Episodes of Meaning Making in Qualitative Method
Jim Butler
Graduate School of Education
The University of Queensland
Abstract: This paper will address specific issues in the general problem of meaning making in the interpretive qualitative research paradigm. It will be a discussion derived from my personal practical knowledge of participating in such research. It will centre around two episodes that I have found in my journey: the epistemology of ‘sudden illuminations’ and the metaphysical question of the oneness of Being and therefore each single instance being implicitly revelatory of Being. The two episodes are intimately connected.
Introduction
In seeking to write an introduction to this short paper I feel I must refer to my reading of Bruner (1990). He has argued that contemporary psychology has lost touch with the broader intellectual community and that it needs to refocus on the deepest questions: ‘questions about how we construct our meanings and our realities, questions about the shaping of mind by history and culture’ (p. xi). In this paper the intention is to take up Bruner’s general theme of connecting research endeavours – in this instance qualitative method - to the broader intellectual community and to address some of the deepest questions.
Bruner (1990: 118) further argues that an interpretive psychology ‘seeks out the rules that human beings bring to bear in creating meanings in cultural contexts. These contexts are always contexts of practice.’ In this paper it is the intention to seek out rules that researchers use to create meanings in contexts of their own practice.
In this paper I will be focusing on my own research practice. The episodes that I have attempted to interpret are empirical episodes. They happened. I am unsure that I have interpreted them in a form that can communicate. But I offer the following meaning making as the present state of the matters. I realise that this could end in self delusion and fail completely.
Episode 1: The Sudden Illumination
The most profound transformational learning occurred within me during my time at the University of the South Pacific, Suva, which was part of my 1997 Special Studies Program. The solitude and reflection time at the University of the South Pacific gave me the gift of a 'sudden illumination'. The illumination for me was the validity of the idealist position (Watzlawick, 1984) that
Knowledge does not reflect an "objective" ontological reality, but exclusively an ordering and organisation of a world constituted by our experience.
For me this was the most wonderful of gifts, a true example of 'transformational learning', empirically demonstrating the validity of what I teach, a confirmation of what I live.
When I returned from Suva I read the following passage (Pieper, 1952):
The essence of knowledge does not consist in the effort for which it calls, but in grasping existing things and unveiling reality. Moreover, just as the highest form of virtue knows nothing of 'difficulty', so too the highest form of knowledge comes to man like a gift - the sudden illumination, a stroke of genius, true contemplation; it comes effortlessly and without trouble.
This theorising of Pieper about certain forms of knowledge being accessible under different forms of mental exertion and different learning settings resonated with some empirical experiences that I had had with a learning matrix proposed by Daloz (1987:214). In the Daloz matrix it was proposed that learning settings could be characterised by two dimensions: challenge and support. He arranged these in an orthogonal form and considered four learning settings:
HIGH LOW
CHALLENGE CHALLENGE
HIGH GROWTH CONFIRMATION
SUPPORT
LOW RETREAT STASIS
SUPPORT
When this matrix was examined with people learning in industrial settings the Daloz analysis was not confirmed in the lives of these people. And in fact, the implication that strong growth only occurs in one quadrant was not confirmed. It is recognised by people that learning and growth can take place in each of the four quadrants and the knowledge that is accessible in each is different, as Pieper argued. In particular, people confirmed that the form of learning that Pieper terms the ‘sudden illumination’ is most often the outcome of the Low Challenge/Low Support quadrant. And indeed this was confirmed in my own Suva experience. What I now believe is true about the Daloz matrix is contained in the following matrix:
HIGH LOW
CHALLENGE CHALLENGE
HIGH +GROWTH +CONFIRMATION
SUPPORT -LIMITING -DEMEANING
LOW +SOARING +ILLUMINATION
SUPPORT -RETREAT -STASIS
When the matrix has been analysed within people’s lived experience then each quadrant is shown to have possible positive and negative outcomes. The High Challenge/High Support quadrant is often the context where research projects and theses are undertaken. On the positive side learning and growth are achieved, but the learning can also be limited to the project goals and you know that you never learn all that can be learnt from the episode. I believe this negativity of quadrant 1is what Gallagher (1995) is referring to in her paper. In quadrant 2, Low Challenge/High Support, the positive outcome can be confirmation and self-confidence. The project gets done quickly and successfully. But to others this context is interpreted as demeaning because someone believes they need a lot of support to complete a small task. In quadrant 3, High Challenge/Low Support there is always the possibility of failure and the person can lose confidence and retreat. But there is also the possibility of people’s learning soaring and for maximal learning occurring, things learnt that could never be learnt in quadrant 1. Some doctoral studies are in this quadrant 3. In quadrant 4, Low Challenge/Low Support, there are dangers for individuals of lack of development and learning, but as Pieper argues there are also possibilities of receiving the greatest learning gifts. Every quadrant can be a trap or an opportunity. But the opportunities offered by each quadrant are not the same, and the knowledge available in each are not similar.
