To attempt to explain why I am arguing the need to reconceptualise learning I am calling on three different, separate areas of research and theorising. Those areas are critical postmodernism, particularly in relation to knowledge and meaning; constructivist ideas about learning; and neurological research in brain functioning. After briefly outlining some of the most pertinent ideas from each of these areas, I will attempt to draw together strands from each to identify key elements of how learning happens and apply it to critique some of the current orthodoxies of teaching and learning.

Critical Postmodern theorising is associated with a contestation of what is taken to be core assumptions within modernisms. Amongst these, the impartiality and objectivity of knowledge, meaning and/or truth, and the unitary identity of persons, are identified as significant areas which are open to question and re-evaluation (Yeatman, 1994). Yeatman argues that epistemological foundationalism is based on assumptions that language and knowledge stand outside, and are free of the power regimes in which they were constructed. A process that posits language and knowledge as conduits (Yeatman, 1990) or as mirrors (Yeatman, 1991; 1994) which, being singular in meaning, can be claimed to be 'objective' and universal, because such cultural elements are held to be untainted by social conditions and or personal interpretation. In challenging such assumptions, from a postmodern critical perspective, knowledges and meanings are considered to be culturally and historically situated, and saturated with previous power contests. Knowledge is therefore understood to be political, contested, and irresolvably multiple (Foucault 1980; Kenway, 1992; Martusewicz, 1992).

In this context every person is understood to be both positioned within the discursive traditions that have formed them (Yeatman, 1994) and as an individual who experiences and interprets those traditions according to their own multiple and complex positionings within different and sometimes disparate roles and relationships.

This perspective of knowledge and 'knowers' differs from a modernist, pluralist, view of knowledge as culturally relative in that it takes account of the contestation and power struggles which are integral to knowledge and meaning construction. It also differs because, in not giving higher status to particular forms of knowledge, which in the past in western society has usually been 'scientific' knowledge (Belenky, Clinchy, Goldberger & Tarule, 1986; Minnich 1990; Yeatman, 1991; 1996), it also allows space for recognising multiple forms and sources of knowledges, multiple meanings and interpretations.

One of the central tenets of the constructivist view of learning is that knowledge does not exist outside people, "there is no knowledge without a knower", [and that] "the knower personally participates in all acts of understanding" (Kincheloe, 1991, p.26). Learning therefore is a process of meaning making which is seen as an interactive relationship between a person's experiences, their existing constructs, and the information/ideas which are available to them.

Another, associated tenet of constructivism is a rejection of a realist and/or rational view of knowledge. This understanding of learning is diametrically opposed to the positivist position that 'objective' knowledge is there to be accumulated by the learner. When a constructivist argues that all knowledge and meaning are social artifacts, they are recognising that, whilst it is the individual who constructs meaning, meaning-making is never done in isolation from the social context (Bourdieu, 1971; Freire, 1970; 1985). This context is inevitably influenced by culture, language(s), politics and history. Therefore when a person learns, they construct their own knowledge and meaning(s) according to what they already know, within the social, historical, and linguistic, context(s) of their learning.

A focus of constructivism is therefore not on an 'external reality', but on how people organise and impose interpretive structures on their experiences to make meaning. The process of meaning-making is understood to be a continual process is which learners actively interpret new experiences and transform their prior knowledge. In these processes each person's system of constructs is not seen as an exact replication of external reality, but as a set of 'working hypotheses' or 'frames' which that person uses as if they were reality. Over time these mental constructs become that person's reality, as they see it (Crebbin 1995). But whilst a person's 'worldview' may frame how they see the world, such processes are understood to be rarely linear or uni-dimensional. It is considered much more likely that they are experienced as part of an 'ever-evolving, dynamic complexity' of problematic and unpredictable cycles which have no final resolution (Bawden, 1991).

Since the development of techniques which allow for non-invasive monitoring of brain functioning it has become possible to construct a much clearer understanding of how the brain functions. Currently there are two different areas of research. Possibly the most well publicised are the various forms of 'brain mapping' which produce visual images of a person's brain showing areas of increased oxygen usage and/or electrical currents as a specific task is performed. This has lead to a greater understanding of which areas of the brain are involved.

Some of the important insights from this research are that:

1. it is not only the cortex which contributes to learning and thinking. The 'lower brain' or lymbic system, particularly the thalamus and hypothalamus are significantly involved in the communication of information
2. learning and thinking does not occur in separate parts of the brain, but involves the whole of the brain, to different degrees

This knowledge that the whole of the brain, including the 'lower brain', contributes to learning is important because it makes it possible to understand how emotion, personal interpretation, and varying levels of consciousness, are involved in constructing meaning as well as memory.

