

THE CONTROL OF EDUCATION IN THE 1980s

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This paper argues that education in the 1980s will be dominated by conflicts over its governance and control.

There is nothing particularly startling about this proposition since conflicts of this kind are already common. However, in order to interpret new and emerging forms of control with some degree of accuracy there is need to set them in their proper context as manifestations of more basic problems and trends which are common to all Australian States and, for that matter, common also, in most essentials, to all 'advanced', industrialised, 'free-world' nations.

Why should control be the central issue which best explains the agenda for the 1980s? Because, as the first half of this paper will argue:

- (a) education is so central to social, political and economic life of the society; because
- (b) even under 'normal' conditions education systems in 'developed' western societies are, by their very nature, resistant to control, and
- (c) because accelerating social change generates new demands on education systems. There is need to look at each of these factors before attempting a more specific explanation of how conflicts over control will manifest themselves in the years ahead.

I

(a) The Centrality of Educational Functions

Education is central to the society in some fairly obvious ways. In these times we are constantly reminded that the schools do, or should, provide a whole population with 'basic skills' (together hopefully, with many other equally valuable acquisitions) and we are reminded too that all of this is central and important inasmuch as it costs more money than any other single government service. However, this overt training function is just the beginning of a proper reckoning of the importance of schooling. There is a broad consensus between Marxists and other critics on the 'left', and the elite defenders of the high culture on the 'right', inasmuch as both agree with just about everybody else, firstly, that we all live in a society which is divided into different

social classes, and secondly, that education maintains and supports those class divisions. Like it or not we must acknowledge that:

"...educational institutions, in fact, perform a deeper, more dimly perceived social function: they contribute to the reproduction of social class structure by reinforcing cultural and status cleavages among classes" (Swartz, 1977).

This points to what is, in our society, the allocation function of schooling. Whereas we were once allocated to social classes by birthright this now occurs principally as a consequence of schooling:

"Educational allocation rules create a situation in which schooling is a fixed capital asset in the career of the individual, more durable than work or income, more stable than family life and relations, and less subject to market fluctuations than 'real' property." (Meyer, 1977).

This more or less clearly perceived understanding of the allocation function of schooling finds its reflections in the ambitions - and the disappointments - of individual parents and children. It also helps explain the latent but enormous political significance of education: since the education system allocates class position it follows that any instability or redistribution of wealth, power and status must impinge on the education system, and either overtly or covertly, put pressure on the structure and management of education.

We see this centrality of education, and again its latent social and political significance, when we grasp the scope of its legitimation function:

"Mass education creates a whole series of social assumptions about the common culture of society and expands the social meaning of citizenship, personhood, and individuality (modern ideas all). It establishes a whole series of common elements for everyone.

- (a) It creates the assumption of a national language or languages and defines universal literacy,
- (b) it reifies a given national history
- (c) it constructs a common civic order - common heroes and villains, a common constitutional and political order with some shared cultural symbols and with legitimate national participation;

- (d) it validates the existence of a common natural reality through science and a common logical structure through mathematics and in this way constructs a myth of a common culture intimately linked to world society.
  
- (e) It constructs broad definitions of citizenship and human rights as part of the modern world view.

Regardless of what people actually learn at school about their language and culture, nationally institutionalised mass education creates the assumptions of a national culture" (Meyer, 1977).

Societies, and more specifically their ruling elites, will not be unattending or indifferent to the movements of an institutions which constructs the collective definitions of everyday reality and allocates power, wealth and prestige and of course, at a more superficial level, also produces those much emphasised basic skills.

(b) The Difficulties of Controlling Education Systems

The control of education is highly problematic because teaching is particularly resistant to the usual methods and processes of organisational control. There is, in other words, a permanent tension between teaching and administrative (Pusey, 1976a). At the root of this problem (it may yet turn out to be a blessing) is the multiplicity of educational goals. Schools are expected to impart a body of knowledge, to develop intellectual and manipulative skills: to educate aesthetic and moral sensibilities; and to teach children to care for the environment and to cope with leisure, with motor cars, with the media, with sexuality, and so ad infinitum. The formal goals of education, the typical laundry lists of educational 'aims and objectives' are now so diverse and so diffuse that they amount to nothing less than total personality development. The important organisational consequence is that the objectives have become almost completely indeterminate and, for this very reason incommensurate with bureaucratic structures and processes and with the typical forms of organisational control. As senior governmental officials are wont to complain, the trouble with education systems is that they are so resistant to 'rationalisation' (take special heed of the most portentiously 'loaded' work in the vocabulary of the 1980s). Poorly defined and diffuse goals are the enemy of bureaucratic administration because they cannot be readily 'operationalised' (another of those portentous words) and so they militate against the stable division and standardisation of tasks and hence, against effectively supervised direction and control.

