JENNIFER M GORE

Asked to speak on the topic "Who has the authority to speak about practice and how does it influence educational inquiry?" I want to explore issues that I doubt were central in the decision to invite me to participate in this symposium. Questions of authority to speak are often structured around "epistemic privilege", such as Do we have a right to speak for you? Can we really know what it is like for you if we haven’t experienced what you have? Is the voice of the researched silenced by that of the researcher? These are important questions that have been addressed in substantial ways elsewhere (see for example Gitlin, 1994).

The question of how such speaking affects educational inquiry is less common, but there are certainly sustainable arguments about how the authority granted to different forms of research have limited the methodologies employed and receptivity to the research by different audiences -- policy makers, other academics, those who are the subject of the research, practitioners, and so on.

I want to tackle the topic I have been given by emphasising what might be its least likely angle, the question of practice, of speaking about practice, and specifically, in education, speaking about pedagogy. For various reasons, pedagogical practice has not been high on the priority list of educational researchers, and particularly not those whose leanings are critical despite a vast body of literature on progressive and radical pedagogies (see Gore, 1993 for an extended demonstration of this claim). My reframed question for this symposium, then, is Who has the authority to speak about pedagogy and how does it influence educational inquiry?

I begin with two quotes:

Bourdieu, 1991

My recent research has been governed by the practice related question How does power operate in classrooms? More specifically, I have been attempting to understand how specific pedagogical practices function in relation to particular goals of progressive/radical educational discourses? In this paper, my primary focus is on the question of how these questions are to be answered. In so doing, I articulate why I advocate and have employed systematic empirical research [1] in order to work towards a theory of power in pedagogy. Unlike much radical pedagogy literature which tends to be philosophical in character, I argue that systematic collection and analysis of data is fundamental to the project of developing a theory of pedagogy.

Before turning to an elaboration of my study and of the arguments behind it, I want to outline both the contribution and the limits of philosophy for understanding pedagogical practice. While there are multiple philosophical traditions, each capable of contributing to an understanding of pedagogy, I focus here on the general contribution that philosophical approaches can make to my project. My treatment, at points in this paper, of "philosophy" as a rather singular entity is grounded in Ladwig's (1996) distinction between philosophical and sociological approaches to educational scholarship. According to him, philosophically based educational researchers tend to rely for their authority on forms of rhetoric akin to those spoken from a pulpit, while sociological educational researchers rely more on forms of rhetoric like those found in a courtroom. On each side of this distinction, different forms of evidence and different kinds of arguments (speculative rather than demonstrated) are employed. In what follows, I outline the various functions of philosophical work for the development of radical pedagogy as well as limits of each function.

A major and important function of philosophy, especially from the analytical tradition, is clarification. Claims about the operation of pedagogy or of power in pedagogy can be clarified with reference to philosophical arguments and traditions. For instance, Foucault's analytics of power has helped to clarify power's inescapability and pedagogy's operation on the body (e.g., Gore, 1993, McWilliam and Taylor, 1996) and Ellsworth's (1989) feminist poststructuralist analysis of her own teaching has helped to clarify the potential oppressiveness of critical pedagogy. However, this clarifying function of philosophy is limited in at least two ways. First, while it can illuminate existing claims and help sort out conceptual confusion, it is unlikely to contribute substantially new knowledge about pedagogy. Second, there are limits to the clarification that is possible when the examples frequently used to build such arguments have little scientific legitimacy/authority. For instance, how can we know whether the examples hold for a wide range of settings or for all instances of pedagogy which are under discussion? Systematic and disciplined observations of pedagogy are needed, in relation to each of these limits, to further clarify the operation of pedagogy.