Alongside that research is work being done to try to identify the neurological processes which are involved in learning, memory and consciousness. It is some of the different aspects of this work which I am finding most useful in trying to re-conceptualise what we mean by learning, and knowing. In this, there are three different areas of research which I see as contributing important information, being the electro-chemical processes involved in transmission of messages; levels of consciousness; how memory is stored and retrieved; and emotions in learning and memory.

In searching for explanations of how memory is stored through the use of neurochemistry there is now a 'plausible' explanation of the memory mechanism of brain circuitries involving physiological/chemical processes (Lynch, 1999, p.1). This research has begun to highlight the complexity and multiplicity of the learning process. For example, it has been estimated that there are approximately "100 billion neurons in the human brain and each has about 10,000 contacts with other neurons" (Department of Psychology, California State University, (DP CSU, 1999, p.1), and that at any time a neuron can be receiving thousands of messages (DP CSU, 1999). These messages are carried through the movement of chemicals known as neurotransmitters which move across the synaptic space between an axon of one neuron and a dendrite of another. At the moment there is known to be approximately 100 different varieties of neurotransmitter in the brain (DP CSU, 1999, p.3).

The contribution of these findings to my research in trying to re-define learning include the understanding that:-

1. any thought process, or 'learning experience', involves multiple sources of information including information from different sensory modes (Crick & Koch, 1990; Bergenheim, Johansson, Granlund, & Pedersen, 1996), which are processed in the thalamus and hypothalamus and are then distributed to the cortex (Kandel, 1995),
2. a signal is transformed as it passes from one part of a neuron to the next, and also as it passes through the synapses from one neuron to the next. Each message undergoes a series of analysis, re-coding and elaboration which involves both parallel processing and integrative linking (Hoyenga & Hoyenga, 1988, Kandel, 1995; Haberlandt, 1998)
3. all of these processes involve several different chemical neurotransmitters, each of which carries its own form of instructions (Schwartz, 1995),
4. at least some of these neurotransmitters carry messages of emotion, awareness, and/or intention which become inextricably linked with the information. For example:- the importance of arousal, intent, and associated with this, a sense of self, is recognised as integral components of learning, memory and thought (Penrose, 1994, p.35-36); incoming stimuli is thought to be subjected to an emotional evaluation which contributes to, but is separate from, the conscious awareness of emotion (Reiman, Lane, Ahern, Schwartz, & Davidson, 1996); and emotional arousal is considered to be critical for enhanced conscious memory (Cahill, 1999, p.1).
5. The actual processes of signal transmission and recognition within the neuro-system, and across the different message systems, are the same (Kandel, 1995). This does not vary with age, race, or gender. What does vary is the meaning which each individual makes of those signals
6. The response(s) to incoming messages depends on the person's interpretations which are influenced by their interpretation of the context, plus their expectations (Kandel & Kupfermann, 1995a).

Traditional thought about learning in classrooms seems to have been firmly based on assumptions that learning only occurs when the learner is consciously focusing on the teacher and/or the content. An example of this is the teacher requiring students to have nothing in their hands and to focus on the teacher. Another example is the 'time-on-task' research which was popular in the 1980's.

In contrast to these assumptions, neurological research has made it clear that there is a great deal of information which is processed by the brain at a sub-conscious level(s) and that we only become aware of impacting signals when they reach a certain threshold level (Kandel, 1995). Some of the most recent research in consciousness has indicated that a great deal of our emotional evaluations, information processing, and meaning-making, are interactive processes which occur at a pre-conscious or sub-conscious levels (Kihlstrom, 1996; Reiman, et.al., 1996; Schwartz, 1996). It is also now recognised that learning and interpretation can occur during what Koch (1996, p.250) refers to as "subliminal perception" and/or "learning without awareness". This kind of learning/meaning making rarely comes into consciousness as explicit knowledge These latter processes seem to be particularly sensitive to the interpretation of contextual cues and are understood to have the potential to frame and impact on subsequent learning.

At least one part of the 'lower brain' the hippocampus appears to be involved in the mapping of connections within/between events, as well as being the place where information is stored before it is re-processed and transferred to other parts of the brain to be stored as long-term memory. Time is needed for this re-processing and consolidation of memory. Information can be stored for several days before it is re-processed for storage. Therefore only information which has made a strong impact, either through powerful emotional connections, or the significance of the meaningful links which the person constructs, survives to be stored in memory. The greater the contribution of meaning, the stronger the memory trace will be. (Kupfermann & Kandel, 1995; Boitano, 1996; Haberlandt,1998).

