Paper proposal for ERA/AARE Joint Conference, 
Singapore, November 1996


TEACHERS: CHOIR OR SOLOISTS?


Jennifer Allen
Faculty of Education
University of Newcastle
CALLAGHAN. NSW. 2308


ABSTRACT

Educational discourses surrounding 'teacher thinking' are constrained 
historically by normative theory. These discourses have excluded the 
significance of critique in 'teacher thinking' definitions and 
disregarded the influence of ideology, resistance and 'vision'. This 
exclusion has constrained and 'objectified' constructions of teacher 
thinking. To challenge existing understandings of critical thinking and 
to reconstruct critical reflection as critique, this paper will explore 
the significance of the conversation between theory and practice, in 
the construction of 'critical thinking'. 

The aim of this paper is to provide a critique of the discourses that 
have historically defined teacher thinking through an investigation of 
six teacher's personal and collective contexts. The paper will report 
on the everyday lives of these teachers using critical ethnography and 
an archaeological approach. Furthermore the paper aims to reconstruct a 
discourse of teacher thinking that includes critique, whereby critical 
reflection encompasses the critique of individual and collective 
context through the historical analysis of ideology, resistance, and 
vision.






The choir stands poised... waiting... the conductor climbs to the 
podium to signal their beginning, their harmonious performance. They 
have practised, they have all been equipped, and they are now afforded 
the opportunity to perform. The conductor signals and the crowd is 
silenced. The choir begins, their voices a synchronised whole, but then 
a soloist is beckoned to step forward, their voice resonates a melody 
that had seemed so much a part of the whole and yet is now enjoyed 
alone. This voice cannot be heard as a solitary voice however, it will 
always be understood as coming from and returning to the choir. The 
conductor signals and the soloist recedes they sing again with the 
whole. The conductor has hoped for a flawless performance, a 
synchronised melody, where each voice sings as part of a melodious 
multitude. She is well pleased as the performance concludes, her 
guidance complete she ascends. She will wait now assured that the choir 
will require her again, for it is in her direction that they are 

assured of their performance.

In my initial leap into the discourses that explore teacher thinking, 
 specifically critical reflection, I began the ascent to the podium that 
 I thought would help me conduct and equip the choir of teachers. I had 
 read and scrutinised my 'music' and studied carefully the composers in 
 the many educational disciplines. In reaching the podium however I 
 realised that I could not be that conductor. I was not concerned at 
 this point about whether anyone else could claim to conduct this choir 
 in unison, knowing only that I could not. I struggled with hearing lone 
 voices within the whole, of recognising the lived experience of 
 teachers as well as their performance as deserving an audience.

I also began to understand as did Rusch (1994) why Kenwyn Smith (1985) 
 used the singing of rounds as a metaphor to explain the complexities of 
 researching human relationships in organisations. A round is one simple 
 and brief tune, repeated over and over, and when joined by other voices 
 at the right moment becomes a symphony. Rusch recalls that 'my research 
 represented that kind of challenge: how to enter the song that was in 
 progress, join in the singing without disrupting the tune, stop singing 
 the song, and capture the many voices that continued in the discourse 
 and the actions of' (p.34).

I also became aware of the illusionary barriers that excluded 
 educational researchers from some discourses. Whilst Kuhn (1970) 
 described research paradigms as loosely connected sets of philosophical 
 beliefs, methods, and exemplars in problem solving which establish 
 boundaries for research, I found these boundaries uncompromising, 
 tightly constructed."1. In giving myself over to the "spirit of 
 adventure" I soon realised that the quest to "conduct teacher thinking" 
 was a journey of exploration, a hermeneutical journey, that would not 
 end in "climbing to the podium" but of continual discoveries; the 
 journey itself is worthwhile. I was as described by Maxine Greene 
 seeking "shimmering fragments offered to the understanding rather than 
 taking refuge in remaking the familiar, calm surface of things (Greene 
 1989, p.320). The choir now had changed, the whole became fragmented, 
 shifting as if the platform on which it stood wavered, the aporias of 
 meaning pushing upward under the platform.

In the context of venturing across disciplinary waters where knowledge 
 itself is a shimmering fragment offered to understanding, my research 
 began the dislocation of critical reflection or teacher critical 
 reflection from the description of teacher thinking, namely critical 
 thinking as a "tool".2 To dislocate definitions of "critical thinking" 
 from that of "tool" is to regard reflection as a process that is 
 embedded in critique, given voice within ideology, resistance and 
 vision. It is to unite knowledge and being, theory and practice, 
 abstract philosophizing and praxis. It is to examine the voices within 
 the choir, the everyday lives of the choir members, and what it is that 
 gives them voice.

Teacher thinking discourses that have been born of "technical" and 
 "individualistic" conceptions of critical thinking depict an alienated 
 character of knowledge, where knowledge and being are disconnected. 
 Critical thinking is lifted out of a social, cultural and historical 

 context, where teachers, like choir members are indistinguishable. 
 Understandings of critical thinking transpose within shifting 
 paradigms, often in dialectical relationships. The dialectical 
 relationship between "rationalistic" and "relativistic" ideology is 
 mirrored in the ongoing debate surrounding the nature of critical 
 thinking, and yet Mackenzie (1989) poses that the critical thinking 
 movement is "refreshingly innocent of the history of its own ideas" 
 (p.87).

Theories of critical thinking influenced by technicism and 
 individualism construct teacher thinking in a paradigm which: (1) 
 separates mind and material world, knowing and being, and dislocates 
 and relocates the individual as having discrete elements which have 
 their own innate qualities that are distinct from and unrelated to 
 other elements, disregard for the body and the other; 3 (2) assumes 
 harmony, consensus, equilibrium and predictability regulating fields 
 available to critique; (3) advances a lack of attention given to the 
 critique of ideology, "vision", and the discursive relations that 
 reveal how thought is historically formed through language and 
 institutional practices; (4) disregard for immanence, enigma, aporias 
 and contradiction; and (5) the fortification of dialectical relations 
 based on rationality (Popkewitz, 1992, p.14-15).