Another central function of philosophy, especially that rooted in social analysis, is critique. Much of the very important work done in the name of radical pedagogy has focussed on the production of a substantial critique of mainstream pedagogical practice (e.g., Freire, 1968; Giroux, 1983; Maher, 1987; Shor, 1980). This philosophical work connects existing schooling practices with larger social visions to highlight, for instance, ways in which pedagogy has excluded certain social groups. However, as with the analytical tradition, the critique is limited by the kinds of evidence upon which it draws. Without systematic and detailed observations of pedagogy, much of the critique remains speculative. For instance, within feminist critiques of education, recent refinements have suggested that schooling functions differently for different groups of girls (and boys) (e.g., Gilbert, 1996). Feminist philosophers have also provided multiple forms of explanation for differences among females and for the experiences of women in education (e.g., Grumet, 1988; Martin, 1981; Spelman, 1988). Clarifying the specific differences among women or between men and women which are related to pedagogy, however, requires disciplined observation.

In addition to critique, philosophical work on pedagogy has articulated alternatives. Radical pedagogy discourse has certainly produced arguments about, for instance, how authority can be used in emancipatory or nurturing rather than oppressive ways (Culley, 1985; Shor & Freire, 1987). Again, however, there are limits to the specificity with which such alternatives have been and can be articulated with a primary reliance on first hand accounts and personal experiences, (e.g., Shor, 1980), rather than systematic observation. For instance, how do we know that giving students a "voice" in classrooms is empowering? Questions have been raised about the limits of some alternative practices proposed in the name of radical pedagogy (e.g., Ellsworth, 1989; Gore, 1993; Orner, 1992), but taking these theoretical debates further requires different kinds of examples, the kind produced through disciplined observation.

Foucault's philosophical work has also provided alternatives in the sense of providing alternative conceptions of power with which to understand pedagogical practice. In his view of power as inescapable (Foucault, 1988), for instance, there are implications for teachers to embrace rather than eschew authority (Gore, 1993). Similarly, I have drawn on Foucault's (1983) explication of the hypomnemata, a Greek notebook used to constitute rather than confess oneself, to propose an alternative use of journals in teacher education programs. Again, however, there are limits to the specificity with which such alternative exercises of power can be proposed without systematic empirical work.

A fourth function of philosophy pertains to the production of alternative policies in education. Philosophical work on pedagogy's unequal effects, for instance, has been used to argue for changes in policy (e.g., Gilbert, 1996). Once again, however, and especially given the policy field's rhetorical reliance on scientific evidence, there are limits to what can be achieved by this work. Interrupting pedagogy discourses within policy can only proceed so far without what Wittgenstein refers to as "other kinds of examples." Put another way, there are limits to which philosophers can speak authoritatively about pedagogical practice.

BACK TO SCHOOL

For these reasons, in my own attempt to answer the questions with which I began this paper, I have returned to "schools" to gather data in systematic ways. The study proceeds from and extends Bernstein's (1990) insight that pedagogy is more than a relay for power relations external to itself. That is, pedagogy is not just a means of transmitting, for example, race, class, and gender relations. Rather, pedagogy seems to carry its own set of power relations. I wanted to understand and explain the power relations inherent to pedagogy, but needed specific and systematic evidence on which to base claims.

Returning to pedagogical settings to observe systematically what happens between particular individuals dealing with particular knowledge in particular contexts was necessary to my project of advancing a theory of pedagogy. Indeed, I want to argue that this kind of work is necessary to the project of advancing a theory of pedagogy. For too long, now, pedagogical theorists have neglected systematic observations of the very phenomena which they are attempting to understand. This neglect of systematic data gathering is partially connected with the general rejection by radical educational scholars of anything that appears positivist (Ladwig, 1996). But in disparaging the work of "empiricists," these theorists have limited their own theoretical accomplishments, limiting the authority with which they can speak about practice.

Systematic evidence is necessary, I argue, especially if claims about pedagogy are to carry persuasive power in relation to the multiple audiences for whom theories of pedagogy are intended. For instance, if the aim of advancing a theory of pedagogy is to help practitioners change what occurs in classrooms, what will persuade them, and especially those who do not accept radical critiques, to substantially alter their practices? Indeed, part of the reason for my study is what I refer to as the incredible "continuity in pedagogical practices" over time despite decades of educational reform. That is, despite a constant flow of new techniques and new curriculum, new ways of understanding learning and new forms of work organisation in schools, there appear to be some aspects of pedagogical relations and pedagogical practice which have altered little during the past century. There is a vast literature also on the difficulties of getting teachers to change (e.g., Fullan, 1991; Goodlad, 1994). As I have argued previously (Gore, 1993), teachers who are already burdened with work need more specific strategic advice than has been available in most of the radical pedagogy literature. Not surprisingly, it has been difficult for radical pedagogues to provide such advice without the kind of evidence that would enable specific claims about practices to be upheld.