Education in this way continues to resist administrative control (Pusey, 1980). We can expect this 'problem' to continue because although governments would like very much to specify and to tighten up what Philip Coombs (1968) called 'the functional specifications' of the education system, they nevertheless continue, on the contrary, to dump every new social problem at the door of the education system and in this way to charge it with the constantly widening demand that it should teach this and that and everything else. And of course this widening of the teacher's responsibilities makes control still more difficult to achieve because it unwittingly serves also to justify claims for a correspondingly expanded area of discretionary judgement over curriculum and classroom practice.

Moreover, the structure, especially of the primary school, gives the teacher some strong defences which are unavailable to many other salaried professionals. The primary school teacher, more so even than the secondary teacher, can maintain a measure of autonomy within the isolation and sanctuary of the classroom inasmuch as "the classroom provides teachers (with) a sanctuary from effective social control by the broader culture" (Warren 1973).

(c) Social Pressures for more Control and New Demands

My third argument is that the cumulative effects of social change are creating new pressures which will be felt in the years ahead as new bids for increased control: and, since it is clearly inappropriate to attempt a review of such an extensive literature here, I make four general observations:

The massive cumulative effects of urbanisation and industrialisation have virtually destroyed three 'institutions' which were once central to the process of socialisation: the local community neighbourhood, the extended family and the church. As so many sociologists have shown, all three traditionally provided a relatively stable context for what was felt, not so long ago, to be the natural and comparatively unproblematic process of child socialisation and identity development. The educational functions of these key 'institutions' have, in the absence of all adequate alternatives, been loaded on to the schools and it is this which largely explains the increasing and enormous inflation in the scope of educational goals.

Moreover, second, traditionally accepted attitudes, values, and outlooks used to give firm shape, content, and direction to the curriculum and to educational policy and management. They conferred a commanding authority upon the school and gave it a prominent place among what were formerly "creedally authoritative institutions (Rieff 1973:21)". There was not too much doubt that the teacher knew best and no doubts about the authority of the bespectacled headmaster gliding and glowering about the school in his black academic robes. As Crozier says (Crozier 1975:27) in his report to the Trilateral Commission:

"Education as a moral establishment...is in trouble all over Western Europe. It has lost its former authority. Teachers cannot believe any more in their sacred mission as their students do not accept their authority as easily as they did before. Along with the religious rationale for the social order educational authority does not hold firm anymore...Routine makes it possible for the system to work and the sheer necessity and weight of its functions will maintain it in operation. But the malaise is deep. The dogmatic structure disintegrates; no one knows how to operate without a structure".

The situation is the same here in Australia. The obvious consequence is that this 'dogmatic structure' has no functionally adequate substitute and that there is now no readily available way of compensating for the resulting disintegration and incoherence of educational policy and for the correspondingly weakened capacity to control and steer the system.

Third, these same currents of change have also given rise to what is aptly labelled as the 'privatisation' of life in 'advanced' capitalist societies. Privatisation produces important changes in the definition of psychological identity. These changes are well expressed in a quotation which Brittain (Brittain, 1977:119-120) takes from Daniel Bell:

"To the classic question of identity 'who are you' a traditional man would say 'I am the son of my father'. A person today says 'I am I, I come out of myself, and in choice and action I make myself'. This change of identity is the hallmark of our own modernity. For us, experience rather than tradition, authority, or revealed utterance, or even reasons, has become the source of understanding and identity. Experience is the great source of self-consciousness...the touch-stone of truth" (Bell, 1976).