In seeking to confront existing definitions of critical thinking the 
 hermeneutic audience of the choir was underway. Hermeneutics was not 
 considered here just an alternative procedure for research, but rather 
 what we all practice, what guides all research, a search for meaning. 
 Sparks (1993) describes the practice of hermeneutics as a homecoming, 
 an excursion and return to one shared world before paradigm boundaries, 
 (p.13).4 In fashioning the research process hermeneutics itself was a 
 portrait of critically reflexive knowledge, exploring what is "at play" 
 in what participants are saying and doing.5 It is also a reminder of 
 the complex conversation and multiple meanings that fuse to construct 
 propositions.6 The conversation of the many disciplines within 
 education, seeking to inform new understandings of critical thinking. 
 In the words of Charles Taylor (1989) to make what is called "epistemic 
 gain", moving from one problematic position to a more adequate one.7

A disciplinary conversation conferring about "critical thinking" would 
 be plagued however with a variety of terminology for reflection, or a 
 "clatter of terms"8 (including reflective inquiry, practical reasoning, 
 self-reflection, reflectivity, deductive reasoning, syllogistic 
 reasoning, logical reasoning, creative thinking, problem solving, 
 convergent and divergent thinking metacognition, and meta-thinking). Of 
 greater concern is the ongoing debates over the "essence" of critical 
 thinking. 

Social philosophers have argued historically for a normative theory of 
 "correct" reasoning (Weinstein, 1988) and more recently debated the 
 notion of general thinking skills (Ennis, 1980; McPeck, 1981). 
 Educational psychology argued the significance of innate capacities and 
 more recently has expounded largely on the cognitive psychologists to 
 argue a universal mechanism for cognitive development with critical 
 thinking as dependent on cognitive structures, adaptive intelligence, 
 and the processing of information. 9 Sociology of education has argued 

 recently over the role of critical thinking in providing a resistant 
 voice within structural practices to achieve emancipation. 

Whilst stated in general terms, each of these discourses struggles with 
 a central aporetic dilemma in seeking epistemic gains in sketching 
 critical thinking. This aporia centres on critical thinking as a 
 generalised skill that can be "taught" and perhaps "mastered" to enable 
 individuals to "reason" and assess, an ability to "think critically" in 
 a wide variety of contexts. The intent of developing one's "capacity" 
 to think critically is the result that people whose skills are 
 developed will behave in a socially effective and perhaps "acceptable" 
 manner. The use of the word "skill" in these discourses has been 
 problematic.

Bonnett (1995) aptly describes the general abilities thesis as placing 
 the emphasis on "form" of thinking, as a very instrumental view of 
 thinking, motivated by the desire to turn the environment into a 
 resource. 

....the "good" thinker is the decisive thinker who ingeniously 
manipulates and structures things; who defines, analyses and 
synthesises, vigorously cutting through obscurity and mystery which are 
felt as so much encumbering and unnecessary obfuscation....prowess is 
shown through the dexterous employment of strategies, techniques and 
skills for devising systems and schemes for swift definition and 
resolution of problems so that clear unambiguous pathways for effective 
action can flow unimpeded. That is what comes to constitute power of 
mind. (Bonnett, 1995, p.304)

In this emphasis the thinker and the world are disconnected and it is 
assumed that form and content can be separated. "The will to action has 
overrun and crushed thought" (Heidegger 1954, p.25). Furthermore 
Gadamer (1989) contends that in seeking to eliminate prejudice we 
eliminate possibilities. The aporetic dilemma then pushing up under the 
platform of the choir is manifested in the continued contestation over 
the contextual framework for critical thinking. 

Within teacher education the contestation is evident in the debate 
 between Cruickshank's "reflective teaching" and Zeichner's challenge. 
 Liston and Zeichner (1990) suggest that "we operate with a folk 
 psychology that attempts to understand educational phenomena through 
 examining the actions and intentions of individuals while giving only a 
 limited recognition to the influences of the social context" (p. 611). 
 Schon (1983) proposed that the teacher as a professional is not 
 involved in an applied science, but should be proficient in 'reflection 
 in action'. This view of the teacher focuses on interactive and 
 interpretive skills in the analysis of problems and begins to address 
 the relationship of context to teacher thinking. Schon argues that 
 real-world problems are not predictable or well structured but require 
 continual 'conversation' with context.  

Another challenge to the influence of technical rationality on teacher 
 thinking research has developed from critical social science. Critical 
 theory sought to redefine reflection as a search for meaning, 
 enlightenment, empowerment and emancipation. 10 Here the process of 

 reflection is not concerned with adapting to one's socio-cultural 
 environment but in the development of theory through an appraisal of 
 self and society. It encourages a site for the evaluation of ideology, 
 transformation and vision. Individuals and collective groupings need to 
 be aware of their historical self-creation and the taken-for-granted' 
 influences upon this creation.  Critical social science also argued 
 that theories of critical thinking had been 'naively individualised', 
 and have disregarded social and collective context.11

Jurgen Habermas challenges Kant's grounding of knowledge and practical 
 reason in individual reflection. Instead of such a "monological" 
 approach, Habermas favours a "dialogical" emphasis on 
 intersubjectivity. In this way Habermas moves beyond a philosophy 
 rooted only in individual consciousness. 12 Thus for Habermas, 
 reconstructions assist self reflection by helping to make individuals 
 aware of what they already know and the necessary presuppositions that 
 operate in all their 'acts of cognition'. The aim then is to analyse 
 the deep structures of cognition and action that function in the 
 endeavours of individuals. 13