Similarly, if theories of pedagogy are to inform educational policy, they are directly inserted into a political field which is imbued with concerns for accountability and dominated by discourses requiring scientific evidence. Likewise, if the goal is transformation of university pedagogy or academic discourse about pedagogy, "socially recognisable evidence" (Ladwig, 1996) must be provided. Abstract and even clear and elegant arguments about pedagogy are unlikely, on their own, to carry much weight with most teachers, policy makers and "mainstream" theorists of pedagogy.

This line of argument leads me to suggest that attempts to develop a theory of pedagogy ought to have strategic applications. Pedagogy is a universal practical endeavour fundamental, in its shaping of citizens, to the development of societies. While I wouldn't want to argue that all intellectual work in education must lead to direct improvements in classroom practices, in the field of pedagogy (and especially in radical pedagogy where so much theorising has occurred) I believe it is incumbent on those who argue for improvements in the practice of pedagogy to direct their efforts at some form of strategic application. As argued in the previous section, such work will have its limits, even if its target is policy or discourse, if it is primarily speculative and fails to draw upon systematic evidence.

My work is intended to illuminate, through an investigation of power's operation in pedagogy, how specific practices are related to specific effects of power in pedagogy. In 1900, Dewey (1968) wrote, "What the best and wisest parent wants for his [sic] own child, that must the community want for all of its children. Any other ideal for our schools is narrow and unlovely" (p.3). And yet, we know that schooling still produces vastly unequal outcomes for different groups of students (e.g., Teese, 1995). My work is oriented at clarifying pedagogy's role in this production of inequality so that it may be more effectively altered.

A particular aspect of radical pedagogy discourse that needed some form of verification was its claims to dispense with power (that is, repressive and oppressive forms of constraint and coercion). In earlier theoretical work, I argued that radical pedagogies may well impose their own regimes of power-knowledge, the effects of which may be equally repressive for some participants (Gore, 1993). Taking this claim any further required that I engage in some observation of radical pedagogy. Not just observation, however, but systematic, meticulous, tedious, detailed observation. Such observation would provide me with other kinds of examples with which to nourish my own attempt to extend these ideas. Of course, there was also and always the possibility that such examples would disconfirm and challenge my argument.

The study involved six months of observations in each of four pedagogical sites. Detailed fieldnotes of events in each site were produced in addition to transcripts where possible and some interviews were conducted with participants (see Gore, 1995a, 1995b for a fuller account of the study). Through the construction of this (or any) data, there is an epistemological break with events observed (Bourdieu, Chamboredon, & Passeron, 1991). Moreover, I am not wanting to suggest that empirical research somehow provides an uncontaminated view of the realities of power relations in pedagogy. Indeed, I was testing particular ideas emerging both from radical pedagogy discourse and from Foucauldian theory.

The four sites selected for the study were: high school Physical Education classes (PE), with an explicit focus on bodies; a first year Teacher Education (TE) cohort, working with three lecturers, where the explicit course agenda included critically discussing dilemmas and tensions underlying the institutional practices of schooling; a Women's Discussion Group (WG), which met for purposes of intellectual stimulation, usually via reading courses provided by community education organisations; and a Feminist Reading Group (FEM), in which women met specifically to address feminist texts (broadly defined) and issues.

These sites were chosen for particular theoretical and strategic purposes: that is, I wanted to be able to respond to debates within radical pedagogy about the extent to which it escaped or altered the relations of power of mainstream pedagogy and also to debates regarding the institutionalisation of pedagogy (Foucault, 1977; Hunter, 1988). The following table summarises the sites according to these theoretical dimensions.