Contrary to the previous language of memory as re-call or retrieval, there is evidence from research in neuropsychology which indicates that memories are not stored intact in any one part of the brain to be retrieved, but are stored in distributed, but specific, areas which are connected through linking networks. In recall the information/knowledge is re-constructed through complex re-activation and re-connection processes (Freeman, 1995). But this does not mean that each retrieval requires exactly the same processes as the initial experience. It seems that repeated similar events, or even some single events, can establish links, or pathways, which may be characterised by changes in the protein structure of the synapses (Flanagan, 1996), a process associated with increased synaptic strength which lasts indefinitely (Lynch, 1999). The strength of the memory trace being dependent on the degree of elaboration and the complexity of the meaning network (Haberlandt, 1998).

By linking these ideas with the previously mentioned understandings of neurotransmission of messages being multiple rather than singular, it seems that the processes of memory re-activation and re-connection potentially brings together all of the different forms of information, including sensual and emotional, plus the interpretations and meaning(s) which were part of the previous experience(s). This supports a notion of memory being made up of multiple rather than singular messages which have been 'bound together' across networks, in some way (Crick & Koch, 1990). In some of the research on how memories are retrieved as a re-construction of meaning(s), the centrality of the self, as the constructor and corrector of meaning(s) (Conrad, 1996), and/or the impact of the emotions in the experience(s), is acknowledged (Penrose, 1994; Reinman, et.al. 1996; Cahill, 1999).

There is no such thing as a behaviour or thought which is not impacted on in some way by emotions. The prefrontal cortex which is involved in cognitive functioning is not directly connected to any of the sensory systems. And even the simplest purposeful behaviour requires several kinds of sensory information to be integrated. Which means that all of the messages must be linked together and/or re-directed (Jessell, 1995; Kandel & Kupfermann, 1995b). In the process these messages are inevitably linked with information about the person's emotional state, intentions and expectations.

There are no neurotransmitters for 'objectivity' but even in the simplest response to information signals are linked with possibly several 'emotional' neurotransmitters such as epinephrine, dopamine, and serotonin (Haberlandt, 1998). Therefore, because the neurotransmitters which carry messages of emotion are integrally linked with the information during both the initial processing, along with the linking of information from the different senses (probably initially in the thalamus and hypothalamus), and again in the re-processing and re-call, it becomes clear that there is no thought, memory, or knowledge which is 'objective', or 'detached' from the personal experience of knowing.

To challenge such traditional, 'scientific' assumptions even more strongly, the evidence that a great deal of this processing occurs at a pre-conscious or sub-conscious level suggests that the learner/knower is not conscious of these embedded messages and therefore cannot access them in an explicit way. For example, a person who has had a negative experience in a particular context (subject area; sporting activity; particular environment; particular person) may know that they are reluctant - feel anxiety - to re-enter that context, but not know why. Such a reaction is therefore not logical or rational, but is never-the-less an integral part of the meaning for that person.

In drawing ideas from, and making links between, these three different separate areas of research and theorising, I have identified a number of what I see as key elements which are probably different from most previous understandings of academic learning. I believe these elements need to be given consideration in furthering and changing our understandings of how learning happens. The four most obvious elements are:-

1. the significance of each individual's personal meaning(s). It is the learner who is the person who constructs meaning from an experience, and who has choices about the interpretations which they make.
2. that we need to recognise the potential of multiple meanings and interpretations, both at a social/cultural level, and at the level of each individual
3. that learning is not a single process but occurs across time, through a complex construction of experiences and information, which are inter-linked through a neural network of chemically constructed messages
4. learning is inherently connected to emotion. An individual's meaning making is impacted upon by their pre-conscious, or sub-conscious, perceptions and emotional evaluations of information, these include their responses to contextual clues which have the potential to elicit previously established constructs, plus expectations or mind-sets that they have developed through their cultural and personal experiences. Frequently these tacit forms of knowledge influence meaning making in ways which the individual is unaware of.

Each person's experiences and understandings about learning and knowledge, and of themselves as a learner, in that context, has a very strong impact on how they approach their academic learning.

This is not a new idea. During the last two decades there has been a great deal of research, particularly in higher education, focusing on how students go about learning. One substantial area of research has focused on student characteristics, their learning approaches and expectations, and the impact which that has on how they deal with new information (Entwistle & Waterson, 1988; Ramsden, 1988; 1992; Trigwell & Prosser, 1991; Eley, 1993; Marton, Dall'Alba & Beaty, 1993; Weinstein & Meyer, 1991; 1994). And although several of these authors have approached their research from different perspectives, or used a range of different words to describe what they mean by effective learning, there is some consensus that students bring a range of different expectations and approaches which impact on the effectiveness (depth) of their learning. According to Marton, et.al. (1993) and Akerlind & Jenkins (1998) an important dividing line between these learning approaches is based on underlying assumptions about knowledge. For example:- a view of knowledge as given or transferred between teacher and learner is consistent with passive learning approaches of receiving and absorbing information, whilst a view of learning as understanding or making meaning is linked with active learning approaches.