The work of Robert Ennis (1962, 1980, 1987) described critical thinking 
 as skills, abilities, or proficiencies necessary for the proper 
 evaluation of statements that could be taught through education, which 
 became known as the "pure skills" conception of critical thinking 
 (Siegel, 1988) 14 His most recent work however has begun to consider 
 the "biases" that may plague critical thinking, particularly in 
 relation to gender. John McPeck has cultivated the most prominent 
 debate against Ennis and his generalised proficiencies.15 According to 
 McPeck "thinking is always thinking about something. To think about 
 something is a conceptual impossibility" (1981, p.3). McPeck continues 
 to represent the view that critical thinking is "discipline specific" 
 (1990a; 1990b). Paul also challenged the work of Ennis claiming that 
 his "atomistic" view must be replaced by a focus on argument 
 networks.16 Of note in Paul's work is his reference to the context of 
 critical thinking and the notion of resistance, ideology and commentary 
 concerning oneself. In favouring a consideration of argument networks 
 or 'world views', self-deception, and a sensitivity to egocentric and 
 sociocentric component's of one's own worldview Paul has alluded to 
 ideological concerns and the need to evaluate oneself, and how an 
 individual may resist critical thinking. Harvey Siegel (1988) also 
 examined the role of ideology within critical thinking, particularly as 
 it relates to rationality, and has also been a key figure in this 
 debate.17 

To delve still further into the aporetic cavern is to argue that these 
 concerns should not only be addressed as individual concerns, but also 
 in relation to discursive practices, engaging in the critique of 
 ideology and rationality, vision and immanence. It is through the 
 examination of the multiple discourses that inform critical thinking 
 that we analyse the contradictions looking for ruptures, 
 inconsistencies, and incompatibilities, the ontological 'site' of 
 critique. It is not that 'rationality' does not exist in some form, 
 only that a positivistic understandings of rationality presents 
 monological journeys through critical thought, as individuals, armed 
 with the generaliseable skill of critical thinking navigate, or rather 

 control the road on which they walk.18

What of the unknown however?19. "Much current talk of teacher thinking 
 under the influence of the general thinking abilities thesis seems to 
 treat thinking as though it were essentially concerned with the known 
 rather than the unknown" (Bonnett 1995, p.306) The raison d'etre of 
 thinking is to accomplish understanding of both the known and the 
 unknown. Thinking is not only the neutral acceptance of what is 
 "natural". The discourse concerning critical thinking then, is prone to 
 "the intimidation of science" as it mirrors the epistemological context 
 in which it grows, and yet ponders the context of critical thinking as 
 static. The central focus has become for some the conquering of one's 
 environment where intelligent behaviour and logic are preeminent.20 

In revisiting critical thinking as limited and constrained by the 
 educational discourses surrounding it, I now move deliberately, using 
 the term "critical reflection", rather than critical thinking. In so 
 doing including the voice of critique, ideology, resistance, 
 transformation, uniting knowledge and being. Foucault (1984) describes 
 thought as "what allows one to step back from this way of acting or 
 reacting, to present it to oneself as an object of thought and question 
 it as to its meaning, its conditions, its goals. Thought is freedom in 
 relation to what it does, the motion by which it detaches oneself from 
 it, establishes it as an object and reflects on it as a problem". 
 (p.288)

Critical reflection is "of thought and question, as to its meaning, its 
 conditions, its goals...in relation to what it does". It is not then a 
 monologist authority or voice, but dialogically defined within 
 discursive practices of ideology and vision. It is concerned with 
 "latent puzzle", with illusion. In examining the "latent puzzle", 
 however critical reflection is also linked to immanent critique, to 
 praxis. Critical reflection is not only thinking that "objectifies" 
 context and thus excludes it as neutral, known, and monological, 
 neither is it concerned with transcendental critique that sanctions 
 disregard for the "reality" of being. Rather it is concerned with 
 critical reflection that is driven by a sense of transcending direction 
 or "vision", of imagination, of possibilities which lives within 
 history, critique and praxis.

It is in hearing at times the discord in the choir that one becomes 
 aware of the immanence of critical reflection. Whilst it is not the 
 purpose of this paper to provide an extensive justification of immanent 
 critique as a research method let us briefly examine immanent critique 
 as it has journeyed the "otherworldliness" of paradigm shifts. Marx, 
 Hegel, Horkheimer, and Habermas have shifted in historically specific 
 and transhistorical theories, in responding to despair and optimism. In 
 examining each of these theories there are a number of commonalities 
 that emerge, that are key considerations in exploring understandings of 
 critical reflection. The first of these is the critique of "unexamined 
 givens" and ideology as "dogmatic moments" became grounded in the 
 uncritical relation of the knower to the genesis of knowledge, and the 
 "conditions" through which knowledge emerged.21  The understanding of 
 the object as "actuality" would manifest the object as false, exposing 
 internal and external contradictions. Thus within immanent critique the 

 juxtaposition of actuality and intention, between ideas and reality is 
 integral. The task of the individual as critic is to expose that the 
 given is not a mere fact, that to understand it to be actuality is also 
 to criticise it by showing what it could be but is not. 22

Calhoun (1995) describes immanent critique as "a critique that worked 
 from within the categories of existing thought, radicalised them, and 
 showed in varying degrees both their problems and their unrecognised 
 possibilities....Critique was required as a tool for finding and 
 heightening the tensions between the merely existent and its 
 possibilities" (1995 p.23). Critique then must also be driven by a 
 sense of transcending direction through continued change in practice. 
 "Dramatic personal and social change becomes possible by becoming aware 
 of the way ideologies- sexual, racial, religious, educational, 
 occupational, political, economic and technological- have created or 
 contributed to our dependency on reified powers" (Mezirow, 1981, 
 p.6).23 

This concept is vital to an understanding of immanent critique. 
 Critique does not arise from the philosophical ideals of theorist alone 
 but rather it arises from the concrete structures of human life. As 
 suggested by Benhabib, "what distinguishes rational 
 reconstructions....is their empirical fruitfulness in generating 
 further research, their viability to serve as models in a number of 
 fields, and their capacity to order and explain complex phenomena into 
 intelligible narratives" (1986, p.269). Immanent critique must then 
 have as its focus actuality in relation to intention and must 
 concentrate on issues that arise out of the lives of those to whom the 
 critique will be most useful.