I also wanted to maximise generalisability to other sites. One way of doing this was to select sites as representative of particular forms of pedagogy. For instance, the focus on institutions as one analytical dimension will carry some weight in relation to the rhetoric of the policy field. Another way of increasing generalisability was to develop categories with which to analyse the data directly from social philosophy and not mediated by educational contexts. For instance, while I selected physical education classes for my mainstream institutionalised site, there is little reason to expect that the techniques of power (derived from Foucault), which have been a major aspect of my analysis to date, would be substantially different in science or language classes (for example). In order to further explain those categories, I turn now to a brief elaboration of my use of Foucauldian theory.

TAMING FOUCAULT

Undergirding my work on pedagogy has been an attraction to Foucault's analytics of power. Indeed, it was my reading of Foucault on power that enabled me to pose my initial challenge to radical pedagogy discourse. Others in education have engaged with Foucault's work also (including some scholars in radical pedagogy). But most of this work has remained at the level of theoretical and philosophical debate.

Scholars in education are not unique in this regard. Foucault's work has generated an enormous amount of debate in most fields within the humanities and social sciences. Different scholars claim better readings based on more careful analysis or their personal knowledge of Foucault (Sennett, 1996) or their use of more appropriate theoretical traditions upon which to base their readings (Fraser, 1989). A problem with much of this work is that there can be no resolution. There is no "right" answer to be had [2]. Moreover, as many commentators have pointed out, Foucault is not always clear (e.g., Arac, 1988; Gutting, 1994). There are apparent gaps and inconsistencies in his work and the sheer volume of it makes it difficult to reduce. Selecting only parts of it leaves oneself open to accusations of failing to take account of his earlier or later works or of its own intellectual roots.

Given these difficulties if using Foucault's work, and contrary to most scholars who attempt to do so, I have attempted to "operationalise" aspects of that work in relation to particular empirical questions. In order to do so, a "taming" of Foucauldian theorising was a necessary step [3]. I wanted to test, rather than just assert, Foucault's relevance to understanding pedagogy.

Overall, I see taming Foucault as a positive accomplishment. Reducing some of his vast work on power to a few (relatively) tidy categories has, in my experience, certainly made these ideas more accessible to students and teachers and has enabled a whole set of data manipulations which are producing some very interesting findings. Paradoxically, there is a negative sense in which I have tamed or "domesticated" Foucault's work by decontextualising these techniques of power, and yet, it is precisely this decontextualisation and categorisation which increases the generalisability of my work. Furthermore, these simultaneously positive and negative effects of my efforts to use Foucauldian theory provide additional evidence in support of Foucault's view of power as both repressive and productive.

Coding categories developed for (one aspect of) the analysis of the data were generated from my reading of Foucault (especially Discipline and Punish, 1977). As I saw it, the major techniques of power which Foucault posited as characteristic of modern society and its institutions were surveillance, normalisation, exclusion, classification, distribution, individualisation, totalisation, and regulation. I examined my data for the existence and operation of these techniques of power in each site. These categories were useful for their capacity to address issues about power and pedagogy which have been raised in literature on radical pedagogy. Additionally, through their decontextualised derivation, they leave open other rhetorical options which will enable response to the fields of social analysis and philosophy, as well as educational policy and practice, on a scale much larger than the "local" site.

REAPING THE BENEFITS

Both philosophical work and systematically gathered data have been crucial in progress I have made towards the development of a theory of pedagogy. Despite my argument in this paper about the limits of philosophical work and the importance of empirical work, in my view, neither assumes central place. The claims I will be able to make from this project could not have been "thought," let alone supported, without its strong evidential base. Similarly, the empirical study could not have been thought, nor could it have been as useful, without the important and complex philosophical bodies of literature from which it emerged. The importance of each of these cannot be overstated. While it is common for this argument to be made (e.g., Bernstein, 1996), my intention is to illustrate how each is central to a project such as my own.

Below are some specific examples of what the empirical work has enabled in developing what I can say about pedagogy. In relation to these brief examples, I demonstrate how the data I have gathered and analysed assists with the functions I have attributed to philosophical work; namely, clarification, critique, alternatives and policy. It is not within the scope of this paper to present findings in any depth, but each of the claims I make in this section can be demonstrated and have been or will be reported more fully in other publications.