The consequences of this are echoed in our typical observations of the so-called youth culture: since there are too many contending choices they learn to avoid choosing. Psychological and quasi-psychological interpretations of internal processes have produced 'an interim ethic of release from inherited controls' (Rieff 1973:20-21)'. Institutions can no longer so easily use unconscious fears and guilt feelings as a way of maintaining loyalty and commitment. Introspection then tends to weaken institutional commitments and to generate a free-floating subjectivity which resists external direction. Most of these changes work against social conformity and, more significantly in the context of this discussion, against established modes of organisational membership and participation. The possibility of greater alienation and conflict are likely to be accompanied and increased simultaneously by continually rising unemployment and a substantial upward redistribution of income in favour of the politically strongest and most aggressively conservative elements in the upper-middle class (doctors, lawyers, dentists, graziers, and business elites). Specifically, this is likely to mean more assistance to private schools and cutbacks in spending on government schools but the more general and

important point here is that these trends will give greater visibility to the production and reproduction of social inequality and in this way create more threatened conflict over the control and governance of public education.

## II

In this second half of the discussion, I intend

- (a) to look at new and emerging forms of control,
- (b) to consider the normative basis of this control and to raise some basic objections against its assumptions, and then
- (c) to give a concrete example of how these new controls operate in relation to the state education systems.

### (a) Contemporary Forms of Control

In the 1980s governments will push for stronger and changed forms of control over education. Most teachers, lay people, and many systems administrators are likely to respond nervously and defensively to such an assertion with hurried answers to their own question: 'control over what?' Over this, or that element of the budget? Over which aspects of the curriculum? Over what committees? Over which sectors of the system? Formulations of this kind show that we are used to thinking about control in a concrete and specific way as control over this or that particular aspect of the education system or even as control in the service of particular 'conservative' or 'progressive' policies. They also show that we have missed the point.

Basically, governments do not want concrete and specific controls because the proliferation of specific controls creates unmanageably complex co-ordination problems (Crozier: 1973). What they want, in the first instance, is something very much more abstract and general. The very best sociological analyses on both the so-called 'left' (Habermas 1976) and 'right' (Crozier et. al., 1975) both agree that what governments want is more governability, i.e. control of a more generalised sort or, in other words, a kind of guaranteed obedience in advance of particular commands. Habermas' way of putting it is to say that governments seek more 'steering capacity' in a sense, more power.

In order to increase steering capacity in democratic countries, government, i.e., the State, needs to produce voluntary compliance and involvement (because we fortunately still find the army and the secret police somewhat distasteful). Under favourable economic condition, the State tries to buy compliance with money handouts: a good example is the Schools' Commission's massive Recurrent Expenses handouts to the State systems in the early 1970s. Indeed the State is continually buying the assistance of particular elite and professional groups with money, salary, and status rewards - again, the Whitlam Government was forced to purchase the doctors compliance with the Medibank scheme in just this way. However, this is insufficient and often unreliable (the State education systems and the doctors both played foul!) and it is in any case unworkable in unfavourable economic conditions, and during low points in the business cycle when there is simultaneously a call for more control and less government expenditure.

How then is steering capacity increased? Bates suggests a first approximate answer as follows:

"Scientific problem-solving for society and societal management are  
but two sides of a single ideological coin" (Bates, 1974)

Applied science and applied 'behavioural' or social science contain the built-in and fundamental logical pre-supposition that, respectively, 'thing-objects' and, in the second case, 'people-objects' are, and should be controllable and manageable. This is to agree with Habermas (1970) that 'technical control' per se is the 'constitutive interest' of the applied and social sciences and that false science, or 'scientism', is the dominating ideology of our times.

Of course, scientists are not all conspirators and ogres! No clear-sighted person can fail to see the enormous benefits of modern science nor can he/she fail to see that science is not value-free, and not neutral. Science always wittingly or unwittingly involves some kind of power-breakage. It is in the very nature of science to take sides against the uncontrolled and to strive always towards increased control and controlability. Indeed these are the very criteria on which applied science judges its own achievements: it is judged successful insofar as it discerns or creates regularities which are independent of particular actors, contexts, and situations and which are, in this sense, predictable, replicable, and controllable:

Scientific problem-solving creates steering capacity. It may or may not solve the explicit problems to which it is overtly addressed but it will, other things remaining equal, make way for administrative control over hitherto unrationalised practice.