The journey seeks to critique the ideological, political, and 
 historical context of the discourses surrounding teacher thinking. As 
 such immanent critique places praxis as central in portraits of 
 critical reflection. Dewey (1933) portrayed reflection as involving a 
 number of cyclical phases beginning with an intentional endeavour to 
 discover specific connections between action and consequence. Whilst 
 Dewey is not describing an examination of the contradictions between 
 the actual and ideal, the need for critique to be defined in respect to 
 action and change is supported within immanent critique. Critique as 
 pure "theory" is regarded as deficient, and without the link to action 
 (praxis) is naively idealistic. 24 Critique then within the definition 
 of immanence is inextricably linked to action, with practical intent.

An immanent critique of definitions of critical thinking and critical 
 reflection is concerned with validity, ideology, and power relations, 
 in view of understanding teacher knowledge and being. Through immanent 
 critique critical reflection also aims to assess the breach between 
 ideas and reality; to examine the relationship between actuality and 
 ideal; to examine the contradictions between the external and the 
 internal; to examine problems that arise from human encounters in 
 everyday experience; to maintain a utopian potential and vision for the 
 future; and yet to recognise the historical contextuality of knowledge.

Michel Foucault reduces all scientific knowledge to ideology....In 
other word ideology is either reduced to other forms of thinking, or 

other forms of thinking are reduced to ideology; either ideology is 
defined by including it in other spheres of thinking, or other spheres 
of thinking are included in ideology (Balaban 1995, p.77).

For Foucault ideology never reflects or distorts real relationships; it 
participates in them. Balaban describes the dialectical relationship 
between a critique of ideology that always asks whether ideology is a 
kind of false consciousness (anti-formalism), and a critique or whether 
it is an expression of the social milieu of those who sustain it and 
thus neither true or false (Formalism) (1995,pp.53-54).25 It is 
possible within immanent critique to embrace the seemingly paradoxical 
approach-that false consciousness and real form do not contradict each 
other (only in the context of formalism and anti-formalism) but are 
compatible, and that neutral and critical conceptions of ideology 
participate in the dialogical process of critical reflection. For 
Marswick and Watkins (1990) ideology is reified through the dialogic 
process. Furthermore Balaban (1995) describes the inner contradictions 
included in any ideology, which do not appear not specific to time and 
place, but are. "Neither science nor knowledge can make ideologies go 
away...An ideology can be replaced but not annulled" (p.112-113).

Siegel (1988) claims that rationality can transcend ideology and 
 refutes the "ideological determinist". 26 To claim however that 
 rationality is autonomous from ideology suggests that rationality is 
 always neutral and not embedded in validity concerns. This is however 
 evident in Siegel's definition of ideology as "a general framework that 
 shapes individual consciousness, guides and legitimates belief and 
 action, and renders experience meaningful" (1988, p.65). Siegel fails 
 to include the "taken for granted", "false consciousness", the 
 influence of power relations, and discursive practices in his 
 definition of ideology. He has removed from rationality a site for 
 being, and from ideology the site of critique. It is not so much a 
 concern of "which comes first" but rather how are rationality and 
 ideology related through critique? The possibility of critical 
 reflection being "naive" of ideology or transcending ideological 
 concerns is disputed here. 27

In presenting this paper as a work in progress, this research six 
 teachers everyday lives will "sing" critical reflection through 
 immanent critique as we carol together. Through critical ethnography we 
 examine complex, situated, ambiguous, and conflicting interactions of 
 teacher culture, of the many voices within the choir. Within the 
 artistry of immanent critique a heuristic explores the context of 
 teachers within a particular historical and social location (to paint a 
 portrait of the "real" situation of teachers, of being). An archaeology 
 of critical thinking will denote a level of analysis of discourses to 
 grasp their "rules of formation", as merely a pure description of 
 discursive events (Foucault 1972, pp.206-7). "That which Foucault 
 treats as discourse is an apparently amorphous mass of statements in 
 which the archaeologist discovers a regularity of "dispersion" rather 
 than a hidden system of knowledge underlying it (Dant 1991, p.129). 

The ethnographic composition will then serve to critique the musical 
 denotations of teachers composed by educational discourses. With these 
 two compositions standing side by side their likeness or contradiction 

 can be examined in view of reconstructing a dialogical discourse to 
 interpret teacher thinking as a site for critique, ideology, 
 resistance, and vision. This paper declares that much more should be 
 said about the individual voices within the "choirist" definitions of 
 teacher thinking.

 To critically reflect is not necessarily a battle fought around 
 opposing contradictions and disciplines. The exploration is not of 
 harmonious synchronised voices where the conductor or researcher is 
 predominant but of lifeworld that grapples with changed lives and 
 practices. The choir acknowledges notes of discord, for in juxtaposing 
 the written score to the verbal performance one can begin to understand 
 what it is that pushes up through the floor of the platform. The 
 soloist a harmony does not make, neither if the choir is always 
 synchronised, and there are notes that some long to sing apart from 
 that which is written. 