If the modified Daloz matrix is considered along with the Pieper analysis of knowledge generation and meaning making then it implies that qualitative researchers can expect to find themselves generating different levels of inference and synthesis from their data. If their mind is allowed, or encouraged to move through the different learning settings in the Daloz matrix then different forms of meaning will arise. Staying in quadrant 1 throughout the research process is not the way to generate the full meaning of the research episode. Quadrant 4 learning settings are important for qualitative researchers in order to make the grandest syntheses, the deepest meanings and to arrive at the fullest satisfaction of the research process.
Episode 2: The Revelation of the Single Instance
Another illumination that my mind gave to me concerns the meaning contained in a single instance of a class. For example, the meaning contained in the study of a single school or a single teacher or a single inservice episode. While supervising a doctoral student on the epistemic development of adolescent students (Brown, 1997) it came to me that ‘if you understand a single instance completely, you have understood everything, because of the unity of being.’ The following text is my attempt to follow through and to theorise this illumination.
In Taylor’s (1986: 4) words
From its inception in Greece, Western philosophy has, for the most part, privileged oneness and unity (the Same) at the expense of manyness and plurality (the Other). Accordingly, the Western philosophical project can be understood as the repeated effort to overcome plurality and establish unity by reducing the many to the one.
This characteristic of Western understanding, of reducing the many to the one, has had many positive and negative effects on science and culture. In terms of research method it has engendered a deep methodological fear: In studying a specific instance qualitatively have we wound up with a rich understanding of this instance but little ability to generalise beyond it? The qualitative method textbooks (Yin, 1994: 36) seek to address this important issue:
Critics typically state that single cases offer a poor basis for generalising. However, such critics are implicitly contrasting the situation to survey research, in which a "sample" readily generalises to a larger universe. This analogy to samples and universes is incorrect when dealing with case studies. This is because survey research relies on statistical generalisation, whereas case studies (as with experiments) rely on analytical generalisation. In analytical generalisation the investigator is striving to generalise a particular set of results to some broader theory. … A theory must be tested through replications of the findings … This replication logic is the same that underlies the use of experiments (and allows scientists to generalise from one experiment to another).
The image of generalisability is derived proximately from statistical procedures and distantly from Western philosophy. When the population is very numerous, like all nurses, or all schools, or all adolescents, … the method is always to take a sample from the population and the statistical models seek to determine the size of the sample so that the results can be generalised to the whole population. This concept of generalisability has set up the problem in such a way that the generalisability can be said to be strictly ‘horizontal’. It is horizontal in the sense that the inference about the population goes from the few to the many, where the few and the many are similar in some specific attribute. The inference path is direct from the sample to the population.
In the quote from Yin the problem of the generalisability of qualitative results is admitted and a solution offered. The solution is still situated within the scientific paradigm. In Yin’s solution the analytical generalisation must be bolstered by replication logic. What I am proposing is that Yin is correct in seeking a solution in the direction of analytical generalisations but that the paradigm must be a philosophic not a scientific one. The philosophic paradigm that is needed is one that emphasises the unity of being, however construed.