Yet parents, teachers, and the local school communities have so far not seen that the method of controlling education has, since the 1960s changed quite markedly to the point now where governmental and higher administrative control is more ideological than hierarchial in the old fashioned bureaucratic sense. Control is now reaffirmed indirectly through outside agencies, i.e. the teacher training institutions, research organisation, and, specialists in the fields of curriculum development, educational administration and educational evaluation. It is the task of those specialists and agencies to apply social scientific research knowledge and methods to the 'rationalisation' and hence to the control of educational practice. In the chilling language of cybernetic systems analysis one refers to these bodies and to their technologies as "auxiliary steering systems".

(b) Objections in Defence of Educational Practice

It is not appropriate here to identify and label a particular body of research work as "false science" or to try specifically to lay down the criteria for ruling off work which is false or injurious to practice from work which is valid and beneficial. It is probably impossible to do this by pointing at particular fields and styles of research. The more epistemologically sophisticated argument, is that the validity of particular researches and their relation to practice must depend mainly on the characteristics of the underlying paradigms and on the way in which they are related to particular problems in different contexts. One might very much like to dismiss all behavioural educational psychology (especially the psychometric kind). Yet this is not the way to proceed because there are always important exceptions. It is likely that these judgements can only be made in relation to particular examples and cases. Here and in respect to education, I can only point my readers to the enormous and growing body of mainly American research which is reviewed and collected, in say, the Handbook of Research on Teaching (Travers, 1973) - it is worth noting that both Travers and Gage, the editor of the first Handbook, both acknowledge in their respective prefaces that this massive body of research has proven very little indeed. One may point also at the new literature on 'organisational development', operations research and systems analysis which informs most of the work which is done in educational administration, educational measurement and evaluation, curriculum development and now, policy studies. One can often identify scientific research by the implicit meanings and connotations of the language in which it is presented. In this respect we should attend to the literature which offers designs and recommendations for the successful triumph over sources of 'resistance to change' and for the best and most 'strategic' methods and techniques of 'intervention', and for the best way of aligning 'delivery systems' with 'target groups'. Or we might attend instead to a different dialect of the same language as it is used to analyse a five minute videotape recording of a 'teaching episode' into a scored grid of fifty or more segments which correspond to tables of "learning outcomes" which have been "operationalised" as "behavioural objectives" to allow for properly designed "criterion referenced" feedback and performance evaluation.



If these points serve in some rough and ready way to identify a body of social science research and its applications to education we may now usefully consider some objections which then need to be raised in defence of educational practice. The purpose here is not to vindicate everything which teachers actually do in their classrooms but rather to outline some of the grounds for the defence of practice per se against its scientific rationalisation. These objections may be outlined as follows:

1. Contemporary criticisms of positivist science and current developments in the philosophy of the social sciences strongly imply, or, at the least, certainly allow, the view that the logical status of social scientific research depends on its relation to practice. In other words the practical activity itself and, in Habermas' language, the 'cognitive interests' which guide it are crucial to any reckoning of the validity claims of the ensuing research findings. Insofar as these validity claims are shown to be void then applied social science can no longer claim that it controls areas of social life for the sake of and in the interest of truth, justice, reason, etc.: it then loses its legitimating force and stands plausibly accused an instrument of control for the sake of, and in the interest of, control alone!
2. Most people are now generally aware of the ecological and other literature on environmental destruction, the depletion of resources, and the physical limits of industrialisation. There is, however, less awareness of the evidence and arguments which support the view that culture (and 'culturally mediated' meanings, understanding, and communication) is both an exhaustible resource and the necessary foundation for a form of reason - would it be too polemical to call it wisdom and good sense? - which is, in many essential respects more rational than the rationalisations which consume it. These views gain added weight from the fact that they are surprisingly and, in some large measure, common to basic intellectual positions on both the so-called 'right' and 'left' (Crozier, 1975; Rieff, 1973). This suggests, further, that support for the defence of educational practice is potentially available in this decade from among both conservatives and radicals.