Bibliography

Allen, J. (1992a). Reflection as critical for the teacher. In T. Lovat 
(ed.) Sociology for Teachers. Wentworth Falls: Social Science Press.
Allen, J. (1992b). The Knowledge Classroom: Open or Closed?  In T. 
Lovat (ed.) Sociology for Teachers. Wentworth Falls: Social Science 
Press.
Allen, J. (1992c). Marx: The continuing influence. In T. Lovat (ed.) 
Sociology for Teachers. Wentworth Falls: Social Science Press.
Balaban, O. (1995). Politics and Ideology. Aldershot: Avebury.
Barrow, R. (1991). The Generic Fallacy. Educational Philosophy and 
Theory, 23(1), 7-17.
Benhabib, S. (1986). Critique, Norm, and Utopia: A Study of the 
Foundations of Critical Theory. New York: Columbia Uni. Press.
Biggs, J. & Collis, K. (1982). Evaluating the Quality of Learning: The 
SOLO Taxonomy. New York: Academic Press.
Bloom, B., Engelhart, M., Furst, E., Hill, W., & Krathwohl, D. (1956). 
Taxonomy of Educational Objectives I: Cognitive Domain. New York: 
McKay.
Bonnett, M. (1995). "Teaching Thinking, and the Sanctity of Content", 
Journal of Philosophy of Education ,29(3) pp.295-309.
Brezinka, W. (1992). Philosophy of Educational Knowledge. translated by 
James Stuart Brice and Raoul Eshelman. Dordrecht: Holland.
Calderhead, J. (1989). Reflective Teaching and Teacher Education. 
Teaching and Teacher Education, 5(1), 43-51.
Calhoun, C. (1995). Critical Social Theory: Culture, History, and the 
Challenge of Difference. Oxford: Blackwell.
Cruickshank, D. & Applegate, J.H. (1981). Reflective Teaching as a 
Strategy for Teacher growth.  Educational Leadership, 38(7), 553-554.
Dant, T. (1991). Knowledge, Ideology and Discourse: A Sociological 
Perspective. London: Routledge.
Dewey, J. (1916). Democracy and Education. New York: Macmillan.
Dewey, J. (1933). How we think. Lexington: Heath.
Elliott, R.K. (1976). Imagination: 'a kind of magical faculty', 
Inaugural Lecture, University of Birmingham.
Ennis, R.H. (1962). A Concept of Critical Thinking. Harvard Educational 
Review, 32(1), 81-111.

Ennis, R. H. (1980). A Conception of Rational Thinking. In. J.R. Coombs 
(ed.) Philosophy of Education 1979: Proceedings of the Thirty-Fifth 
Annual Meeting of the Philosophy of Education Society. Bloomington, 
Illinois: Philosophy of Education Society. 
Ennis, R. H. (1987). 'A Taxonomy of Critical Thinking Dispositions and 
Abilities'. In J. Baron & R. Sternberg (eds) Teaching Thinking Skills: 
Theory and Practice. New York: Freeman.
Ennis, R. H. (1989). 'Critical Thinking and Subject Specificity: 
Clarification and Needed Research', Educational Researcher, 18, April, 
pp.4-10. 
Ennis, R. H. (1990). 'The Extent to Which Critical Thinking is Subject 
Specific: Further Clarification', Educational Researcher, 19 (4), 
pp.13-16.
Entwistle, N. & Ramsden, P. (1983) Understanding Student Learning. 
London: Croom Helm.
Fay, B. (1987). Critical Social Science. New York: Cornell Uni. Press.
Fenwick, T. (1994). New Perspectives on Professionals' Learning: The 
Liberatory and Limiting Potential of Dialogue. Uni. Of Alberta
Foucault, M. (1972). The Archaeology of Knowledge, A.M. Sheridan-Smith. 
New York: Pantheon.
Foucault, M. (1973). The Birth of the Clinic: An Archaeology of Medical 
Perception. New York: Pantheon.
Foucault, M. (1977). 'Nietzche, Genealogy, History', trans. Donald 
Bouchard and Sherry Simon, in Donald Bouchard (ed.), Language, 
Counter-Memory, Practice. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Foucault, M. (1984). 'Polemics, Politics and Problematisations: An 
Interview. In Foucault: A reader, ed. P. Rabinow New York: Pantheon 
Books. 
Gadamer, H-G. (1977). Philosophical Hermeneutics. trans. by David. E. 
Linge. Berkeley: Uni. Of California Press.
Goodman, R.F. & Fisher, W.R. (1995). Rethinking Knowledge: Reflections 
Across the Disciplines. Albany: State of University of New York Press.
Greene, M. (1989). Educational Philosophy and Teacher Empowerment. 
Paper presented at the National Forum of the Association of Independent 
Liberal Arts Colleges for Teacher Education, Indianapolis, June 2-4, 
1989.
Grondin, J. (1991). Introduction to Philosophical Hermeneutics. New 
Haven: Yale Uni. Press.
Guilford, J. (1956). The Structure of Intellect. Psychological 
Bulletin, 53, 267-293.
Habermas, J. (1972a). Knowledge and Human Interests. London: Heinemann.
Habermas, J. (1972b). Communication and the evolution of society. 
London: Heinemann.
Habermas, J. (1974). Theory and Practice. London: Heinemann.
Habermas, J. (1976). Legitimation Crisis. London: Heinemann.
Habermas, J. (1987a). The Theory of Communicative Action vol. 2. 
Lifeworld and System: A Critique of Functionalist Reason. Boston: 
Beacon Press.
Habermas, J. (1987b). The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity. 
Cambridge: Polity Press.
Hager, P. (1994). John Anderson on Critical Thinking. Educational 
Philosophy and Theory, 26(1), 54-70
Haynes, F. (1991). Towards an Archaeology of Critical Thinking. 
Educational Philosophy and Theory, 23(1), 121-140.
Hegel, G.W.F. (1975). Natural Law. T.M. Knox, trans. Philadelphia: Uni. 

