's account of what is at stake, remains an open question, but Spivak's strictures are a telling reminder of the refusal of much dominant research to recognise its actual subject position and the discursive habits and reader collusion that sustain this stance. In this sense, Luke's textualised subject position, as a potentially 'silenced' and 'marginal' voice defined by a group identity, represents only a partially convincing negotiation of these issues.

Noddings (1994: 358) from a markedly different viewpoint, seeks to argue a case for the validity of the 'personal' within a humanist liberal model of teaching in the face of Baudrillard's (1990) 'depressing' claims about the new postmodern 'subjectivity'. She characterises the humanist version of the personal in universalist terms as all those instances of teachers' use of selected details from their personal lives, or from their own reading, to stimulate children's interest in learning. She attempts to establish her own textual authority through recourse to biographical and autobiographical accounts from her past experience, and her textualised self is presented unproblematically as a transparent inscription of a

social self and resolved identity, as 'not just any reasonable literate adult' but rather 'an educator, an expert' (p. 359). In keeping with the assumptions of a liberal subject position free choice is perceived as a fundamental constituent element in the formation of an individual's subjectivity: teachers are free to draw on any pedagogically appropriate aspects of their personal lives to illustrate and explain the curriculum. Supported by anecdotes that 'almost every educator would agree are... appropriate' (p. 355) she outlines ways teachers routinely and effectively use biographical and fictional stories to enrich student learning, where the effectiveness of this pedagogy for students relates to the fact that 'the model comes close to their own reality' (p. 355).

These assertions are a prelude to a brief attempt (although still framed within various liberal assumptions about a unified,

self-determining, autonomous experiencing subject) to experience directly the uptake of Baudrillard's claims that 'subjectivity has escaped us and now resides in objects'(p. 358). The validity of Baudrillard's claims is tested phenomenologically through some humorous and serious examples. Noddings concedes that various forms of technology appear to exhibit their own consciousness and self-perpetuation apparently independent of human will. In a different example she criticises herself for being susceptible to recruitment into larger impersonal projects in which she does not fully believe because of the lure of 'things' over values (p. 359). However, she ultimately rejects this postmodernist denial of individual agency and knowledge as too painful and meaningless, rejects what Docherty (1993: 68) has called the postmodernist refusal of a 'collocation or identification between the Subject of consciousness and the substance of his or her thought'. For Noddings 'the personal represents the only hopeful response to postmodern malaise' (p.360). At the same time, she concedes that Baudrillard's case that the postmodern condition turns everything into spectacle is possibly accurate, and that 'maybe we cannot really choose our role in the scene' (p. 360).

There is not space here to take up all the problematic aspects of this humanist counter-case to Baudrillard's postmodern version of the loss of conventional notions of self-authored subjectivity. However, some key problems are worth raising. The construction of a liberal phenomenological subject position is vulnerable to the kind of postmodern critique explored in the analysis of Luke's self-textualisation, in terms of the attempts to establish textual authority through self-representation. At the same time, while various kinds of postmodernist writing have been criticised by McLaren (1992) and others as providing one more way of 'constructing a knowledge of the partial, the particular and the contingent', liberal first-person narratives are equally susceptible to the charge that they closely resemble 'postmodern detailism and anecdotalism' (p. 90). As well, various compelling criticisms have been made of the use of auto-critique to establish textual authority. McLaren argues that this call for authors to write more autobiographically and dialogically to explain the sociological and biographical contexts that shape their analysis is misplaced. Such a move assumes epistemologically that reflexive self-criticism can determine in an unproblematic way the 'boundaries' and 'influences' on the study, as though the researcher's major or only task was to achieve as completely accurate as possible personal account of what is being represented. For McLaren such a procedure forces authors 'into an endless production of self-determined interpretations' (p. 87). Agreeing with this view, Grossberg (1988: 67) has commented that recourse to autoanalysis 'merely reinscribes, not only the privileged place of experience, but the privileged place of the author's experience', an experience that is usually thought to

define itself unproblematically rather than be construed. In its more

extreme existential Romantic forms, as Schmitt (1986) has noted, such accounts entail endless authorial self-absorption and self-invention, where the self is seen as the index and embodiment of everything beyond, a microcosm of personal lived and imagined experiences that replicates and explains all larger social patterns.

Moore (1993) argues that similar tendencies are evident in some new forms of postmodern ethnography. In commenting on these new discursive moves she has noted that the proclaimed dispersal and fragmentation of authorial authority in these texts, and even of the 'official' authors themselves, is not nearly as complete as has been supposed. While postmodernist anthropologists have drawn attention to the constructed and ideologically-loaded nature of all accounts of culture, and have tried to develop new forms of writing predicated on the use of 'dialogue, intertextuality and heteroglossia to unmask and displace the unitary authority of the (traditional) author' (p. 191), the changes have not been as dramatic as claimed. They tend to represent changes to notions of self rather than a radical rethinking of foundational assumptions:

We are no longer objective, comparative scientists, but self-reflective, self-critical connected individuals. The newly valorised subject position is no less male than the one that preceded it, and its liberal credentials should be viewed with the same scepticism (p.212).