3. Scientific research creates the unwarranted expectation that even the fine grain of educational practice can and should be more closely structured, and in principle, made more programmable. This suppresses the all-important question as to what are, or should be, the ethical, political, and organisational limits of rationalisation.
4. Scientism debases practice by inculcating the belief and the expectation that technical formulations of issues, and facts, are ipso facto, more authoritative than ordinary non-professional understandings of whatever is under scrutiny.
5. Scientism "demoralises" educational practice by fostering what Berger (1974:34) calls a style of "problem-solving inventiveness...that may be called a 'general tinkering attitude' "which is based on the assumption that human values are irrelevant to the determination of the task. The basis objection to this technological-experimental attitude is that it is dogmatically amoral inasmuch as it forces people to treat all ethical and moral claims in the same way as all other aspects of their work, i.e., as manipulable variables. This destroys one of the basis characteristics of practice, namely that it is structured in part by values and norms which have real constraining and imperative force and which are, or were, integral to practical activity.
6. Rationalising science destroys practice by attacking its two essential constituents: common speech and experience. Practice marshals the facts, meanings, understandings, intuitions, ideas, procedures, and rules etc., which are available from the common culture(s). Basically these 'cultural contents' are realised and made effective in ordinary, unconstrained, everyday speech - in what philosophers and sociologists of language call 'natural language'. What science and false science do is to impose instead a 'constructed' or artificial language which restricts reference only to those elements which the 'model' is designed to control. Ordinary speech is the medium through which our total lived experience is used to comprehend shape, define, and unravel everything that faces us in every next minute of our waking lives - including the eight and some hours worth which is spend in the workplace! The formal languages of science

have the converse effect of blocking off reference to lived experience. Experience is only admissible insofar as it is 'objectified', depersonalised and expressed in terms which facilitate its one-sided assimilation into that part of the situation which is truly amenable to scientific management. The rest is defined, in advance, as personal, idiosyncratic, private and irrelevant - that is the enormous dogma which 'scientific' educational research brings to its every meeting with educational practice. The other consequence of the forced use of scientific language is that both the science and its applications become unintelligible to the uninitiated lay person. In the case of genuine science this may be seen as a more or less unavoidable consequence and cost of enquiry. In the case of false science the unintelligibility of the application is more likely to express its incipiently political purpose. The unwitting consequence (and often the complicitly acknowledged aim) of much educational research is to make educational issues unintelligible to the parents, citizens, pupils, and teachers who have the greatest stake in what is actually done in the classroom.

(c) Externally Mediated Control and Rationalisation: an Example

But how and by what processes are applied social science research and its rationalisations brought to bear on educational practice? Curriculum development provides a useful local example of how this occurs.

In the case of the Australian Federal Government's Curriculum Development Centre (CDC) the methods of intervention vary between two modal strategies. The first is the standard Research and Development model (Hubermann, 1974) of curriculum development and educational innovation. The developers begin by eliciting descriptions, demonstrations and explanations of the teaching practices of one or several teachers working in a particular situation. Then these practices are abstracted from the particular people and the particular contexts in which they were originally situated or first observed; translated into 'materials' and 'methods' and then transformed into packages or routines which are 'trialed', 'evaluated', and then 'adopted'. The usually hidden priority, and the implicit criterion of selection which guides every step of the process is the replicability of the practice in different situations, i.e. its potential usefulness and portability as an administrative resource or as one theorist (Giacquinta, 1973) puts it, its potential for 'eventual incorporation as a stable part of the organisational structure (and as) part of the regular routine of the system. And so,

'development' is really a process of formalisation, which converts educational practice into administrative structure.

The second method of intervention which goes under the name of 'school-based curriculum development' serves the same function but the process is more discernibly political. The senior administrators in the 'client' state education system negotiate the place and style of the intervention (usually a workshop, seminar or conference) with the outside agency - here the CDC: this is usually done covertly since the perceived independence of the outside agency's field workers is an important resource for the production of control. In order both to leave field workers uncompromised and to draw the maximum benefit from their goodwill and commitment the initial negotiations with the system authorities are usually carried on over their heads. The purpose is to set up the intervention (conference, seminar, etc.) in a way which gives the administrators in the client system full participation in the 'problem-solving' discussions of the chosen target group of practising teachers and/or community and parent representatives, etc. The field workers then initiate and steer discussions in such a way as to 'problematise' existing practices (together with their cultural and communicative contexts) and to re-situate the discussions, questions and problems in a changed - and rationalised - frame of reference which reduces the experiential knowledge of educational practice to administratively manipulable formula. The language of educational evaluation provides added semantic resources for this purpose. These two methods of intervention both illustrate how CDC, a Federal research and development instrumentality, produces steering capacity for its client systems, the state education departments. In both cases the essentials of the process are the same. The intervention is only indirectly aimed at changes in the particulars of curriculum contents and practices: the direct effect is to rationalise the general criteria of validation for the curriculum as a whole. And so the process of validation itself is the real target for the intervention and the basic purpose is to invalidate, undercut, or capture uncontrolled recourse to common cultural norms of truth, right, and commonsense. Discussions may seem thereafter to go on very much as before and people may tender their own beliefs, reflections, and understandings but insofar as the interventions are successful, the residual legitimacy and authority of culturally referenced validity claims is subordinated to the rationality of administrative control.