of Pennsylvannia Press.
Heidegger, M. (1954). What is called thinking? Translated. J.G., Gray 
1968, New York: Harper Row.
Held, D. (1980). Introduction to Critical Theory: Horkheimer to 
Habermas. Berkeley: Uni. of California Press.
Horkheimer, M. (1974). Eclipse of Reason. New York: Seabury Press.
Hoy, D.C. & McCarthy, T. (1994). Critical Theory. Oxford: Blackwell.
Jensen, A. (1970). Hierarchical theories of mental ability. In 
Dockrell, W. (ed.), On Intelligence. London: Methuen.
Kuhn, D., Amsel, E. & O'Loughlin, M. (1988) The development of 
scientific thinking skills. Orlando: Academic Press.
Kuhn, T.S. (1970). The structure of scientific revolutions. Chicago: 
Uni. of Chicago.
Liston, D. & Zeichner, K. (1990). Teacher Education and the Social 
Context of Schooling: Issues for Curriculum Development. American 
Educational Research Journal, 27(4), 610-636. 
Mackenzie, J. (1989). Review of Siegel, H. Educating Reason: 
Rationality, Critical Thinking and Education, Educational Philosophy 
and Theory, 21(1), 87-90.
Madison, G.B. (1990). Hermeneutics of Postmodernity: Figures and 
Themes. Bloomington: Indiana Uni. Press.
Marx, K. (1967). Capital. New York: International Publishers.
Marx, K. & Engels, F. (1980). Werke. Berlin: Dietz.
McPeck, J. (1981). Critical Thinking and Education. New York: St. 
Martin's Press.
McPeck, J. (1990a). Teaching Critical Thinking, Dialogue and Dialectic. 
New York: Routledge.
McPeck, J. (1990b). 'Critical Thinking and Subject Specificity': A 
Reply to Ennis', Educational Researcher, 19 (4) pp.10-12.
Messer, S. (1976). Reflection-Impulsivity: a review. Psychological 
Bulletin, 83(6), 1026-1052.
Mezirow, J. (1981). A critical theory of adult learning and education. 
Adult Education, 32(1), 3-24.
Mezirow, J. (1990). Fostering critical reflection in adulthood: A Guide 
to Transformative and Emancipatory Learning. San Francisco: 
Jossey-Bass.
O'Loughlin, M. & Campbell, M.B. (1988). Teacher Preparation, teacher 
Empowerment, and Reflective Inquiry: A Critical Perspective. Education 
and Society, 6(1), 54-70.
Parker, W. (1991). Achieving thinking and decision-making objectives in 
social studies. In J. Shaver (Ed). Handbook of Research on Social 
Studies Teaching and Learning (pp.345-356). New York: Macmillan.
Paul, R.W. (1982). Teaching critical thinking in the 'strong' sense: A 
focus on self-deception, world views, and a dialectical mode of 
analysis. Informal Logic Newsletter, 4(2), 2-7. 
Plato. (1952). The republic, translated B. Jowett. In R.M. Hutchins 
(ed.) Great Books of the Western World: vol.7. Plato. Chicago: 
Encyclopedia Britannica. pp.295-441.
Popkewitz, T. (1992). Constructing the Subject: The Handbook of 
Research on Teacher Education. Unpublished paper. Madison, Wisconsin: 
Wisconsin Center for Education Research, University of 
Wisconsin-Madison.
Poster, M. (1984). Foucault, Marxism and History. Cambridge: Polity.
Quinn, V. (1994). In Defence of Critical Thinking as a Subject: if 
McPeck is wrong he is wrong. Journal of Philosophy of Education, 28(1), 

101-111.
Rusch, E.A. (1994) Gaining Voice: Democratic Praxis in Restructured 
Schools. Paper presented at the American Educational Research 
Association, New Orleans, April 4-8.
Schon, D.A. (1983). The Reflective Practitioner. New York: Basic Books.
Schon, D.A. (1987). Educating the Reflective Practitioner. San 
Francisco: Jossey Bass.
Siegel, H. (1988). Educating Reason: Rationality, Critical Thinking, 
and Education. New York: Routledge. 
Siegel, H. (1991). The Generalizability of Critical Thinking. 
Educational Philosophy and Theory, 23(1), 18-30.
Sparks, E.T. (1993). A Paradigm Shift to Reading around the Hermeneutic 
Circle. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the National Reading 
Conference, Charleston, December 1-4, 1993.
Taylor, C. (1985). Philosophy and the Human Sciences: Philosophical 
Papers II. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Taylor, C. (1989). Sources of Self. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press.
Thompson, J.B. (1990). Ideology and Modern Culture. Cambridge: Polity 
Press.
Toulmin, S. (1995). Foreword in pp.ix-xvi. in R.F Goodman & W.R. Fisher 
Rethinking Knowledge: Reflections Across the Disciplines. New York: 
State Uni.of New York.
Vygotsky, L.S. (1978). Mind in Society: The development of higher 
psychological processes. Cambridge: Harvard Uni. Press.
Walsh, P. (1992). Discourses of the Reflective Educator, Journal of 
Philosophy of Education, 26 (2), pp.139-151.
Weinstein, M. (1988). Reason and Critical Thinking. Informal Logic 
Newsletter, 10(1), 1-2.
White, S. (1988). The recent work of Jurgen Habermas: Reason, justice 
and modernity. Cambridge: Cambridge Uni. Press.
Witkin, H.A., Moore, C.A., Goodenough, D.R. & Cox, P.W. (1977). 
Field-dependent and field-independent cognitive styles and their 
educational implications. Review of Educational Research, 47, 1-64.
Young, R.E. (1989). A critical theory of education. New York: Harvester 
Wheatsheaf.
Zeichner, K.M. & Teitelbaum, K. (1982). Personalised and 
Inquiry-Oriented Teacher Education. Journal of Education for Teaching, 
8, 95-117.

NOTES
1. The everyday lives of teachers is apropos dialogue in one 
discipline, but was deemed gauche within another. The ordinary lives of 
ordinary people, guided by "common sense" understandings was regarded 
by Plato as "ignorance parading as knowledge. Elizabeth Sparks (1993) 
recounts Plato's conceptualisation of knowledge in these terms and 
describes how her awareness of the 'ontological difference' opens a 
portal of opportunity for understanding differently what is given in 
giftedness.