A slightly different interpretation is offered by Ramsden (1992) who agreed that students include information about the context and the subject, about self-as-learner-in-this-subject, and about task demands, into the interpretation. But he also included knowledge of different learning approaches, arguing that those students who had access to a range of different ways of approaching a task (superficial Ý deep), choose the approach which they consider most appropriate for the needs of the task.

Despite the fact that these 'theories' acknowledge the importance of students' expectations and assumptions about learning, knowledge and self-as-learner, and recognise the student-as-interpreter-and-decision-maker, they do so in a way which suggest to me either, that these decisions are rational and logical; or that they follow some inevitable sequence. What seems to be missing from all of these studies is a recognition that learning is a 'personal', emotionally embedded process in which networks of un-conscious and sub-conscious tacit knowledges have the potential to impact on the multiple ways in which the students interpret information without any conscious awareness.

Some of the challenges which I will briefly mention here are related to assumptions about knowledge, and the kinds of knowledges which are given priority in 'educational settings'. Other challenges are to current views about the importance of conscious learning, and about memory and remembering.

Many of the current studies of learning and teaching suggest that it is the students' interpretations and/or the teaching approaches which need to be changed, not the ways in which academic learning are constituted, the kinds of knowledges which are taught and valued, or to challenge the assumed superiority of 'scientific' knowledge and ways of knowing. As Saljo, (1997, pp. 104-5) put it, the concept of knowledge as static is not (only) a 'school' problem but part of the dominant western culture of 'knowledge as absolute'. On this basis, he suggested, a surface approach is obviously a rational response to the way schools function. To challenge knowledge at this level is to critique 'modernist' 'scientific' notions of knowledge on which a great deal of our teaching, learning and assessment are based. Because if we understand that all learning, and all knowledge is personally, and emotionally biased, then it cannot be objective, rational, or singular in meaning. Instead we need to consider the originator(s) intentions and the cultural and social meanings of the context in which the 'knowledge' was produced, as well as the individual student's emotions and emotional reactions, expectations and prior assumptions, as necessarily integral to 'knowledge' and learning.

A different kind of challenge to current approaches to teaching come from ideas about memory and remembering. The view of learning as a kind of procession from short-term-memory, to long-term-memory, to recall, has had a strong impact on teaching for a considerable period of time. This view is now being challenged in a number of ways. Firstly, the notion that memories are kept intact and/or in one place is challenged by the evidence that remembering is actually a process of re-construction of the experience through a complex network. Secondly, the evidence that it may take days between an initial experience and the consolidation of memory into neural pathways or networks, means that (a) that only a very small proportion of learning/experiences are constructed as memories; and (b) students need time to unconsciously re-visit pre-processed information in order to categorise it in some way.

This latter point is also part of the challenge to current views of learning as only occurring when students are focused, and consciously concentrating on the information (and/or the teacher). Because, it seems, the memory construction process is rarely brought to conscious awareness (except perhaps in dreams). In addition, the evidence of substantial 'learning' occurring at pre-conscious or sub-conscious levels, supports alternative explanations about how students learn the 'hidden curriculum', as well as different understandings of 'effective learning'.

Despite years of giving some kind of acknowledgment to the need to 'start from the student's understandings' this is frequently done poorly, not because teachers don't try, but because much of the information which is taught is not accessible to students in ways which are personally meaningful. We, as teachers are sometimes complicit in this because we do not question the kind of information to be learned and/or the student's relationships with the information being taught.

It would seem that a great deal of what is 'taught' is not 'learned' because it is not re-processed and/or consolidated into memory. If the learning experience(s) are not sufficiently dynamic for the re-processing to occur, then there will be no memory network laid down. Alternatively, whilst many teaching approaches emphasis practice and re-visiting of previously 'learned' material, if it is not done in ways which enable a student to both connect to, and build on, that prior learning then it could be interpreted as separate sets of information.

Finally, the personal meaning which students construct around any learning experience includes not only the information and the context, but the purpose, as understood by the student. Which means that any kind of learning for which students don't see a real purpose outside of classrooms and exams will be stored (if it is stored) in ways which inextricably link it to that set of contexts.

The danger of understanding learning more clearly is that, as we know more about learning, teachers may become more adept at manipulation of the learners and/or the context. Or even worse, we may find ourselves attempting to police and/or control the 'selves' of others.

The evidence suggests that learning is considerably more complex and personal that we have suspected and hopefully will always be immune to such invasions.

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