Some of the CDC's activity may well have been beneficial as was certainly the case with the Schools Commission's Innovations Program (Pusey, 1976b). Although both programs have now been abolished the lesson is that the inputs of outside research and support agencies will inevitably involve some kind of power brokerage and that there is therefore need for a more sophisticated reckoning of the educational and social values which are at stake.

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I have sought to argue that: the 1980s will be dominated by new bids for tighter control.... that new and predominantly ideological controls would typically take the form of 'rationalisations' which governments will seek to design, impose, and legitimise by reference to both 'true' and 'false' sciences...that accordingly, key policy issues will depend on a proper reckoning of the limits of useful rationalisation...that these questions arise from an opposition between educational practice and rationalisation misconceived as the pseudo-scientific management of education and...that for social and educational reasons, there is need to protect and to enrich educational practice.

A basic tenet of the whole discussion is that good education depends in some basic way on the accumulated experiential knowledge and practical wisdom of the individual teacher - most of all at the primary and early secondary school levels. One then goes on to argue that the things which matter most are those characteristics of the teaching situation which are particular to the individuals involved, to their relationships with each other and to the particular context in which this relationship is set. On this view - it was basic to the 'Karmel' Report of 1973 - the standardisable and routinisable element is held to be real but nevertheless of secondary importance. Everyone is aware that this sort of view has been cynically advocated by some teachers' unions and other organisations to defend their vested interests and to make claims for comforts and more "goodies". But this does not affect its validity.

At no stage have I argued that all rationalisation is spurious or harmful. Rationalisation may indeed be rational insofar as there truly is a 'one best way' of defining and attaining a particular goal. However, the basic problem remains: how are we to specify the limits of rationalisation? It may be desirable to use computers to teach basic mathematical skills but how then do we decide where not to use the computer? Packages may help with remedial reading but do we want to use packages to teach civics and politics? Some forms of evaluation may help the teacher to assess his/her own work but do we want evaluative questionnaire item banks and criteria supplied by an external agency? Do we want timetables and curricula to be divided and packaged into externally monitored modular programmes? How are we to assess the value of competency-based teacher education technologies and to what extent should formalised cost-effectiveness accounting determine the recruitment and promotion of teachers? Or, to put the general problem more formally: how do we arrive at a set of criteria for differentiating actions, structures, procedures, and policies which support practice from those which degrade it?

There is a basic sense in which answers must depend on the inherently indeterminate nature of the task (Pusey 1976). However, beyond this point the questions arise fairly straightforwardly from what has been said already about the nature and defence of practice: do proposed methods, structures, decisions, procedures, packages, interventions, etc., impose a vocabulary which restricts reference in ordinary speech to lived experience in the 'unscientised' residues of our common culture(s)? Is the 'replicability' of the proposed initiative and its potential for administrative control covertly intruded as a first order value? Does the design or the method make the activity unintelligible and inaccessible to those who are effected by it?

In sum we may expect that governments will, in this decade, favour ideological means of creating more steering capacity in so far as there is a continuing call for more control and less government spending. Ideological controls are both potent and relatively inexpensive - educational research organisations and expert committees cost very little by comparison with expensive and uncertain attempts to buy improved education with tied grants to government schools. Controls of this kind are well suited to an activity like public schooling which is readily amenable to only a low level of honest rationalisation and which is heavily charged with ideologically manipulable hopes, fears and doubts. The most basic practical implication is that educationists, teachers, and parents should prepare themselves to defend practice in the same medium in which it is subverted, i.e. with ideas. Groups and individuals succumb to ideological control when they are manoeuvred into a forced justification of their practice on criteria which are loaded against them; there is every chance that the demand for 'proper rationalisation' will be made and won in precisely this way while teachers and schools are busily fighting the Treasury for a 10 per cent increase in the allocation for disposable software or for the additional provision of half a remedial reading teacher for every 100 pupils.

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