2. Still others journey as if there are no boundaries, venturing 
masterfully across disciplinary waters. Walsh (1992) describes these 
relaxed disciplinary frontiers citing the writings of Habermas and 
Foucault, who "continually flout those between social philosophy, 

social theory, psychology and history" (p.140). Educational research 
seeking to know teacher thinking has been challenged not only by the 
intersections of the discourses but their interdependence. Toulmin 
(1995) describes the twentieth century as "a time of extraordinary 
change in every branch of philosophy and the social sciences, above all 
epistemology...the last time our ideas about knowledge went through 
such a deep change was the mid-seventeenth century" 
(p.ix).Alternatively this search should not like Wofgang Brezinka 
argues emphasise the need for a unified theory of educational science, 
dependent on philosophical studies, including epistemology and the 
philosophy of science, wielding as tools enlightenment, rationality, 
and critical reflection (1992, p.227).

3. See Charles Taylor, p.57-60 in Goodman, R.E. & Fisher, W.R. (1995) 
for a discussion of 'this kind of consciousness' in relation to radical 
reflexivity.


4. Following Escher, Sparks, E.T. (1993) depicts the hermeneutic 
circle, the continuous path comprising four "turns" offering four 
"gifts"; the gifts of imagination, enigma, ignorance, and incarnation. 
Sparks depicts Escher's woodcuts from Escher, M.C. (1967) The graphic 
work of M.C. Escher, translated J.E. Brigham, New York: Ballantine 
Books. The 'gifts' are described as vision (imagination); enigma 
(salute to the hermeneutic stranger in our midst); ignorance (the 
beginning of wisdom is the gift of ignorance); and incarnation 
(becoming oneself is losing oneself).

5. Marcus discusses reflexivity as the integral bias of any hermeneutic 
practice further in Goodman & Fisher 1995, p.108-9.


6. See Grondin 1991 (p.133) for further discussion of hermeneutics as 
critically reflexive knowledge.

7. For a further discussion of 'epistemic gain' as an alternative to 
absolute truth claims or complete relativism see Charles Taylor (1989) 
in his 'Excursus on Historical Explanation' in Sources of the Self, and 
(1985) Philosophy and the Human Sciences.
8. A phrase coined by Walter Parker (1991).
9. The 'cognitive' emphasis within psychology has considered how 
teachers process information and make decisions. 'Cognitive styles' 
have been used to suggest preferred ways of organising and processing 
information. Reflection/impulsivity (Messer, 1976) field-dependent and 
independent styles (Witkin, et al., 1977), convergent and divergent 
ability, (Guilford, 1956) are examples of these. Taxonomies have also 
been used to classify reflection as a cognitive skill that is in 
hierarchical relation to other cognitive skills. These classifications 
are very much response oriented evaluating the learning outcome rather 
than the process or precondition for reflection, and disregard social 
context (Bloom,et al., 1956; Jensen, 1970; Biggs and Collis, 1982). A 
metacognitive capacity is also regarded within psychology as central to 
self-reflection (Calderhead, 1989; Vygotsky, 1978; O'Loughlin and 
Campbell, 1988; Kuhn et al., 1988). Research by Entwistle and Ramsden 
(1983) suggested that individuals can adopt either a deep or surface 

approach to learning.  Rusch (1994) argues that 'metacognition is not 
only a complex word, it is a complex requirement for educators. The 
practice of metacognition moves beyond Schon's (1991) notion of 
reflective practice to a conscious and persistent reflection on the 
embedded values that govern reflective practice (p.38). 
10. The attack on 'positivism' of the Frankfurt school, and later 
through Habermas challenged the need for 'broader' definitions of 
rationality. Habermas (1972a) in Knowledge and Human Interests claimed 
that knowledge was created in communities of inquiry guided by sets of 
rules and conventions. These conventions were according to Habermas 
based on a number of interests that controlled, understood and freed 
from dogma. Whilst the first two interests, a 'technical' (as related 
to empirical-analytical sciences), and the 'hermeneutic' (as related to 
the interpretive sciences) were considered by Habermas as accepting of 
the 'objectification' of the construction of the social world, whereas 
the third, the 'critical' is applied to the object of critique itself.
11. Critical social science and critical theory are regarded 
differently here, for a further discussion see Fay, 1987, p.4-5.
12. Young (1989) suggests that Habermasian philosophy grew out of the 
concern and contradiction between creating theories free from history 
and culture (transcendental) and the historical formation of 
consciousness (the ideological character of this) (p.37). 
13. "Self reflection brings to consciousness those aspects of a process 
of formation which ideologically determine a present praxis of action 
and a worldview...Rational reconstructions, by contrast, encompass 
anonymous rule systems which can be followed by whatever subjects 
insofar as they have acquired the corresponding rule 
competencies...These legitimate forms of self-knowledge have remained 
undistinguished in the philosophical tradition under the title of 
reflection. However, a concrete criterion for distinguishing them is at 
hand. Self-reflection leads to insight through the fact that what was 
hitherto unconscious will be made practically conscious. A successful 
reconstruction also brings an 'unconscious' functioning system of rules 
in a certain way to consciousness: it makes explicit the intuitive 
knowledge which is given with rule competencies in the form of 
know-how". (Habermas, 1974, p.29)


14. Ennis later responded to challenges by adding to his list of 
proficiencies a set of "tendencies" that were also requisite for 
critical thinking. Thus Ennis suggested that there must be a tendency 
to exercise the proficiency" (1980, p.17). As a major proponent of a 
"largely general view" Ennis continues to be widely influential in 
defining critical thinking as
"reasonable reflective thinking that is focused on deciding what to 
believe or do" and elaborated in terms of a detailed set of 
dispositions or abilities (1987).
15. Victor Quinn (1994) In Defence of Critical Thinking as a Subject: 
if McPeck is wrong he is wrong, Journal of Philosophy of Education, 
28(1) pp.101-111;  presents a recent argument in defence of critical 
thinking in opposition to McPeck.
16. Paul claimed that one should abandon the idea "that critical 
thinking can be taught as a battery of technical skills which can be 
mastered more or less one-by-one without any significant attention 
being given to the problems of self-deception, background logic, and 