It is accepted with Chinese philosophy ( The Tao) and Indian philosophy (The Brahmin) and Western philosophy ( Aristotle’s Being, Hegel’s Geist) that all human beings are derived from the same source, or share in the same form, or are manifestations of the same Tao, Brahmin or Geist. If this premise is accepted then as deeper and deeper understandings are reached the divergence between individuals decreases. Because, as we get closer and closer to the Tao, Geist or being the properties or factors or explanatory understanding becomes more and more universal, in other words, variance decreases.
The qualitative methods with their focus on depth may reach levels within a single instance where the divergence between this instance and other numerous cases may be very small. It may be therefore possible to understand the essence of the many within the one instance. Another context may interact with the essence to show different manifestations in particular cases but the understanding of the one and hence the deep understanding of the other may lead to greater understanding of the many. Lave and Wenger (1991: 34) appear to have a similar understanding of the generalisability of qualitative results:
On the other hand, the world carries its own structure so that specificity always implies generality (and in this sense generality is not to be assimilated to abstractness): This is why stories can be so powerful in conveying ideas, often more so than an articulation of the idea itself. … The generality of any form of knowledge always lies in the power to renegotiate the meaning of the past and future in constructing the meaning of present circumstance.
Similarly Bernstein (1983:217) cites Arendt as arguing in a similar vein:
What Arendt is struggling to discriminate and isolate for us is a mode of thinking that is neither to be identified with the expression of private feelings not to be confused with the type of universality characteristic of ‘cognitive reason’. It is a mode of thinking that is capable of dealing with the particular in its particularity but which nevertheless makes the claim to communal validity. When one judges, one judges as member of a human community.
Therefore, the method would be proposed in this manner: Collect data at the level of the single instance. Infer from these phenomena the deep structure of the instance. The deeper one is able to go the broader and broader the generalisability will become. Having found the most profound truth this is then applicable to all other cases. So in understanding profoundly the single instance, the result has become profoundly generalisable. Knowledge has been gained about the whole population. It only remains to see how these profound truths work themselves out in particular instance. As an illustration of what I believe are profound truths that lie at the base of all qualitative educational research I refer to the work of Bugental (1981: 153):
Man finds himself thrown into a world of infinite possibilities where each moment is a choice point, each act give life (actuality) to some possibilities and condemns others to oblivion. From each such choice branch unimaginable consequences. It is this unimaginable quality that is at the base of man’s living in contingency. Contingency here means that any act has an infinite array of outcomes and man can at any point recognizes only some finite part of this infinite array. Man organises his choices, his adaptations, in terms of his estimation of the possibility of various outcomes and tries hard in the process to increase his chances of actualising that which he wants in his life, while diminishing the probabilities of that which he does not want. The impossibility of assuring the outcomes of one’s actions, the consequences of one’s actions means that always there exists the possibility of tragedy ensuring from any choice which one makes. This is the possibility against which we can never be completely insured.
The research literature rarely seeks to deal with tragedy in human endeavours like education but which are a feature of being, as Shakespeare knew and formulated so profoundly.
The philosophies mentioned earlier in this text all agree that the most powerful way to achieve this generalisable understanding of all humans is to focus on a profound understanding of the ‘self’. The understanding that has most generalisability, the understanding that has the most widespread use, comes from the most profound understanding of the self (Butler, 1996).
What is the level of understanding attained by qualitative research? These models I am proposing imply that the
The deeper and deeper one understands a single instance, the more and more generalisable the results become.
Conclusion
I have attempted to theorise my own meaning making, knowledge generating processes. I am proposing that interpretative qualitative method can and should take account of ‘sudden illuminations’. Similarly supervisors of theses and lecturers on qualitative method can and should tell the story of the four learning quadrants and their impact on knowledge and learning and that some knowledge is ‘grasping existing things and unveiling reality’.
References:
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