In earlier work I argued that radical pedagogy discourse was strong on social vision and rather weak on the articulation of specific instructional practices for pedagogy. I made use of Foucault's notion of regime of truth to argue that and explain how radical pedagogy discourses could be experienced as oppressive just as mainstream pedagogy could be oppressive. Beyond the abstract sense of power-knowledge and notions of the dangers inherent in everything (Foucault, 1983b), however, it was difficult to say much more about the "oppressive" effects of radical pedagogy. As I surmised then, surely radical pedagogy wasn't as oppressive as mainstream approaches, or at least oppressive in different ways. Proceeding further with the clarification of distinctions and similarities between radical and mainstream approaches required the kind of systematic evidence I have been arguing for in this paper.

A major finding of the study was that no site was free of the techniques of power I was exploring. This finding confirms Foucault's view that power is inescapable by demonstrating that, in pedagogy at least, specific techniques of power were evident in vastly different settings [4]. Even in the feminist reading group, far removed from the schooling institution and informed by critiques of patriarchal power, these techniques were employed. This data extends and clarifies existing thinking about radical pedagogy, pushing boundaries of thought about what is possible and how it functions.

This observation of power techniques in all sites also clarifies and extends arguments about radical pedagogy's functioning vis-a-vis mainstream pedagogy. For instance, this finding gives greater specificity to my earlier claim that, at the level of instructional practice, radical and mainstream pedagogies may not be as different as is claimed within the radical literature (Gore, 1993; in press). Although there are some qualitative differences in the configuration of power in each site and in the specific use of particular techniques of power, this evidence is useful in clarifying both the unique contribution of radical work and the limits of that work. It should also be useful in clarifying specific exercises of power (particularly in institutions) which are based more on tradition than need and which function in the interests neither of teachers nor students. School policies may well be targeted as a result of this work.

My preliminary analysis also has demonstrated that, of all the techniques of power studied, radical pedagogy, particularly in the teacher education site, was most strongly characterised by normalisation (Gore, 1996). While this finding was somewhat surprising, it gives greater specificity to my previous arguments about radical pedagogy's emphasis on social vision and the enactment of new regimes of truth around these pedagogies. It supports and extends those arguments by clarifying how teaching people to think beyond their current perspectives and dispositions is likely to be experienced as confronting. This finding also has potentially useful implications for understanding the resistance that some educators encounter when they attempt to enact radical pedagogies. That is, whichever techniques are most strongly experienced in a particular site are most likely to encounter resistance, if Foucault (1980) is correct that "there are no power relations without resistances; the latter are all the more real and effective because they are formed right at the point where relations of power are exercised" (p. 142, emphasis added).

CONCLUSION

With these brief examples, I have begun to demonstrate how the systematic empirical work in which I have engaged has produced findings which will be fundamental to advancing a theory of power relations in pedagogy. Separating philosophical and empirical domains of academic work for a project such as this is counterproductive and unnecessarily limiting both in terms of the claims which can be made and the audiences which will listen. In educational scholarship, where so much of our work is oriented at improvements in schooling practices and outcomes, this alliance of intellectual activities seems important far beyond the specific case I have addressed here.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

My thanks to James Ladwig and Gavin Hazel for their comments on earlier drafts of this paper. I am also grateful to the Australian Research Council and my own institution for the funding which has made the study possible, and to all who have participated in the production and analysis of data, especially Kellie Morrison, Gavin Hazel and Tom Griffiths.

Correspondence: Jennifer Gore, Education, The University of Newcastle, Callaghan, NSW 2308, Australia.

NOTES

[1] Philosophical work also has an empirical element. The distinction I am drawing in this paper is designed to highlight the degree to which what is typically referred to as "empirical reality" holds central place in the different kinds of scholarship under discussion here.

[2] With systematic evidence I may have something to offer such debates but to make it a focus of my work would be far removed from the original questions governing my research.

[3] I thank Philip Wexler for his provocative use of this expression in relation to my work.

[4] I want to point out that it would have been possible to not find each of these techniques of power, especially given the diversity of sites.

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