multi-categorical ethical issues" (1982, p.3). The aporetic dilemma 
continued then as Paul distinguishes a "weak" and "strong" sense of 
critical thinking dependent upon "a highly developed belief system 
buttressed by deep-seated uncritical, egocentric and sociocentric 
habits of thought by which he or she interprets and processes his or 
her experience" (1982, p.3). It is this belief system that endangers 
critical thinking and may lead to a "weak" sense of critical thinking 
which is "atomistic", where critical thinking is the mastery of those 
skills and techniques necessary for the avoidance of "atomic" mistakes.
17. Siegel argued that there are three distinct and highly 
generaliseable components of critical thinking; Ability (skills and 
criteria of reason assessment), the epistemology underlying critical 
thinking, and the "critical spirit" (dispositions, habits of mind, and 
character traits) (Siegel, 1991). Furthermore, Siegel regards the first 
and last components as  highly generaliseable, with the second 
component as fully generaliseable. Elliott, R.K in suggesting that 
thinking involves varying degrees of spontaneity and receptivity 
acknowledged that the contemporary tendency is "to understand the mind 
on the model of the person conceived essentially as agent. This view of 
mind regards thinking, imagining, as quite like a person's doing or 
publicly performing something of which, at every stage, he the 
monolithic person, is entirely the author" (1976, p.13). The choir 
member then is the composer, the conductor, at all times and agent in 
their performance.
18. Tara Fenwick (1994) describes the change in educational discourses 
and teacher thinking  and the ideologies that imprison understandings 
(p.1); Maxine Greene (1978) also discusses 'deformations and 
prejudices' in thinking (p.102).
19. Michael Bonnett (1995) describes the analogy of cabinet maker from 
Heidegger, M. (1954). What is called thinking? in greater detail, 
p.305. Following Heidegger's analogy of the work of the cabinet-maker 
Bonnett's depiction of aspects of thinking is valuable. The cabinet 
maker uses skills and procedures indeed, but they must begin from 
something in the wood, in the forms cloaked in its grain. The cabinet 
maker not only fastens his eyes on the "inner" grain but fixes his ears 
on the tradition listening for its voice, prepared to listen and be 
persuaded by it (Heidegger, 1954,p.14)
20. See Haynes (1991) for further discussion on the disregard for 
context in discourses defining critical thinking.


21. This rejection was directed at both the natural law ontology of 
those before him and the prescriptivism of Kantian moral philosophy. 
The role of immanent critique for Hegel was to reveal the presence of 
unexamined givens, and thus the dogmatism of knowledge within the
"taken-for-granted"(Hegel, 1975). To Hegel the source of critique was 
thus not only the object but the concept of the object. According to 
Benhabib Hegel develops the method of immanent critique in order to 
avoid the pitfalls of criteriological and foundationalist inquiries 
both in epistemology and in moral, political philosophy' (Benhabib, 
1986, p.9). 


22. For Horkheimer (1974) engaged in the Marxian-Hegelian debate it was 
also the critique of the given in the name of a utopian-normative 

standard that constituted the philosophical tradition. To follow such a 
tradition Horkheimer suggested that a critique of knowledge, presented 
as a dialectical critique of ideology, was required. This critique must 
locate all thought in its historical context and uncover its rootedness 
in human interests. Horkheimer in Eclipse of Reason describes 
philosophy as confronting "the existent, in its historical context with 
the claim of its conceptual principles, in order to criticise the 
relation between the two (ideas and reality) and thus transcend them" 
(1974, p.182.) To Horkheimer theory and history are intertwined and if 
a theory is correct, it will be evident in history. In this way the 
ideal of a free, self-determining society is not merely an "ought" but 
a possibility, an immanent, historical potential. Held (1980) discusses 
this immanent, historical, potential in Horkheimer's work within the 
context of praxis. This praxis is historical, political and 
epistemological and the Hegelian transformation of "practical 
philosophy" into a philosophy of praxis is realised in Horkheimer's 
definition of immanent critique.

23. It is here that Habermas would differ from deconstructional 
discourses. Foucault as an example would claim that it is not possible 
to go beyond power whereas Habermas espouses the conditions necessary 
to be freed from the nexus of power claims this is possible. This 
criticism of Habermasian critique is also recognised by this thesis and 
will influence the exploration definitions of power and power 
relations. Habermas would however maintain that although cognitive 
interests are the transcendental conditions of knowledge they are 
themselves naturalistically grounded.
24. Young (1989) suggests it is not enough to have an immanent 
theoretical focus, but for critique to be historically immanent it has 
to be reflected in changed lives, and ultimately changed practices and 
culture (1989, p.80).
25. Similarly John Thompson (1990) distinguishes between two "types" of 
conception of ideology, a "neutral conception of ideology" and 
"critical conceptions of ideology".
26. On the determinist thesis ideology is basic and rationality is 
relative to prior ideological commitment. But one only needs to ask 
what reason there might be for thinking that ideology is basic to 
realise that the determinist has put the ideological cart before the 
rational horse...one must take rationality, and reasons seriously in 
order to even raise the question of the possible influence of ideology 
on the evaluation of reasons...Rationality must therefore be conceived 
as autonomous from ideological constraints, and indeed providing the 
ground from which alternative ideologies can themselves be 
evaluated...rationality, not ideology, is fundamental; rationality 
transcends ideology in the sense that any worthwhile analysis of 
ideology presupposes standards of rationality and the recognition of 
the cognitive force of reasons. (Siegel, 1988, p.73) 
27. Young (1989) notes the Habermasian distinction between 
transcendental reflection and critical reflection. Young defines as a 
key to explore this criticism the linking of action to reflection. 
Whilst transcendental critique involves "reflection on and 
reconstruction of the general or universal features of human nature and 
the possibility of knowledge", critical reflection is aimed at a 
critique of ideology that could free the subject from hidden 
constraints" (Young, 1989, p.37). Young argues then that whilst 

transcendental reflection is distant, critical reflection is closely 
linked to action as it can free "those who carry it out from the 
influence of ideology on their own actions" (Young, 1989, p.37). Yet 
ideology remains and critical reflection must be its host.