Moore further observes that the inclusion of many different authorial 'voices' within one text only reinstates the notion of the overriding authority of individual authorship by a plural appeal to this form of authority. The 'resolved' self as enunciated through various self-determined lived experiences remains in place, theoretically and practically.

Some Conclusions and the Future

In this paper I have raised various questions and problems in relation to attempts to use autobiographical or personal references to legitimate a postmodern textual authority. I have argued that a major difficulty, elaborated by Docherty, is the persistence or recuperation of modernist discursive moves, such as use of citational authority and recourse to a 'stable' textualised subject position, to resolve questions of textual authority. For Docherty, the whole institution of the modernist authoritative author and 'his' necessarily powerful relation to the text overtake various uses of autoanalysis in postmodernist writing. Docherty's comments remain a forceful reminder of the challenges confronting any attempts to dismantle traditional textual authority and the discursive beliefs and rules on which it is based.

A further problem is the whole issue of how new forms of textual legitimacy might be demonstrated. This relates to the questions of who

speaks, how is this right to speak established, and who can be legitimately spoken for in the researcher's representation of others. This paper has supported the case put by Hennessy (1993) Taylor (1993) Probyn (1992) and others concerning a range of difficulties in the use of the notion of a putative textual 'identity' to resolve these questions, whether based on the usual coordinates of race, gender, class or sexuality, or on some other social or political grouping. This paper has argued that the use of a stable authorial 'standpoint' does not provide a convincing solution to these questions. As Probyn (1992: 503) notes, too often this kind of identity 'emerges as an articulation of a rather static and rhetorical use of difference; difference as a

second-hand image of various theoretical battles within feminism and the left'. Equally, the recourse to incidental or heartfelt autobiographical confessions or assertions, as Grossberg (1988) McLaren (1992) and others have noted, is unable to provide a convincing alternative source of textual authority. While phenomenologically-based studies of teachers' experiences of the kind theorised by Pinar (1975) and implemented by Connelly and Clandenin (1990) have been viewed as a persuasive alternative to past 'objective' educational research, this kind of autobiographical research is highly vulnerable to postmodern critique. Gough (1994) and Lather (1991) among others have argued that these researchers' foundational belief in the existential authenticity of a unitary, stable, essential, self, points to this framework's questionable assumption that the subject controls and is the source of all knowledge. There is the further discursive problem, noted in this paper, of these researchers' belief in the indivisibility of textualised narrating and narrated selves, and their straightforward relation to a claimed historical subject.

However, these points are not intended to imply that there is no place for self-textualisation and the use of personal experience in postmodernist research or that researchers should necessarily return to the modernist discursive pretence of objectivity. Rather, this paper has suggested that considerably more care needs to be taken by any researchers who would claim to speak purely for themselves or more broadly for others. Enunciatory strategies are needed that move beyond the reinscription of a resolved authorial authority or have recourse to the claims of a felt 'experience', or 'authentic moments' of true identity. Certainly more is needed than simple explicit statements about the limitations of the author's authority to represent an object of study and to speak for others, especially when this is used to legitimise the very textual authority brought into question.

This paper concludes with some speculative suggestions for ways to address these concerns and develop different, more defensible enunciatory positions from which to textualise selves in research. Certainly the researcher needs to recognise that recourse to the personal is always an attempt to reclaim textual authority, as Docherty

as persuasively demonstrated, and that this move needs to be acknowledged as such. The researcher, rather than attempting to secure a textual identity through the static declaration and location of difference, should demonstrate a negotiation of the usual coordinates of identity (gender, race, class or group) rather than simply announce an identification with one or more of these concepts. The researcher will need to be far more careful in defining the personal and its particular uses within the text. This does not imply a need for endless self-criticism, but rather a sharper recognition of the basis of any experiential claims made. For example, Gough (1994b: 560) refers to the generative 'alternative discourse system of gossip', the practice of a kind of self-disclosure that should be clearly differentiated by the writer from any claims to represent an essential self. Also such a move should clearly not be an open-ended opportunity for self-invention. The whole question of speaking for others cannot be resolved easily, and researchers should demonstrate a scrupulous attention to the limits of their authority to represent other subjects. Equally, the researcher should acknowledge the impossibility of a full textual inscription of self or selves (whether conceptualised in terms of the specific contents of subjectivity, or motives, or origins, or role as agent of a larger process). Such a recognition will acknowledge the inevitable gaps between textualised and historical selves.

Heshusius (1994:15) makes the timely observation that educational research should have more than the researcher's self or selves as its

main object of study. She is concerned to point out the arid outcomes of the research concern to sustain an objective stance, and how this has led to a focus on 'the methodological management of the self' based on a perceived need for 'regulated distance between self and other'. In place of this 'discredited' model she proposes a 'participatory mode of consciousness which involves a somatic, nonverbal quality of attention that necessitates letting go of the focus on the self'. She concedes that such an approach may end up codified, objectified and regulated by the predictable procedures of modernist research. The preceding remarks in this conclusion are not offered as a checklist in 'the methodological management of the self', but rather as real concerns in the use of the 'personal' in postmodernist research.

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